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Preface 
Tests are constructed and used to facilitate assessment and understanding of 
human beings in all their multifaceted complexity. Hence, testing by its very 
nature is both a scientific and a social endeavor. 
The interplay between testing and society has resulted in both praise and 
criticism from concerned citi zens, psychologists, educators, and numerous other 
professional and consumer groups. For over 40 years, Oscar K. Buros, as Direc-
tor of The Institute of Mental Measurements and Editor of the Mental Measure-
ments Yearbooks. contributed immensely to this interplay between testing prac-
tices and societal issues. On March 19, 1978, Oscar Buros died. Luella Buros , 
his wife and lifelong helpmate, completed the work on The Eighth Mental 
Measurements Yearbook with the support of the Institute's devoted staff. She 
also took steps to relocate the Institute to ensure the continuation of the Institute's 
scholarly work and services for test consumers. The new Buros Institute of 
Mental Measurements is now at the University of Nebraska- Lincoln and is under 
grant from The University of Nebraska Foundation . 
An important objective of the new Buros Institute is to conduct an extended 
outreach effort that will help communicate more effectively with test users about 
contemporary issues in testing . Thus, it was the combination of recent social 
issues focusing on testing and our desire to fulfill more vigorously the mission of 
the Buros Institute that motivated the development of an annual scholarly sym-
posium and this series on measurement and testing. 
We intend each symp.osium and volume in this series to present state-of-the-
art knowledge that will contribute to the improvement of test construction and 
test usage. Such a schema will incorporate topics across a broad spectrum such 
as theoretical models of human behavior, test standardization procedures, soc ial 
and legal factors in testing, admin istration of testing programs , and test-based 
decision making. Thus, the series will be focused thematically and yet be flexible 
enough to integrate current and future measurement and testing issues into its 
schema. 
The success of our first Buros- Nebraska symposium and this volume is the 
result of the efforts of many individuals. We thank Luella Buros for having faith 
in us to carryon and extend a tradition that has become so important to the 
measurement field and to test users. Barbara Plake , as editor of the first volume 
in the series, made conceptual and editorial contributions that were of critical 
importance to its success. Finally, we want to thank Larry Erlbaum for his 
support , encouragement, and commitment to the project and to its timely 
completion. 
Series Editors 
Stephen N . Elliott 
James V. Mitchell, Jr. 
Lincoln , Nebraska 
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Dedication 
At the combined annual meeting of the American Educational Research Associa-
tion and the National Council on Measurement in Education in April of 1980, 
Luella Buros, widow of Oscar Buros, was presented with a plaque honoring the 
achievements of her husband. The inscription read as follows: 
"TRIBUTE" 
"Whereas Oscar K. Buros established the series of Mental Measurements 
Yearbooks, and continued publishing these brilliantly over the last 40 years of 
his life; and 
"Whereas these yearbooks have achieved recognition as classic contributions 
to the theory and practice of educational and psychological measurement, and of 
great benefit to our various professions-
"Therefore, we the undersigned officers of the American Educational Re-
search Association and the National Council on Measurement in Education do 
hereby pay public tribute to the memory of Professor Buros, and to the high 
principles of quality and integrity which he represented in his work and in his 
life. " 
It was most fitting that Luella Buros received this tribute on behalf of her 
husband, because she had helped him in many ways from the very beginning of 
the series, particularly with matters pertaining to business and design . Oscar 
Buros had dedicated the Third and Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbooks to 
his wife, and when she completed The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook 
after his death, she dedicated it "To the memory of my beloved husband: Oscar 
Krisen Buros." The new Buros Institute of Mental Measurements will be dedi-
cating both Tests in Print III and The Ninth Mental Measurements Yearbook to 
Oscar Buros. For the first book in this symposium series, however, we decided 
to take a different path and dedicate the volume to a remarkable couple who had a 
loving, happy, and productive relationship over so many years. We therefore 
dedicate this volume to: 
Oscar and Luella Buros 

Filling the Gaps Between Test 
Outcomes and Usage: An 
Introduction 
Barbara S. Plake 
University of Nebraska- Lincoln 
Why do we have tests? What useful purposes do they serve? How can test results 
be used to make decisions? How can a test be proved to provide accurate and 
usable information? Questions such as these have been posed recently by a 
concerned public who have become more aware of and concerned about testing, 
test quality, and appropriate test usage. Their questions are challenging, legiti-
mate queries that can and should be addressed by members of the measurement 
community . 
Some of the questions being asked by the public are value laden, providing 
topics for many thoughtful but heated debates. For example: Would we be better 
off as a soc iety if we did not have tests? Should testing be banned? Other 
questions are technical in nature and require accurate answers from the measure-
ment community, which communicates to the public the present state of the art in 
measurement, assessment, and interpretation . Finally, questions such as "How 
can tests be used to eliminate the errors made in the selection process?" can 
provide an impetus within the measurement field for both theoretical and empiri-
cal development and yet are not ones that can, at least so far , be definitely 
answered . 
The measurement field should take serious stock of itself and assess, as well 
as possible , the boundaries of its capabi lities. From this assessment, it would be 
possible to communicate with the public about what testing can do , may be able 
to do, and is incapable of ever doing. At the present time , however, there 
appears to be an informational and expectational gap concerning what can be 
possible with the use of test results . Unless measurement experts and test users 
obtain a direct line to the angels, for example , error-free measurement will never 
be a reali ty ! 
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Part of the communication and expectation gap can be assigned to a lack of 
measurement sophistication on the part of the public. Measurement course work 
and classes are not readily accessible to the public as a whole and may not be 
truly meaningful and usable to the public even if they were . A well-meaning but 
confused public provides fertile ground for test misunderstanding and misrepre-
sentation by both knowledgeable and unknowledgeable test representatives. 
Tests enter into the lives of the public in so many ways; questionnaires, market 
surveys, school achievement batteries, classroom exams, and admission screen-
ings are only a few possibilities. Yet the knowledge level of the public is minimal 
at best with regard to test information and interpretation. 
Another part of the blame for the communication and expectation gap belongs 
to the measurement and testing professionals. Careful theoreticians are the first 
to caution on too rapid application oftest advances into test usage and decisions. 
The state of the art is not as advanced in criterion-referenced testing or latent-trait 
modeling as some practitioners would want the public to believe. In addition, we 
are only now beginning to come to grips with decision-making models for test 
usage. Thus, a clear and purposeful statement (for public consumption) of what 
tests can and cannot do needs to be addressed by measurement and testing 
professionals. This would be an important first step in narrowing the gap . 
Until such a statement is made, societal confusion and concern will abound. 
Confusion is fostered by the fact that decisions about test quality, application, 
and utility are made regularly by persons who are not trained as psychometri-
cians . Legislative and legal decisions by politicians and judges who mandate and 
dictate test usage and disclosure only serve to widen the communication and 
expectation gap further. 
PURPOSE OF THE VOLUME 
The purpose of this volume is to investigate social and technical influences on 
test development and usage. As such, the volume can be viewed as making initial 
progress toward identifying what testing can and cannot do . This is accomplished 
first by establishing what some of the social influences are that impact tests and 
second by documenting some current technical aspects of testing. The volume 
provides essential preliminary information on how tests can be used and may be 
interpreted. 
The intent of the volume is to present state-of-the-art content on: (1) charac-
teristics that tests should have to be valid for use in decision making; (2) public 
awareness and social- legal issues that influence the credibility of tests that are 
used in decision making; (3) applications of tests in the decision-making process; 
(4) cognitive psychology's impact on test development and vice versa; (5) quality 
issues of test development, packaging, sales, and usage; and (6) technical ad-
vances in test validation . These components are found in the five chapters of 
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Section I: Social and Technical Influences. Section II: Influences on Aptitude and 
Achievement Test Development and Usage is composed of three chapters that 
provide an integrated example of how social and technical issues have affected 
the development and usage of aptitude and achievement tests . 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
Section I 
Section I begins with the keynote presentation, "Struggles and Possibilities: The 
Use of Tests in Decision Making" from the first Buros-Nebraska Symposium on 
Measurement and Testing, and is authored by Dr. Ellis B. Page. Breaking from 
the style found in the other chapters in the volume, Dr. Page's chapter is essen-
tially a transcription of his symposium presentation because it was the keynote 
presentation for the symposium and therefore set the stage for the subsequent 
chapters within the section. 
Dr. Page brings to focus a series of concerns that are relevant to the topic of 
uses of tests in a decision-making process. He chooses this forum to emphasize 
the social as well as technical issues in using tests for decision making. Dr. Page 
reviews factors that often influence perceptions of test quality, such as attacks on 
testing by the media , decisions with regard to test usage made by the courts, and 
concerns for test fairness and bias. Perception of test quality is identified as a 
fundamental factor in the use of tests for decision making. Unless tests are 
considered to provide valid, reliable, and reasonable pieces of information, he 
surmises, their role in making decisions will be subject to controversy and 
question . The chapter proceeds from a discussion of ways of establishing test 
quality and the reasons attitudes about the quality of tests may be threatened to a 
presentation of theoretical foundations for applying test results in the decision-
making process . Page's chapter therefore approaches the use of tests in decision 
making on two levels: initially, it must be demonstrated that the tests in question 
are in fact appropriate for use in a decision; second, a decision-making process 
should be employed to determine how the information provided by the test can be 
applied rationally to aid in making decisions . 
Dr. Robert Sternberg presents an account of contributions of cognitive psy-
chology to test development and usage in the following chapter titled " What 
Cognitive Psychology Can (and Cannot) Do for Test Development." He con-
tends that cognitive psychology stands to make substantial contributions to test 
development, although most of the contributions will be in the future. Sternberg 
discusses four topics: (I) what cognitive psychology is; (2) how cognitive psy-
chologists study intelligence; (3) implications of cognitive psychological re-
search for test validation ; and (4) score interpretation and modification . Testing 
is presented in a reciprocal fashion whereby tests are used as assessment tools in 
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cognitive psychological research, the results of which can suggest modifications 
to test development and usage . 
The next chapter presents fundamental and valuable information on the role 
and status of test validation research. In this chapter, Dr. Lyle Schoenfe ldt 
reviews the hi story of test validation strateg ies, identi fying methods of establish-
ing test content , criterion-related , and construct validity . New advances in crite-
rion-related validity , such as multivariate validation approaches, are presented 
and evaluated. In addi tion, validity generali zation and Bayesian statistical ap-
proaches are discussed. The chapter presents recent advances and applications of 
test validation theory and research to the fie ld of business (e .g., applicant selec-
tion and job satisfaction) . Test validation is presented as an essenti al and legally 
necessary step in test usage. Some important and timely ramifications of not 
using tests with demonstrated validity are also discussed . Because the use of test 
results is only reasonable if the test is valid , this chapter presents the foundations 
upon which test usage relies. 
"Social and Legal Influences on Test Development and Usage" is the title of 
the following chapter. After Schoenfeldt' s presentation of legal ramifications of 
inadequate test validation, Dr. Donald N. Bersoff posits three social influences 
that he regards as underl ying all legal dec isions pertaining to tests . These social 
influences are: (I) attempts to undo past injustices due to discrimination; (2) 
recognition of the public of their rights to privacy; and (3) negligence and lack of 
care by persons in positions to make dec isions. Application of these social 
influences are illustrated in the fi elds of education, employment , and forensics . 
Bersoff continues his chapter with some examples of how social sc ience research 
has and could be used to aid in court decisions on testing. He relates the impact 
of social influences and social science research to decisions in the cases of Larry 
P v. Riles, PASE v. Hannon, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , and Merriken v. 
Cressman. The chapter concludes with a section on psychologists and public 
policy. Bersoff places the ultimate dec ision of test usage in the court 's hands, 
recognizing that the court 's decision will be influenced by the social and legal 
climate, which should be influenced further by test quality (validation) and 
expert psychometric testimony . He points out the final decision , however, is 
made by the judges, who are not generally psychometrically oriented . 
Section I is concluded with a chapter from the Director of the Buros Institute 
of Mental Measurements, James V. Mitchell , Jr. , which is titled , "Testing and 
the Oscar Buros Lament: From Knowledge to Implementation to Use." Dr. 
Mitchell reviews the progress made in test development , using information accu-
mulated from research and theoretical developments in testing knowledge. He 
reports that ev idence of the status of test quality , as found in administration or 
technical manuals for tes ts, is often inadequate, and he contends test publishers 
are rewarded financiall y for test development by consumers who are, on the 
whole, psychometricall y naive . If test sales are used as the guide, it appears that 
test users are, as a group , influenced by Madison-Avenue- type adverti sing and 
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tests' promises and titles, and they are not functioning as informed consumers. 
The responsibility for naive behavior of test consumers is traced to education and 
communication failures of professionals in the fields of testing and measurement. 
Dr. Mitchell concludes his chapter with specific recommendations that he be-
lieves will upgrade the education level of the consumers of tests that in turn will 
result in requiring test developers to upgrade the quality of their test documenta-
tion and development. 
The perceptions of tests, especially as they are influenced by attacks on tests 
by persons in the media or courts who are in positions to make recommendations 
or decisions without adequate psychometric training, is one central theme that 
recurs in the chapters of Section 1. The "call to action," issued by Mitchell, is 
reverberated in all the chapters of the first section. Improvement of test construc-
tion and test usage, viewed from utilization, theoretical support for and from 
cognitive psychology, test validation, legal and social influences, or quality 
control, require communication channels to the ultimate users of test results- the 
public. 
Section II 
Section II contains three chapters that originally were presented in the 1982 
American Psychological Association's State of the Art Symposium . The sym-
posium was organized by Dr. Carol Dwyer and focused on testing issues. The 
first chapter in Section II is authored by Dr. Anne Anastasi and is titled" Apti-
tude and Achievement Tests: The Curious Case of the Indestructible Strawper-
son ." Dr. Anastasi initially reviews the traditional distinctions between aptitude 
and achievement testing, specifying that aptitude testing has been conceived as 
measuring "innate capacity" independent of learning, whereas achievement 
testing presumably assesses the effects of learning. The historical antecedents of 
this view are traced from Franzen's (1920, 1922) description of AQ (achieve-
ment quotient), the components of which were identified as EQ (educational 
quotient) and IQ (intelligence quotient). Dr. Anastasi then recounts efforts of 
psychometricians to disband the AQ terminology, beginning with Kelley (1927), 
noting that investigators repeatedly have reported extensive overlap of informa-
tion obtained from these two types of tests . Yet despite the attempts by psycho-
metricians to establish simi larity between aptitude and achievement tests, the 
distinction reappears continually in presentations and writings of psychologists 
and psychometricians. Progress is being made though, as test companies recog-
nize and communicate to the consumers that the distinction between aptitude and 
achievement tests is essentially one of breadth versus specificity of test content 
and antecedent learning experience. The conclusion of her chapter contains a 
more detailed analysis of the continuum of developed abilities, a continuum on 
which she places both aptitude and achievement tests. Thus, the major thrust of 
Dr. Anastasi's chapter is that psychologists and measurement experts have been 
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making steady progress in clarifying what aptitude and achievement tests mea-
sure; yet communication of this knowledge to test users, test takers, and the 
general public remains a problem. 
Current issues in achievement testing is the topic of Dr. Robert Ebel' s chap-
ter , "Achievement Test Items: Current Issues." Dr. Ebel focuses his attention 
on the measurement of human characteristics and initially addresses the funda-
mental topic of the measurability of human characteristics. Within the domain of 
measuring human characteristics, Dr. Ebel considers the relative merits of vari-
ous types of test items, such as: (1) essay and objective items ; (2) realistic 
problem-solving items; and (3) alternate-choice items . Ebel concludes his chap-
ter with a discussion of a technology of item writing. The major theme appears to 
be that any important human characteristic is necessarily measurable, and test 
items that focus on the basic components of knowledge are examples of an item-
writing technology that has promise to yield highly reliable and valid assess-
ments of human characteristics. 
The final chapter in Section II , "Abilities and Knowledge in Educational 
Achievement Testing: The Assessment of Dynamic Cognitive Structures," is 
authored by Dr. Samuel Messick . The chapter begins by examining the question 
of what educational achievement tests are or ought to be. Both educational 
achievement and cognitive ability are viewed as constructs. The distinction be-
tween theoretical definitions and practical reality of assessment instruments is a 
major theme. Messick posits that educational achievement is a compound of 
developed abilities and knowledge structures. He then contrasts his view of what 
educational achievement tests are with that presented by Ebel, Anastasi , and 
others. Messick's conclusion is that theory, not empiricism, should guide the 
conceptualization and process of test development. He maintains that, to serve 
both theory and practice, new approaches to achievement measurement that are 
complex, dynamic , and cognitive need to be developed. 
Each author in Section II conceptualizes aptitUde and achievement testing 
differently. Anastasi elects to present aptitude and achievement testing on a 
single continuum, the distinction between them being one of specificity of a task 
and antecedents to the task. Ebel, on the other hand, considers aptitUde as a 
special case of achievement and vice versa, establishing that intelligence, apti-
tudes , abilities, and achievements are synonymous. Messick believes the con-
ceptual distinction between aptitude and achievement tests is flawed due to a 
reliance on empirical results obtained from using imperfect and variously con-
taminated tests . Thus, he discards the approach taken by Ebel, Anastasi, and 
others . His implication is that new approaches to appropriate measurement of 
aptitudes and achievement, which should be dynamic , cognitive, and complex, 
will enable a better assessment of what role cognitive abilities play or ought to 
play in educational achievement testing. 
In summary, the authors in Section II focus on aptitude and achievement 
testing and debate social and technical issues pertaining to their application, 
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meaning, and usage. Dr. Anastasi points out that , despite attempts by psycho-
metricians to defeat the distinctions popularly held by the public about aptitude 
and achievement tests, the "strawperson" remains indestructible and hence is an 
excellent example of social influence on test interpretation and usage. Technical 
issues that influence test construction and usage are central to Ebel' s and Mes-
sick 's chapters, with Ebel postulating the existence of an item-writing technol-
ogy and Messick imploring test developers to use a theoretical , not empirical , 
basis for test construction . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The assessment of human abilities and qualities by tests has become an integral 
part of decision making in modern society. Nearly everyone has taken or will 
take a test that has the potential to influence his or her life significantly . The 
public is becoming more aware of and concerned about testing, test quality , and 
appropriate test usage. Testing and measurement cannot be treated in isolation. 
They are not immune from criticisms and influences from the very people their 
work affects most-society . To survive and thrive, measurement and testing 
must continue to develop through both improved technology and interactions 
with society. 
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SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL 
INFLUENCES 

Struggles and Possibilities: 
The Use of Tests in Decision 
Making 
Ellis Batten Page 
Duke University 
What a happy occasion it is to celebrate, as we do in this volume , the establish-
ment of a national Buros Institute of Mental Measurements, located on the 
campus of the University of Nebraska, in Lincoln . What a culmination of many 
plans, hopes, and dreams! On such an occasion, we can take a quiet pride in our 
profession and in the life and accomplishments of one of our colleagues and 
friends, Oscar Krisen Buros, who with Luella Buros is leaving to us, and our 
posterity , an institution of integrity to foster the science and practice of testing. 
How new all this field really is: According to Stanley and Hopkins (1972, p. 
163), the first large-scale testing was done in the City of New York Survey, in 
1911 . Oscar Buros was 6 years old then , so we can think of most of the 
astonishing developments in measurement really happening during his lifetime. 
And the first machine for scoring of answer sheets, the old IBM 805, was 
developed when Oscar was 30. Many of us can remember, only 20 years ago, 
many clerical workers reading the dials from these machines and writing the 
scores as they might be estimated from this analog device. Then these tools also 
became obsolete as the field was overtaken by optical readers and computer 
scoring. So Oscar and Luella Buros have witnessed the explosion of testing into a 
central institution of education, of psychology, of all the social and behavioral 
sciences. But they have done much more than witness: Their publications have 
served as a steady center of this growth, and their independence has established a 
tradition of reputation and honor as a goal, if not always as a realization , of the 
profession and the practice of testing . 
The establishment of such published symposia from the Buros Institute is an 
important further step. There is a major place for such a forum. I hope these 
symposia will represent a determined effort to stand apart from the testing giants, 
11 
12 PAGE 
just as Buros did, and to remain independent of federal agencies as well. The 
Institute, and these symposia , should continue to sponsor solid , sometimes se-
vere criticism of tests and test practices, also as Buros did. They should similarly 
stand apart from the political huckstering and trend riding, the cheap shots 
against testing, and apart from the constant distortion of what tests tell us about 
ourselves and our world. 
Of course, the Institute should make full modern use of wordprocess ing, 
automatic mailing, information retrieval, and all the present and future efficien-
cies of operation becoming available. But hopefully there will remain these 
steady principles that marked Buros' work, and a similar vision of mental mea-
surement , of how it can help our society to be happier and more productive. 
At such a historic time, it is a pleasure to remember the classic words of E. L. 
Thorndike (1918 , p. 16) , which serve as a kind of cornerstone for our whole 
professional and scientific development: 
Whatever ex ists at all ex ists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves 
knowing its quantity as well as its quality. Education is concerned with changes in 
human beings; a change is a difference between two conditions; each of these 
condit ions is known to us only by the products produced by it- things made, words 
spoken, acts performed, and the like. To measure any of these products means to 
define its amount in some way so that competent persons will know how large it is, 
better than they would without measurement. To measure a product well means so 
to define its amount that competent persons will know how large it is with some 
precision , and this knowledge will be conveniently recorded and used. 
If we have, for our profess ion, an Apostle's Creed, surely Thorndike has here 
given it to us. And the last phrase echoes for us: "so that this knowledge will be 
conveniently recorded and used." And used. Aye, there's the rub and the thrust 
of the testing movement. It is the use of testing that has caused its growth from 
academic curiosity to a billion-dollar industry and that makes it a battle ground 
today for conflictiong ideologies and the warring of powerful political alliances. 
In my opinion, technical people in testing cannot go on sidestepping these major 
battles. Sooner or later, we should recognize publicly what it is that we believe; 
we should state our beliefs openly for both colleagues and society; and we should 
counterattack the falsehoods about testing. 
Who are these enemies? For one example, let us mention the recent storm of 
anti testing sentiment surrounding the publication of Gould's (198 1) book , The 
Mismeasure of Man. This book follows in the tradition of Leon Kamin's (1973) 
The Science and Politics of I. Q., the writing of the consumerists Nader and Nairn 
and of Lewontin , Layzer, and others. Once again, the major media have rushed 
to approve the new book by Gould and to endorse its claims. A recent New 
Yorker has an extended piece by one of their science popularizers, in which most 
test experts are implicitly denigrated and the founders of our disc ipline are 
derided and smeared . There are many echoes of these sentiments. 
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The major media of the Northeastern Seaboard are, of course, considerably 
more antitesting than is the American mainstream. What of the more conserva-
tive press? Although it is part of the conservative tradition to recognize and to 
accommodate large individual di fferences , the better-known conservative writers 
seem daunted by the name-calling and by the technical difficulty of the argu-
ments. Both sides are handicapped by the recondite nature of many of the core 
proofs of testing. As Garrett Hardin recently commented during a visit at Duke, 
most opin ion leaders and shapers who control our media, of whatever leaning, 
are highly literate but are " innumerate." Left or ri ght, journalists fail to grasp 
our technicalities . They believe that our hard-won principles (the best body of 
theory in the social sc iences) are purely a matter of opinion! 
Then what about the " numerate" scienti sts concerned with tests? Those who 
do speak out often suffer for it and are frustrated again and again by the major 
media. Consider, the experiences of one of our most productive and di stinguished 
defenders of psychometri cs, Arthur R . Jensen of Berkeley. Those who know him 
well can recount some of hi s harassment and defamation, which, by the way, is 
still going on. And Richard Herrnstein (1982) of Harvard has written a critique, 
much of it from his own unhappy treatment , about his efforts to be expressed 
properly in the major media. His forum is the Atlantic Monthly, an intellectual 
magazine that is highly respected and of general readership but that commands 
none of the publicity clout of CBS or of the New York Times and their multi-
million audiences . Some of Herrnstein ' s ( 1982) accusation is worth reproducing 
here: 
Incurably addicted to quantification, I have now searched the daily and the Sunday 
New York Tim es from 1975 to November 198 1 for all book reviews dealing with the 
IQ. The results speak for themselves. Of the 15 reviews that I found, everyone' 
denigrated IQ tests , often vitriolicall y. All but two of the books reviewed were ant i-
testing, as far as one can te ll fro m the reviews, and were praised for their position . 
One exception was a book by Arthur Jensen lI 980] , which happened also to be the 
only book by a trained psychometrician (psychometrics is the psychological spe-
cialty concerned with testing). Jensen 's book was panned by a philosopher with no 
detectable expert ise in the subject. 
Except for Jensen's book, none of the other major works on testing written by 
profess ionals during the period was reviewed. Most remarkabl y, however, the 
Times published no review by a trained profess ional. Dozens of literate psycho-
metricians might have commented on the shallowness of the books the Times 
usuall y chooses to re~"iew . But psychometrics is forbidden territory in the Times-
its books are mostly unreviewed , its discoveries are unreported, and its experts are , 
from what gets published , unconsulted. Rarely, if ever, in more than a decade , has 
a spec ialist published a review of a book on testing in the Times, [or in] other 
national publications that occasionally comment on testing. For no other subject of 
public concern- not for economic policy, disarmament, welfare reform, nuclear 
power plants- has the professional outlook on a controversy been so shut off fro m 
a voice in the national press. Yet , while public policy on testing may not have the 
immediacy of a tax cut or a nuclear accident , it ul timately affects everyone lp . 69] . 
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A DOUBLE STANDARD 
Herrnstein's (1982) article is a good one, revealing for all concerned with testing 
and education. Its principal burden is the double standard of treatment of two 
cases of apparent malfeasance by testing researchers: One of these cases is 
known widely even to college students; the other is a nonevent, conveniently 
buried from public awareness . The first, so widely known, concerns the probable 
falsification of certain twin data by the late, brilliant Sir Cyri l Burt. Herrnstein 
counted at least six stories about this apparent misconduct in the New York Times 
alone. However, as repeatedly noted by scholars of behavior genetics, nothing in 
Burt's estimates was very deviant from what has been found by other researchers 
since his reports. Burt's data are, in short, now redundant, and if he did fabricate 
some of his numbers, he "apparently knew enough to guess correctly" (Herrn-
stein, 1982, p. 70). But the attacks on him persist, endlessly, and are made 
central to denigrating not only behavior genetics but our entire field of mental 
measurement. 
The other story will probably be new to many readers and will surely be new 
to most nonspecialists. In J ul y 1981, Dr. Rick Heber, Director of the Waisman 
Center of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and chief adviser to a U.S. 
president on mental retardation, was convicted in federal court of diverting funds 
to personal use and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. Heber, it will be remem-
bered, was principal investigator of the much publicized miracle of the environ-
mentalist movement, the "Milwaukee Project." He had proved, he wrote, that it 
was possible to take 20 children of retarded parents and depressed homes and to 
raise their true IQs an average of over 30 points, from dull normal to superior in 
intelligence, by a massive preschool intervention. 
What of his results themselves and their claim to scientific seriousness? Eight 
years before that trial , an article was published for fellow researchers (Page, 
1972b), arguing that the Milwaukee Project was, for a number of technical 
reasons, not scientifically credible. And just before Heber's indictment, another 
article (Page & Grandon, 1981) carried an intensive criticism of the Project. In 
brief, we found that the Project, which had never been truly refereed , was 
extremely shaky, and the 'explanations of it shifted in ways quite unacceptable in 
scientific reporting . What evidence was avai lable on follow-up data, moreover , 
suggested that there was no residual difference between the treatment and control I 
groups on measures , such as school reading tests, which were outside the reach 
of Project management. The 30 points gain, if it ever existed, had apparently 
disappeared. 
The point here, however, is not to resurrect the Milwaukee Miracle to slay it 
again but to draw attention to the way that psychometric questions are treated in 
the media. The earlier "findings" of the Milwaukee Project had been widely 
noted in the national media. The Washington Post believed that it might have 
"settled once and for all" (sic) the question of heredity versus environment for 
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the intelligence of slum children. The New York Times had reported that the 
Project "has proved" that IQs could be raised more than 30 points by the 
methods of Heber and his associates (these quotes cited by Herrnstein , 1982). 
Wouldn't one suppose, therefore, that the disgrace of the Project leadership 
deserved some attention? After all, the Milwaukee work had been unique and 
widely acclaimed in its demonstration of such large environmental effects. And 
this demonstration had depended on faith in its leadership. Wouldn't the as-
tonishing misconduct of the leadership , then , cast some shadow across such 
findings, which no one else had obtained? 
Not at all. Not a word about the Heber scandal has appeared in the Times, the 
newsweeklies , Science magazine, or on national TV. To quote Herrnstein (1982) 
again, 
The media seem unwilling to publish anything that might challenge the certitude 
with which editors, politicians, judges, and others insist that we know how to 
increase measurable intelligence, or that test data "prove," to use The New York 
Times's word , that a poor environment causes familial retardation [po 7 10) . 
What is the cause of this remarkable double standard? Clearly , it is the ideology 
of the major media, warmly supportive even of falsehoods favorable to environ-
mentali sm, generally condemnatory of individual differences and hence of psy-
chometrics, our field , which persistently and embarrassingly reiterates important 
and substantial differences in humankind . 
Yes, we have our critics, and they have an extraordinary double standard; and 
they are in very strong positions, affecting the beliefs of everyone: of editors, 
educators, judges, legislators, federal officers, and the other countless millions 
who read the national press or listen to the national TV. If we believe in our 
di scipline and its contributions to society , then we had better stand up for our-
selves and our field. What, then, do we believe? 
THE VALUE OF TESTING 
Scientific Value. In our own quiet way, and in .our own private literature, 
there is a strong consensus among us concerning the pers isting values of our 
science and our profession. In an excellent summary of this question , the scien-
tific basis of testing was powerfully defended by Carroll and Horn (1981) . They 
showed our growth to be following the earlier development of physics, in our 
gathering understanding of intelligence and our strengthening theory. 
Poor Alternatives to Testing . Many of our negative reactions to our critics 
and would-be reformers are similarly shared among ourselves . That the inter-
ference of the courts is often ignorant , confused, and damaging is noted by even 
the mildest of sc ientific commenters (Bersoff, 1981) . And the reforms forced on 
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testing by outside criticism have, we are largely agreed, been frequently " non-
solutions" (Reschly , 1981). Such " unproductive changes" include the banning 
of intelligence tests (such as in California) and the use of " pluralistic norms" 
(such as SOMPA; cf. Mercer, 1977) . Often aggressive counterattacks to our 
critics are slipped quietly into our thoughtful articles written for each other. Such 
a counterattack is well illustrated by the comment of two of our respected 
colleagues (Carroll & Horn , 198 1): " Indeed , it seems clear to the present authors 
that far from being abused by overuse, the science of human abilities is underex-
ploited in diagnosis, counseling, and evaluation [p o 10 19] ." 
Fairness to Minorities. For a very important topic, the claim of racial un-
fairness , the view of experts was well summarized by Cole (1 98 1) , when she 
wrote - that " we have learned that there is not large-scale, consistent bias against 
minority groups in the technical validity sense in the major, widely used and 
widely studied tests [p o 1075]." This position has been strongly supported by a 
blue-ribbon panel on testing of the National Academy of Sciences . And a similar 
conclusion is widely understood for the question of bias in college admissions 
(Linn , 1982). Indeed, much of the claimed evidence against test validity , for 
example in employment , has apparently been misunderstood and improperly 
summarized (especially see Schmidt & Hunter , 198 1). 
IDEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES 
Through many arguments about test practice, however, run deeper currents of 
contemporary ideology, philosophical , political, and economic . Those who 
claim an exclusively societal or economic determinism are especially resentful of 
testing and psychometric research, and what these disciplines show us about the 
sources of human abilities and personality. In a candid account of the contempo-
rary scene, then, we must not avoid the issue of what science and scientists say 
about family influences on these traits, both genetic and environmental. 
Heritability of Intelligence 
Surely we can now say that there is a scientific consensus for the heritability of 
intelligence, and we can reject the name-calling of those who would say that 
hereditary influence is a delusion or a hoax. If there is any scholar who honestly 
questions it , and sincerely seeks evidence, there is a direct solution: Such a 
person should read--or even just browse- in Fuller and Thompson 's (1 978) 
weighty volume, Foundations of Behavior Genetics . Absorb the stately march 
there from fundamental genetic principles to physiology, to neurobiology, to 
quantitative methods, to the genetics of cognitive and intellectual abilities, to 
personality and temperament , to mental illness. Loiter, for a while, in the 40 
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pages of bibliography with their 1500 references. And for those with quantitative 
curiosity , there are excellent works available (Falconer , 1960; Thompson & 
Thoday, (979) . 
Or, if a scholar seeks further knowledge of the genetic evidence specific to 
mental measurements, give such a scholar Jensen's (1980) monumental book 
Bias in Mental Testing. Someday this may be more widely recognized as one of 
the best works ever written on testing, for the serious student of psychometrics . 
(For other informed appraisals of such evidences, see Bereiter, 1970; Cancro , 
1971 ; Hebert , 1977. And for a nontechnical treatment of the issues, see Jensen, 
198 1.) But then, how should we convince the lay world outside of the large 
consensus on this matter of heritability? In 1972, more than 50 scholars from 
fields bearing on this question published a " Resolution on Scienti fic Freedom 
and Heredity ," signing the emphatic statement that " we believe such influences 
are very strong. " (Page, 1972c). Of the 50 signers, 60% were in Who' s Who in 
America, and four were Nobel laureates. And their statement was published in 
the most prominent professional journal in psychology. But that testament , too , 
became a nonevent for the major media to ignore . The national press took no 
notice of this, nor did CBS when its special, " The IQ Myth ," led by Dan 
Rather, managed, through dist0l1ion and omission, to make test scores seem a 
pure artifact of favored environments. One of the most common responses of 
in formed psychologists and measurement experts is to avoid these questions or , 
if pressed , to state that these questions are not important for our major concern : 
the use of tests in decision making. On the contrary, I hope to persuade that such 
evas ions, of such overpoweringly central questions, must lead to waste, futility , 
and di shonor in our testing fi eld . Indeed, to some extent this has already 
happened . 
Nonetheless , it is curious how blind the media are to this consensus among 
scientists about the heritability of intelligence . Even Gould 's (198 1) book , with 
its strong ideological loading, does not exactly dispute the existence of heri-
tability , though taking exception to nearly every estimate of it. The device used 
by Gould , and by others before him , is to challenge the precision of such an 
estimate, as if some softness of numbers invalidated the whole pursuit. If a test 
score is not precise, they seem to affirm , it is useless. If a heritability estimate is 
not certain , then it is meaningless. One can only imagine the stultifying influence 
such perfectionism would have had on the growth of any of our sc iences? But the 
clear fact , revealed even in the most polemical criti cism to the careful reader, is 
that there is consensus about the large heritability of general intelligence . 
Heritability of Specia l Abilities 
Even among able psychometricians, however, there is much uncertainty about 
the heritability of specific abilities or achievement measures . To explore this 
question, a friend and I (Page & J arjoura, 1979) obtained an unprecedented data 
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set from one of the two major college testing programs, the respected American 
College Testing Program (ACT). Our results are briefly outlined here, as bearing 
on this important and neglected problem affecting many of the tests the schools 
have so widely adopted. If these measures, too, are loaded with heritability, we 
should take this fact carefully into consideration. 
As is well known , the ACT has four achievement tests , in the four fields of 
English, Math, Social Studies, and Natural Sciences. From two different years of 
testing, 1976 and 1978, ACT gathered for us 6800 pairs of twins from the nearly 
2 million students who used this excellent program to apply to colleges in those 
years . These twins were identified from the concordance of surname, birth date , 
and place of residence (or home phone) . Even without knowing which pairs are 
fraternal or identical, it is possible to do some genetic analysis of such a wonder-
fully large data base, as long as we are willing to make certain assumptions about 
same-sexed and opposite-sexed pairs (Scarr-Salapatek, 1971). Here there is little 
space for technical detail, but let us consider certain findings, displayed in Table 
2.1. 
Table 2.1 shows results from a factor analysis of the genetic components 
estimated from our methods (Page & Jarjoura, 1979 , p. 11 5). First, we observe 
the sizable loadings of the four tests on the principal genetic factor. The 
heritability estimates of these four tests were all high , by the way , ranging 
from .64 to .84 . That is , each of the four ACT achievement measures showed a 
substantial heritability in itself. The further question we raised, however, was the 
extent to which the measures were genetically unique and the extent to which 
they shared their genetic loadings with the others. 
In Table 2.1, Part A shows these loadings of the four measures on the first , 
unrotated principal factor from the genetic correlations we generated . In Part B 
of the table, we observe the amount of each of the genetic correlations , which is 
explained by the principal component. And in Part C we see that there is also a 
genetic loading specific to each of the four tests (these loadings are in the major 
diagonal). What is thought provoking, and not often recognized among psycho-
metricians, is that so much of the intercorrelation among such ability and 
achievement measures should have a unitary factor as its biological source. And 
it appears that G (genetic loading) and g (the always observed correlation among 
diverse mental measures) do indeed have much to do with each other. (See also 
kinship studies in Behrman, Hrubec , Taubman, & Wales, 1980; Loehlin, 
Lindzey, & Spuhler, 1975; Loehlin & Nichols , 1976; Martin, 1975.) 
From this example, we can score some points against frequent criticisms . One 
of the repeated claims is that Burt's apparent defection destroyed the basis for 
any belief in heritability. But obviously, Burt's few disputed twin pairs played no 
role in this large analysis (nor in numerous other analyses in the United States or 
abroad) . Another strawman from our critics is that we regard intelligence as a 
"single thing." This claim is clearly false. Here one sees that, even genetically , 
there are other influences distinct to each trait. Even so, however, here as in all 
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matrices of mental measures we see the ubiquitous positive component underly-
ing the whole matrix , which in this analysis is genetic. "S ingle thing" it is not; 
indeed , by all estimates, it is based on many gene loci. And psychologically 
there are surely various subabilities that contribute to it. Still , whatever its 
nature, g does appear , to a greater or lesser extent , in virtually all mental tests. 
Still another charge hurled at testers, but denied by our analysis, is that we 
believe that "genetics is all ." Our Table 2. 1 clearly rejects any such conclusion , 
as does the research of everyone else known to us. Indeed, it is the power of 
behavior genetics that it can best expose those influences that are, indeed , en-
vironmental. For example, we may consider the simple declaration that variance 
of a test is the sum of the genetic variance, the environmental vari ance, and error: 
Var(test) = Var(G) + Var(E) + error. (I) 
Then it is possible to regard a test score in the way suggested by Fig. 2. 1. 
For students of testing, thi s figure seems a most fa miliar one. From any test , 
we might in fer that the shaded curve represents the vari ance expectable from 
error around some true score X'. But let us alter the meaning: Let X' now 
represent the genotype, and the shaded figure represent the vari ation expected in 
the phenotype, through the operation of a combination of environment and errors 
of measurement. What such a perspective makes us realize is that , in each one of 
our mental test scores, we are indeed looking at a genotype, plus other influ-
ences. That is, we may consider the individual score to consist of genotype 
" true" score, the envi ronmental variations around such a genotype, and of 
course a res idual error variance . Indeed, given the enormous amount of research 
on these matters, we may assert that , for the individual student , most of the 
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FIG . 2. 1 . Famili ar figure in measurement , applied to either re li ability or 
heritab ility. X may represent the " true score of a test" and the shaded curve 
represent measurement error. Or it may represent the genotype of a tes t for an 
individual and the shaded portion may represent the combination of environmental 
influences and measurement error. 
di stance from the mean is difference in genotype , and thi s is true, whether or not 
it conforms with the sentiments of CBS or of the New York Times. But this 
assertion in no way denies our pursuit of these environmental causes of test 
performance. Rather , it clarifies our goal and gives us some methods for identi-
fying the environmental variance without the usual distortion and confounding 
with an unconsidered background genetic variation. 
The formula in Equation (I) is of course very general. A more detailed 
formu la would be the following: 
Var(IQ) = Var(E) + Var(G) + Cov(G, E) + Var(G X E) + error , 
(2) 
where the two new terms represent the covariance and interaction of the genetic 
and environmental influences . These are surely plausible enough additions to 
such studies. It is logical that , given the sorting out of soc ial classes, in part 
caused by differences in ability of the parents, there cou ld be a correlation of 
genes and environment. And it is also logical that , to some extent , what favors 
one genotype might not favor another to the same degree. 
But such components are difficult to di stinguish in twin data and , therefore, 
are usually neglected in studies of heritability because of mathematical con-
founding. Yet critics have sometimes used thi s confounding to disparage any 
attempts at heritability analysis. One of the critics is an astronomer, who con-
temptuously referred to the usual methods of human genetics as " numerology," 
but then himself committed two astonishing logical errors in his mathematical 
proof (Layzer, 1974). Each of his objections to heritability leads to reductio ad 
absurdum . His policy argument is that all heritability analysis should be curtailed 
and that we as a society should emphasize only environmental efforts. His prime 
example of such remed iation was the Milwaukee Project (this was, of course, 
before those investigations were closed and the leaders sent to Federal prison) . 
There were the following two dilemmas : First , GE covariance either ex ists or it 
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does not. If it does not ex ist , then heritability analysis may proceed without it . If 
it does ex ist , then Layzer is already granting the argument of Herrnstein (1973) 
and of others that the upper soc ial classes are already partially sorted for genetic 
ability in intelligence. Either way, Layzer's practical conclusions are spoiled. 
His argument about G x E interaction suffers the same fate. If such interaction 
does not ex ist , then heritability studies may proceed without it. If it does exist , 
then, by the very definition of interaction , any marginal improvement in social 
environment will be, to the extent of that interaction , as unfavorable as it is 
favorable. (For a more complete treatment of thi s question, see Page, 1975; and 
for general treatment of interaction effects in the context of intelligence, see 
Eaves, Last , Maltin , & Jinks, 1977 .) 
Again , why are such matters worth speaking about , in a volume devoted to 
tests and decision making? Is it not enough that most able testers acknowledge 
the truth of heritability and of innate individual differences? Isn ' t thi s fact , 
indeed , something of an embarrassment to testing? Shouldn ' t we continue, by 
our pass ive, noncommittal reaction to these controversies, to paper it over? Isn' t 
it , in fact , almost bad manners to raise the question? So it has often been treated , 
and there is usually , as Herrnstein (1 973) points out , a personal and professional 
cost in res isting the tide of opinion as shaped by the major media. 
But these questions are important exactly because our fa ilure to resist such 
untruths is damaging the reputation of testing and seriously undermining its 
utility in making decisions. The truth or falsity of our assumptions is crucial to 
making long-range decisions, by the very nature of scientific dec ision making. 
To support this assertion , we turn to the nature of decision making and to the 
kinds of information requi red to make an intelligent choice. 
DECISION MAKING 
We should recognize that a sc ience of dec ision making has become itself a vast 
and well -developed field of applied mathematics and stati stics with many 
branches: linear programming, dynamic programming, transportation al-
gorithms, queueing theory, and many other techniques with large implications 
for behavior science . For a survey of the general fi eld , the reader may see many 
general texts in operations research (Churchman, Ackoff, & Arnoff, 1957; Hill-
ier & Lieberman, 1974; Trueman, 1974; Wagner, 1969) and increasingly in 
statistics (Hamburg, 1970; Winkler & Hays, 1975). Some of these methods have 
been studied for psychology or education (Anderson, 1970; Banghart , 1969; 
Johnstone, 1974; Kaufman, 1972; Levin , 1975; McNamara, 197 1; Novick & 
Jackson , 1974; Page, 1976 , 1978; Page & Canfield , 1975; Page, Jarjoura, & 
Konopka, 1976 ; Tillett , 1975; VanDusseldorp , Richardson, & Foley, 1971) . A 
few have brought such methods to bear directly on the use of tests (Cronbach & 
GIeser, 1965; Edwards, Guttentag, & Snapper, 1975; Page, 1980) . In general, 
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however, there has been little recognition of its importance to educational psy-
chology and its kindred disciplines, and few investigators have applied it to our 
most serious problems of educational choice. 
Decision Analysis. For easy understanding, the science of decision making 
is often expressed in the notation of decision analysis. and the notation is that of 
an upside-down tree, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The best-known writer in this field is 
undoubtedly Howard Raiffa (1968), whose approach can be appreciated without 
extensive mathematics, and can be applied directly in practical situations. 
In Fig. 2.2, let us suppose that there is a career choice at stake, such as 
whether to pursue a premedical career or some other. In this drastically sim-
plified representation, as in many more complex ones, there are just four aspects 
of choice: 
I. Decisions to be made (in squares). 
2. Probabilities to be estimated (in circles). 
3. Values of the outcomes (numbers at dots). 
4. Costs of the choices (small tollgates) . 
Let us assume that the values of the outcomes are estimated in the same units as 
the costs at the tollgate. Then such a tree may be automatically solved by 
applying recursively two rules, beginning at the bottom of the tree and working 
up: 
1. Probability nodes are averaged. by mUltiplying each value by its associ-
ated probability, summing across the branches, and carrying the weighted mean 
up to the node. 
2. Decision nodes are maximized. by selecting that branch that carries the 
highest net value. (Costs are subtracted from the value of the relevant branch.) 
Tests for Individual Decisions. Decision analysis, then, like most methods 
used in operations research, suggests our optimal choice, under the assumption 
of the correctness of our data. 
But where do we obtain the number themselves? They are based on some sort 
of data, either objective or subjective. And the role of tests in forecasting should 
be closely tied to the probabilities shown. The probabilities of various outcomes, 
once a decision is taken, must depend on all appropriate information about these 
outcomes: the experiences of others and the chooser's own abilities, past 
achievements, economic needs, and the like . For example, suppose that the 
choice of Plan B is for premedical training, where the payoff ($100 ,000 a year?) 
is high but where the general probability of success is only 1 in 5. In the 
individual case, this probability should be adjusted to the person concerned. 
Once again, test scores should play an important role in such adjustment , consid-
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FIG. 2.2 . A decision tree. A decision is reached by tracing out the branches as 
far as possible , assigning values to each terminal node, and probabilities to each 
branch from a P node. P nodes are then solved (working from the bottom up), by 
averaging out the branches. And D nodes are solved by fo lding back all but the 
most valuable branch as evaluated below each D. For vocations, the probability 
values are determined by knowledge of both the world and self, as are also the 
terminal values. Technical procedures can be appl ied to aid all such determina-
tions. (Source: Page, 1974b, p. 71. Reprinted with permission .) 
ered together with the background information about others who have gone 
before. 
Consider, then, what great damage is done to decision making, if tests are 
discredited and not used or if they are eliminated from the tools of decision 
makers by court order or administrative uncertainty . It is not only the testers who 
have much at stake in such mistaken elimination of tests; the biggest losers are 
the students and those who would guide and select them. 
From even such a simple model, an immediate realization is that such deci-
sion trees become complex, requiring computer assistance in their solution-just 
as life decisions are indeed complex, yet made quite haphazardly today, without 
mathematical help. We sti ll await truly competent, computerized advisory sys-
tems for such choices, though we have been aware of the need for some years 
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(Page, 1974b), and some working research models were established in the past 
(Katz, 1966). 
Tests for Program Decisions. Let us look at Fig. 2 .2 from another view-
point, as though we were administrators and the decision were between two 
programs, here labeled A and B. Suppose Program B seems to produce higher 
average values, where these are measured in terms of test scores, but our data are 
from a national study, where there is confounding of tests with school practices 
and with the SES variables of the communities. What we face , again, is that 
decision sciences must depend not on naive correlational data but on production 
functions of the treatment variables. If this seems an obvious point, then it has 
been seriously neglected in the social planning of the past several decades, and 
its neglect has led us to one disillusionment after another in the world of educa-
tional research and development (cf. Page, 1972a). 
Scores as Production Functions. In our desire to use tests in planning, we 
are often blocked when we must choose among educational programs. Choosing 
a criterion test then becomes troubled. Suppose one program relies more on a 
textbook and the other more on films. Then it will be very difficult to construct a 
test that will not be biased toward one outcome or the other. Quite understand-
ably, in such a situation, we often wisely choose tests that are not so close to the 
programs. We may, rather, choose a selection of standardized tests of global 
ability or achievement: in English, for example , or in math , social studies , or 
natural sciences . But wait, these are the very tests we found to be heavi ly loaded 
on the same g factor (general abi lity). Even more disturbingly, they are loaded on 
the same G factor (general genetic ability). And when we employ pre- post 
testing with such measures, the change scores have well-known problems. Are 
we really expected to detect the effects of programs through such measures of 
general (and even genetic) ability? 
Yes, in general we must, for there seem to be few defensible alternatives. We 
have mentioned the experimental bias of tests designed explicitly for the com-
parisons, and these (even where avai lable) have many problems beyond such 
built-in program biases. Tests that are called "criterion referenced" frequently 
exhibit these problems . We have long seen much literature for and against such 
criterion referencing, and some excellent consideration and debate have occurred 
(for example, by Julian Stanley, Robert Ebel, Roger Lennon, and Frank 
Womer) . For an extended period Dr. Womer directed the massive National 
Assessment of Educational Progress, which was dedicated, at least originally , to 
the criterion-referencing philosophy (also see Page, 1982 , on this philosophy). 
For research questions about programs, such issues have a special bite. 
Special Versus General Tests of Achievement. Let us briefly summarize our 
dilemma: On one hand, it is fairly easy to write tests that measure some very 
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limited body of knowledge (e.g. , the new vocabulary taught in a spec ific lesson) . 
Here indeed we can show marked change from before an instruction to after. On 
the other hand , a small handful of words will have practically no visible effect on 
one's ability to read general matter- and this is the goal we really cherish for 
major decisions. If we test only the explicit program content , we may be acting 
out something like the " drunkard' s search," which the philosopher Abraham 
Kaplan used to tell us about at UCLA . The drunkard was feeling around under a 
lamppost and was asked what he was looking for . " I dropped my key ." Where 
did you drop it? " Over there. " But if you dropped it over there, why are you 
looking for it over here, under the lamppost? " This is where the light is." 
We can , after all , develop a test for the lesson just past , which may show us 
how we improved . That is where the light is. But the most important outcomes of 
education often seem like the lost key, beyond our reach , over there in the dark. 
Is there a way out of this problem? Yes, if we have sufficient numbers and 
sufficient random ass ignment and accurate enough predictive control variables, 
then our standard errors of the means will be small enough to permit comparisons 
that are meaningful for such standard testing programs. Such conditions, howev-
er , hold in probably less than I % of the evaluation situations that face the 
psychometric researcher . 
Showing Environmental Effect. The problem is not hopeless . If we have, 
indeed , important variables, sufficient cases, and solid models, we may be able 
to show these important environmental influences in a helpful light. Let us 
consider two findings from recent research on the applied issue of private and 
public schooling. 
Our first case illustrates the danger of fa iling to provide for large individual 
differences (in g or in G) . Coleman , Hoffer , and Kilgore (1981) had claimed 
very prominently that , even after' ' controlling" for effects of family, they found 
a striking superiority of the private schools in the United States in the educational 
achievement of the huge sample from High School and Beyond . In a reanalysis 
of the data, however , this time including six brief subtests of mental ability 
(mostly nonverbal and relatively school-free) , we found that any residual effect 
of private school was less than 0 .5% of the variance in student achievement 
(Page, 198 1; Page & Keith , 198 1) . Thus a claimed environmental effec t largely 
disappeared when student input was weighed into the test. This is, of course , a 
common enough result when such variables are included- which has apparently 
led some to wish to avoid measuring intelligence in such research. 
The second findings, from the same debate, had a more optimistic outcome , 
as shown in Fig . 2 .3 . In Fig. 2 .3, we observe some major student vari ables, such 
as family background , race , and general ability , which are understandably load-
ed with parental influences , both genetic and environmental, and largely beyond 
the control of the school system. But here we al so introduced the amount of 
homework the student did , as a causal variable for the general achievement of 
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FIG . 2.3. Explaining student ach ievement of students in private and public high 
schools. After allowing for background variables, homework still explains 3% of 
test ach ievement. (Source: Page & Keith , 1981. Reprinted with permission.) 
reading and math. Clearly, from the paths shown , our major background vari-
ables were fundamental in explaining test achievement; and the special control of 
"general ability" (a factor score made from two short vocabulary tests and four 
nonverbal tests) was the most influential of all. Yet the homework does shine 
through, explaining 3% of the variance in achievement even after controlling for 
background variables. The eternal verities of educational psychology sti ll stand: 
After ability , time spent on task does make the most difference, and our standard 
tests, even loaded as they are with heritability, can show that such time matters. 
Indeed, in this case of school comparison, homework also helps explain about 
half of the tiny effect of private schools. 
Tim Keith and I believe that homework, then , is a major variable that all 
schools should emphasize, one that could truly improve performance. Keith's 
(1982) separate article shows this homework effect even more clearly for student 
grades: There is, in fact , a possible compensation for low ability shown in this 
study of grades, with the low-ability hard worker actually catching up with the 
high-ability nonworker in such school performance. Keith's remarkable graph is 
shown in Fig . 2.4. 
But another problem of practical decision making is illustrated in this home-
work question. I have talked about these results with various groups of policy 
people: school boards , legislators, practicing administrators, equal opportunity 
officials, teachers, and even governors active in education. The idea of increas-
ing homework seems to have no lobbies ! To the contrary, there is often an 
embarrassed si lence (and the facts are indeed embarrassing, with the average 
senior doing less than 4 hours of homework each week, in all classes combined). 
Some educators have even denigrated the homework question altogether, speak-
ing of "meaningless drill" and the like. Clearly, far more than our psychometric 
research enters into educational policy! But this case does illustrate how test 
2. STRUGGLES AND POSSIBILITIES 27 
information may improve our knowledge of bas ic issues, and our understanding, 
if not always our application, of practical issues . 
Heritability and Program Research. Our general neglect of heritability has 
led to research handicaps that may unfortunately hinder our understanding of 
some policy issues . In order to guide curricular change, we should know which 
variables are relatively more influenced by fami ly variables and which more 
influenced by schools. But our usual research strategies, with no kinship con-
trols, do not often permit thi s distinction. Given large samples of twins and 
siblings, however, and item information across achievement tests, we could do 
heritability analysis on each item. Or, if zygosity were not known for the twin 
pairs, we could analyze which items were more influenced by home or school , 
and various analyses of these results could in turn illuminate areas for greater 
curricular attention in those schools showing such deficits. 
Still another application of such techniques could be in matters of national 
assessment, where we seek to track the national performance of student genera-
tions and to study the changes from one generation to another. For example, 
there remain large questions about the causes of the decline of standardized test 
scores over the past 15 years or so. One real possibility-that declines were 
caused by shifting ability levels of parents- was never really explored. Yet item 
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FIG . 2.4. Mean grades in high school as a function of time spent on homework 
and of abi li ty. (Source: Keith , 1982. Reprinted with permission .) 
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some light on the question, through the following reasoning: Reused items may 
be measured at two points in time and their gain or loss reported. The twin 
correlations of such reused items may be also discovered. Then if the more 
family-influenced items are those in which there is greatest decline, the inference 
would be that the decline was more likely caused within the home than within the 
school; and the conclusions would be quite different from those in the contrary 
case. Conceivably, this exploration would not be very productive (we would 
soon find out), but it would open a major line of investigation. And it was a 
thesis that would be very easy and inexpensive to explore. A major cluster of 
hypotheses remained unstudied . Once again, our psychometric understandings 
are frustrated by our current political and ideological commitments. And we have 
failed to make adequate use of the psychometric information available to us in 
our search for improved social strategies. 
Decision Making and Ratio Scales. One apparent problem of test scores for 
decision making is the following: Most scientific strategies for optimizing deci-
sions require that benefits be measured on some absolute scale of values. In 
many decision techniques (such as certain kinds of dynamic programming), one 
develops a ratio of costs and benefits for each alternative choice , a ratio that 
makes no sense unless both costs and benefits have some recognized zero points. 
Even in simple decision trees like that in Fig. 2.2, where costs are used there 
must be some way of equating costs and benefits; they must be translated to the 
same scale. But in mental measurement, we take most of our test scores to be 
interval scaled, not ratio scaled. How may this difficulty be overcome, so that the 
most important outcomes of education may be appropriately studied? 
This question has been considered elsewhere, but some general answers may 
be suggested here. Any time we consider change in scores then we have , indeed, 
a ratio scale, for no change will be zero; two points will be twice the value of one 
point, etc. Now, as we know, change scores have their own problems, because 
the error variances are additive, whereas the subtraction of one score from the 
other eliminates from the result most of the variance in the true scores. But if we 
use group change scores, as we often will in program decisions, then indeed the 
errors of measurement are made very small as the number of observations grows 
large; and our analysis may proceed. 
Often, of course, we will not have repeated measures on the same group but 
will have some other groups that may be regarded as controls for comparison 
purposes in our multivariate studies. Here, again, a zero point may be established 
as the mean made by the relatively "untreated" control, and a production func-
tion may be estimated as a relation between possible alternatives and the growth 
in such means. This should not give the impression that all such questions of zero 
points are easily resolved but that they can become tractable for many practical 
purposes in scientific decision making. And we are currently taking little advan-
tage of such strategies. 
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TEST SCORES AND DEEPER VALUES 
Test scores, we have assumed, measure those outcomes for which we most 
depend on our schools. The scores, then , stand for social values that we highly 
esteem. Yet strangely little attention has been given to the placing of these test 
values in some higher framework . 
Suppose we ask the simplest curricular question: For example, should we 
double the time for mathematics in a certain grade, at the expense of some other 
course of study, such as history? How could we obtain evidence to help guide us 
in this decision? It is striking that, after 70 years of using test scores and a 
century of behavioral science, we still have no commonly accepted way of 
combining such test scores or of trading them off against each other. 
The Bentee. A decade ago, some of us studied this question , with the 
concern of being able to use test scores as production functions (Page, I 972d, 
1973, 1974a, 1976, 1980; Page & Breen, 1974a, 1974b). In this work , we felt it 
necessary to invent a unit of measurement of educational benefit, called the 
bentee, for benefit T-score. An illustration of the bentee is shown in Fig . 2.5. 
In this figure, we note that the bentee represents the highest educational value, 
and the branches beneath it stand for seven major branches of educational gain, 
ranging from the verbal, quantitative, social sciences, and natural sciences 
through esthetic learning, matters of the body (such as sports, health) to the 
"personality" (which may include citizenship and moral and spiritual learning 
where these are deemed appropriate). Each of these major branches may be itself 
divided into subdivisions. In the present figure, only one, verbal, has been 
divided into seven exhaustive areas. And one of these in turn, literature, has 
been divided. And the tree branches down through poetic analysis and poetic 
meter, to iambic pentameter, the great verse metric that has been the medium of 
Shakespeare and of many of our greatest English poets. Recognition of iambic 
pentameter, then, may be an explicit goal of instruction for good English stu-
dents; it would be a suitable topic for a test item or for an operational objective in 
instruction . In these steps, we observe that the tree reaches from the highest 
philosophical and social values , through only a few steps, to the lowliest and 
most concrete behavioral objective. Surprisingly, climbing down this tree , the 
educational philosopher may actually be able to converse (chatter?) with the 
educational psychologist, who may be occupied with behavior modification 
techniques . 
But how is the actual "evaluation" carried on? Having investigated two 
methods, we believe that a "token" method may be suitable for most curricular 
purposes: In this method, appropriate judges , acting individually, apportion 100 
tokens (such as poker chips) among the half-dozen divisions at each branch. The 
method may be applied recursively , at any level of the tree, and by judges chosen 




FIG . 2.5. The recursive nature of the ben tee method. As analys is moves from 
the general to the spec ific, a shift is made from societal to expert opinion and from 
va lue space to test space. (Source: E. B. Page, 1974 . Reprinted with permission.) 
in formed citizens. At the lower levels, it might be subject matter specialists or 
future employers (in training situations). These trees may be adapted for any new 
program of study with its own nodes and branches. 
Such a tree has a fairly clear relation to the use of test scores in decision 
making. Where we have test scores for the various branches (such as English, 
math , social studies, natural sciences), we may apportion our tokens according to 
our beliefs in the relative benefits of these accomplishments. And our weightings 
may vary with the individual concerned (the general student may have a different 
weighting vector from the premed) or with the program under study . But once 
such judgments are established, then we may proceed to evaluate the educational 
accomplishment of individuals, of groups, and of programs. By adopting 
changes in such bentees as our objectives, we may plot our production functions 
as a relation between decision alternatives and the values that we seek to opti-
mize . Given such methods, we may employ much more frequently the well-
developed techniques of the dec ision sciences in our own studies of policy. (The 
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reader is directed to related literature: For a technical approach different from the 
bentee, see Dalkey, 1969 . For a deeper understanding of means-end analysis, see 
Churchman, 1961. For a classic treatment of personnel decisions and test scores , 
see Cronbach & Gieser , 1965; and for the most advanced general treatment of 
multiple objectives, see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976.) 
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS AND CAUSAL RESEARCH 
We have already noted that "production functions" must involve more than 
incidental relationships between variables. When we seek to "optimize" some 
benefits from our decisions, we must depend on the assumption of a causal 
relation between the decision alternatives and the desired benefit. For example, 
suppose we note, as many researchers have, a recurring agreement between child 
intelligence and family income. If we believe that this relation is causal, then we 
naturally predict that when we change fami ly income, we will correspondingly 
change child intelligence, at least to some limited degree. Programs to eliminate 
poverty, therefore, according to this reasoning, should have a strong influence on 
reducing school fai lure . 
Or if we believe that such intelligence is a causal outcome of time spent with 
the child by a well-intentioned adult , then we will predict that programs such as 
Head Start will have a clearly beneficial effect on future performance of par-
ticipating children. Many programs of recent decades have, in fact , been con-
structed on the assumption that observed correlations of this sort represented 
strong causal relations . The disappointment about such programs results from the 
ambiguous and debatable outcomes actually observed. (For a sharp disappoint-
ment in a major experiment, see Page, 1972a.) We do not need to resolve these 
issues themselves to understand the need for some improved methods of policy 
study. The most important improvement seems to be this: We must routinely 
seek out data that will permit us to estab lish causal models explaining the 
maximum amount of variance possible of those variables that we wish to opti-
mize. This means, in the first place, that we indeed have such models and , in the 
second, that we systematicall y collect the information that will maximize our 
knowledge . The first requirement implies that we must turn to path analysis to 
make explicit our causal models. Figure 2.3 shows such a model for exactly such 
a purpose, here seeking a causal influence of homework time on test achieve-
ment. The second requirement implies that we should emphasize the use of 
comprehensive data sets, rich with the correlates, whether from school, society , 
or fami ly , that most aid in causal explanation of our outcomes of interest. In Fig. 
2.3, then, we truly wish to know the effect of homework time on achievement; 
but we do not wish to be deceived by the correlates of race, SES, or other school 
variables in estab lishing our "production function ." But if we did not collect 
these background characteristics (including intelligence) or if we did not com-
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bine them properly into our causal model, we would be utterly deceived about 
the effect of homework (just as Coleman, as mentioned earlier, was deceived in 
his claimed effect of private schools). 
Path Analysis. As a testing profession, then, interested in policy decisions, 
we must turn to the rich discipline that is now the center for policy research in 
most social sciences. This is the field of path analysis, introduced by Sewall 
Wright (1921) some 6 decades ago. In its wandering route, it has come from 
genetics, to economics, to sociology, to education and psychology and is now 
found at the heart of many of the research journals in these fields. The number of 
textbooks about path analysis has rapidly increased in recent years, and these 
have improved in complexity and quality (Aigner & Goldberger, 1977; Blalock, 
1971; Duncan, 1975; Heise, 1975; Kenny, 1979; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973, 
ch . 11; Li, 1975; Pedhazur, 1982, chs. 15-16; Taubman, 1977). 
There is excellent research discipline in using these models. Because they are 
explicitly causal, their use forces us to specify our hypotheses about the presence 
and direction of causal influences and strongly encourages us to employ in our 
models whatever variables we have available that may illuminate our interests. 
Drawing and publishing such a model, moreover, forces us to put "up front" our 
assumptions about these influences. If we have left out measures of intelligence , 
say, or family influence, then this will be apparent in our model. Or if we have 
placed variables in the wrong order, thus distorting the influences, this too will 
be apparent to our readers, whether they are allies or critics. These considera-
tions, clearly, have huge meanings for debates about policy decisions. Indeed, 
without such considerations of background influences, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to plot out any ratios for costs versus anticipated benefits. 
Comprehensive Data Sets. The second major requirement for such causal 
reasoning is the availability and use of large data sets containing the information 
necessary for causal inference and estimation. High School and Beyond is proba-
bly the most pertinent and available data set for many current concerns. It will be 
still more valuable as the follow-ups are completed and distributed in 1983 and 
beyond (current tapes are available through the National Center for Education 
Statistics , U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C.) . A splendid data 
set is also available in the predecessor to HSB, the National Longitudinal Study 
of 1972, with its four follow-ups (also available from the NCES in Washington). 
Still another valuable set of tapes may be obtained from the U.S. Department of 
Labor, dealing more with work and later life and less with the high school years. 
But each of these data sets lacks something of great importance in family back-
ground and many other matters that might be of large interest for many particular 
policy questions . 
Still, such data sets are much more powerful than many realize , even when 
they appear to lack certain variables of prime concern . Advanced path techniques 
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involving unmeasured variables or latent variables can often generate new fac-
tors much closer to the variables of real concern. For instance, we generated a 
relatively school-free "mental ability" from factor analyzing a set of short 
mental tests (Page & Keith, 1981) . Others have similarly constructed factors of 
"self-concept" from a collection of items about attitude. HSB already supplies 
an excellent SES scale from a weighted sum of many relevant questions about 
education, occupation, home, and other factors. In general, then , a rich data set 
can be much more than the simple sum of its parts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From this analysis, there are some strong inferences to draw about the use of tests 
in decision making, and we briefly summarize them here: 
1. Test professionals and test users should stop being placed on the defen-
sive by ill-informed and polemical critics. We should reassert, firmly and pub-
licly , the many virtues of testing and the superiority of making decisions using 
tests, compared with those made without tests. 
2 . We should insist that psychometricians and others depending on tests be 
heard in the major media when tests are discussed. 
3. We should stop being apologetic about the reality that tests do, in part , 
show genetic influences and other family influences as well as social environ-
mental influences. These are in fact part of their purpose. 
4. We should cite frequently the research on the alleged biases of the most 
widely used standardized tests of abi lity and achievement. In general, the conclu-
sions are similar to those of the blue-ribbon National Academy of Sciences panel : 
When properly used, tests are not biased against English-speaking U.S. minority 
groups. 
5. The measurement of intelligence is one of the greatest achievements in all 
behavior science. The attempts to eliminate it from consideration at many deci-
sion points (such as selection for certain programs, schools, colleges, and profes-
sions) are not in the best interests of education nor of society as a whole. 
6. When using tests in research on achievement, we should often lean 
toward the avai lable standardized instruments, especially when these may be 
treated securely. 
7 . In such research situations, we should commonly control for the entering 
ability of the students. It is often fallacious to make program selection without 
such controls and may lead us to wasteful and disillusioning programs. 
8. To assist in making decisions, test researchers should become more fa-
miliar with methods from the decision sciences, which permit technical analysis 
of projected costs and benefits. 
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9. To make use of such decision models, test researchers should translate 
scores, where necessary, into useful values to serve as production functions. 
10. But to use such production functions, we must look closely at the under-
lying causal relations of the variables (such as achievement) that we wish to 
optimize. We should design these relations into explicitly causal models in path 
analysis. 
11. If researchers look only at the variables of narrow interest, they will often 
be deceived by what Simon called "spurious correlation." Rather, the explana-
tory variables must be expanded to control, as much as possible, for background 
correlates of both programs and outcomes. 
12. Many of such correlates will be found strongly active in family influ-
ences . To study such family influences, wherever possible researchers should 
look to twin pairs and other sibling and kinship relations, together with their 
degree of kinship (e.g., if known, whether twins are identical or fraternal). 
13. It is important that government agencies, large testing corporations, and 
other collectors of data recognize the explanatory power of such family informa-
tion and collect such variables into data sets wherever feasible. 
14. And it is, finally, important that data sets be made inexpensively avail-
able to researchers , so that the causal study of human achievement may proceed 
in as open and active and public an environment as we can create . 
Now it should be evident why this chapter is called Struggles and Pos-
sibilities. Testing is struggling under attacks by many enemies, operating from 
many motives and conceptions , often incorrect. And testing is also under con-
stant criticism from its friends. It is friendly criticism, of course, that most 
characterizes the scientific enterprise and the tradition of Oscar Buros, as editor 
and model for this Institute that we celebrate in this volume. It is this ferment of 
friendly and informed criticism that has fostered the splendid growth of our field 
in its theoretical structure and in the construction and use of tests. These too are 
struggles, and they are essential to the continuing evolution of testing. Surely, 
the Buros Institute will continue this tradition of sharp and searching criticism by 
its most knowledgeable friends. 
We must call upon ourselves, as well, to defend our field firmly against the 
defamations and uninformed assaults by its enemies. If we are faithful to the 
scientific tradition of open scientific debate and self-criticism, then testing will 
continue to grow and flourish, just as it has during the Buros' shared lifetime of 
work. But let us , and the Institute, firmly and courageously take sides. 
Our field, after all, is probably the soundest structurally of any in the social 
and behavioral sciences . It is probably the most useful for decision making, for 
individuals and for social programs. For its past accomplishments, it probably 
has the smallest amount of apology to make- though it will surely be trans-
formed in each succeeding generation as more is learned. Let us celebrate the 
field as we celebrate the Buros Institute. Perhaps the Institute might prominently 
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display on its wall those famous lines from Shakespeare, now as applicable to 
our discipline as to ourselves as individuals: 
This above all: To thine own self be true, 
And it must follow , as the night the day , 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. 
REFERENCES 
Aigner, D. J. , & Goldberger , A. S. (Eds .). Latent variables in socioeconomic models. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland , 1977. 
Anderson, G. E . , Jr. Operations research: A miss ing link . Educational Researcher, March 1970 , 
21, 1- 3. 
Banghart , F. Educational systems analysis. Toronto: Coll ier-Macmi llan, 1969. 
Behrman, J. R ., Hrubec, Z., Taubman, P., & Wales, T . J . Socioeconomic success: A study of the 
effects of genetic endowments, family environment, and schooling. Amsterdam: North-Holland , 
1980. 
Bereiter , C. Genetics and educabi lity: Educational implications of the Jensen debate. [n J . Hellmuth 
(Ed.) , Disadvantaged child (Vol. 3). New York: Brunner-Mazel, 1970. 
Bersoff, D. N. Testing and the law. American Psychologist, 198 1,36( 10),1047- 1056 . 
Blalock , H. M., Jr. (Ed.). Causal models in the social sciences . Chicago: Ald ine, 197 1. 
Cancro, R. (Ed.). Intelligence: Genetic and environmental influences. New York: Grune & Stratton , 
197 1. 
Carroll , J . B ., & Horn , J . L. On the scientific basis of ability testing. American Psychologist, 198 1, 
36(10) , 101 2- 1020 . 
Churchman, C. W. Prediction and optimal decisions: Philosophical issues of a science of values. 
Englewood Cli ffs, N.J.: Prent ice-Hall , 196 1. 
Churchman , C. W., Ackoff, R. L. , & Arnoff, S. L. Introduction to operations research. New York: 
Wiley, 1957. 
Cole , N. S. Bias in testing. American Psychologist , 198 1,36(10) , 1067- 1077. 
Coleman, J ., Hoffer, T., & Kilgore, S. Public and private schools. A report to the National Center 
for Education Statistics by the National Opinion Research Center. University of Chicago, March 
198 1. 
Cronbach, L. J ., & Gieser , G. Psychological tests and personnel decisions (2nd ed.) . Urbana: 
Uni versity of Illinois Press, 1965 . 
Dalkey, N. Ana lyses from a group opinion study . Futures, December 1969, I, 54 1- 55 1. 
Duncan, O . D. Introduction to structural eqllation models. New York: Academic , 1975. 
Eaves, L. J ., Last , K., Martin , N . G., & Jinks, J . L. A progressive approach to non-additivity and 
genotype-environmental covariance in the analysis of human differences. British Journal of 
Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 1977 , 3D, 1- 42. 
Edwards, W. , Guttentag, M. , & Snapper, K . A dec ision-theoretic approach to evaluation research. 
[n E. L. Struening, & M. Guttentag (Eds.), Handbook of evaluation research (Vol. I). Beverly 
Hills, Calif.: SAGE, 1975. Ch. 8, pp . 139- 182. 
Falconer, D. S . Introduction to quantitative genetics. New York : Ronald Press , 1960 . 
Fuller, J . L., & Thompson, W. R . Foundations of behavior genetics. SI. Louis , Mo .: Mosby, 1978. 
Gould , S. J. The mismeasure of man . New York: Norton, 198 1. 
Hamburg, M. Statistical analysis for decision making. New York : Harcourt , Brace & World , 1970. 
Hebert , J. P. Race et intelligence. Paris: Copernic, 1977. 
Heise, D . R. Causal analysis. New York: Wiley, 1975. 
36 PAGE 
Herrnste in , R. J . IQ in the meritocracy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. 
Herrnstein, R. 1. IQ test ing and the media . Atlantic, August 1982,68- 74. 
Hill ier, F. S., & Lieberman, G. J. In troduction 10 operations research (2nd ed.). San Francisco: 
Holden-Day, 1974. 
Jensen, A. R. Bias in mental testing. New York: Macmillan-Free Press, 1980. 
Jensen, A. R. Straight talk about mental tests. New York: Macm illan- Free Press , 198 1. 
Johnstone, J. N. Mathematical models developed for use in educational planni ng: A rev iew. Review 
of Educational Research, 1974,44(2), 177- 20 1. 
Kamin, L. The science and politics of l Q. New York: Wiley, 1973. 
Katz, M. R . A model of guidance for career decis ion-making. Vocational GlI idance Quarterly, 
September 1966, 2- 10 . 
Kaufman, R. Educational system planning. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prent ice-Ha ll , 1972. 
Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and value tradeo.lfs. 
New York: Wiley, 1976. 
Keith, T. Z . T ime spent on homework and high school grades: A large-sample path analys is. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 1982,74,248- 253. 
Kenny, D. A. Correlation and causality. New York: Wiley- Intersc ience, 1979. 
Kerlinger, F. N ., & Pedhazur, E. J . Multiple regression in behavioral research. New York: Holt, 
Ri nehart & Winston, 1973 . 
Layzer, D. Heri tab ility analyses of IQ scores: Science or numero logy? Science, 1974, 183, 
1259- 1266. 
Levin, H. M . Cost-effect iveness analys is in evaluation research. In M. Guttentag & E. L. Struen-
ing (Eds.), Handbook of evaluation research (Vol. 2). Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE, 1975. Ch. 
5 , pp. 89- 122. 
Li, C. C. Path analysis: A primer. Pac ific Grove, Ca li f.: Boxwood, 1975. 
Linn , R. L. Admiss ions testing on trial. American Psychologist , 1982,34(3), 279- 29 1. 
Loehlin , J . c., Lindzey, G., & Spuhler , J . N. Race differences in intelligence. San Franc isco: 
Freeman, 1975. 
Loehlin , J . C . , & Nichols, R. C. Heredity, environment, and personality: A study of 850 sets of 
twins. Austin : University of Texas Press , 1976. 
Martin, N . G. The inheritance of scholastic abil it ies in a sample of twins: II . Genetical analys is of 
examination results. Annals of Human Genetics, London, 1975, 39, 2 19- 229. 
McNamara , J. F. Mathemat ica l programming models in educat ional plann ing. Review of Educa-
tional Research, 197 1,41(5),4 19- 446. 
Mercer, 1. R. Labelling the mentally retarded. Berkeley : Un ivers ity of Cali forn ia Press, 1977. 
Novick, M. R., & Jackson, P. H. Statistical methods for educational and psychological research. 
New York: McGraw-Hi ll , 1974. 
Page, E. B. How we all fai led in performance contracti ng. Educational Psychologist, 1972, 9 , 
40- 42. (a) 
Page, E. B. Miracle in Milwaukee: Raising the I.Q. Educational Researcher, 1972 , I( 10),8- 15. (b) 
Page, E. B. Resolution on scientific freedom and hered ity. American Psychologist, 1972, 27(7), 
660- 66 1. (c) 
Page, E. B. Seeking a measure of general educat ional advancement : The bentee. Journal of 
Educational Measurement , 1972,9( 1) , 33- 43. (d) 
Page, E. B. Effects of higher education: Outcomes, values, or benefits. In L. C. Solmon & P. 
Taubman (Eds.), Does college matter? Some evidence on the impacts of higher education . New 
York: Academic, 1973. Pp. 159- 172. 
Page , E. B. 'Top-down ' trees of educational va lues. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 
1974,34(3), 573- 584. (a) 
2. STRUGGLES AND POSSIBILITIES 37 
Page, E. B. Problems and perspectives in measuring vocational maturity . In D. E. Super (Ed.) , 
Measuring vocational maturityfor cOllllseling and evaluation. Washington , D. c.: Monograph of 
the National Vocational Guidance Association, 1974. (b) 
Page , E. B. Heritability of inte lligence: Methodological questions. Technica l comment , Science, 13 
June 1975, 188(4193), 11 26- 11 28 . 
Page , E . B. The optimization of educational values in Navy curriculum design. Proceedings of the 
American Statistical Association: Social Statistics, Part II : 1976, 655- 659 . 
Page , E. B. Should educational evaluation be more objective or more subjective? More objective! 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 1978 , 1(1) , 5- 6 
Page , E. B. Tests and decisions for the hand icapped: A guide to eva luation under the new laws. 
Special issue: A monograph , Journal of Special Education , Winter 1980, 14(4) . 
Page, E. B. The media, technical analysis, and the data feast: A response to Coleman. Educational 
Researcher, 1981, 10(7),2 1- 23. 
Page , E. B. Rethinking the principles of national assessment: Towards a more useful and higher 
quality knowledge base for education. Report commiss ioned by the National Institute of Educa-
tion . In ERIC, 1982. 
Page, E. B. , & Breen , T. F. , III. Educational values for measurement technology: Some theory and 
data . In W . E. Coffman (Ed.), Frontiers in educational measurement and il1j'ormation process-
ing. Boston : Houghton-Mifflin , 1974 . Ch. 3, pp . 13- 30. (a) 
Page, E. B., & Breen, T. F. , III. Factor analysis of educat ional va lues across two methods of 
judgment. Proceedings of the 15th 1nteramerican Congress of Psychology (Bogota, Colombia) , 
1974, pp . 106- 107. (b) 
Page, E. B. , & Canfie ld , J . Design of Navy course structure through a dynam ic programming 
algorithm. Report for the U.S. Navy Personnel R. & D. Center, San Diego, Calif. , June 1975. 
Page, E. B. , & Grandon, G. M. Mass ive intervention and child intelligence: The Milwaukee Project 
in c ritical perspective . Joumal of Special Education , 1981 , 15(2) ,239- 256. 
Page, E. B. , & Jarjoura , D. Seeking the cause of correlations among mental abilit ies: Large twin 
analysis in a national testing program. Special issue on Inte lligence , Joumal of Research and 
Development in Education, 1979, 12(2), 108- 11 7. 
Page , E. B. , Jarjoura , D. , & Konopka , C. Curriculum des ign through operations research. American 
Educational Research Joul'I/al, 1976, 13( I), 3 1- 49. 
Page , E. B. , & Keith, T. Z. Effect of U.S. private schools: A technica l ana lys is of two recent 
c laims. Educational Researcher, August 198 1, 10(7) , 7- 17 . 
Pedhazur, E. 1. Multiple regression in behavioral research: Explanation and prediction (2nd ed.) . 
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston , 1982. 
Raiffa, H. Decision analysis: Introductory lectures 011 choice under uncertainty. Boston: Addison-
Wesley, 1968 . 
Reschly , D. J . Psychological testing in educational class ification and placement. American Psychol-
ogist, 198 1,36( 10), 1094- 1102. 
Scarr-Salapatek, S. Race, soc ial class , and IQ . Science, 197 1, 174 , 1285- 1295. 
Schmidt , F. L., & Hunter, J . E. Employment testing: Old theories and new research findings. 
American Psychologist, 1981, 36(10), 11 28- 11 37. 
Stanley , 1. c., & Hopkins, K. D. Educational and psychologica l measurement and evaluation. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall , 1972. 
Taubman , P. (Ed .) . Kinometrics: Determinants of socioeconomic success within and betweenfami-
lies. Amsterdam: North-Holland , 1977. 
Thompson, J . N., Jr. , & Thoday , J . M. (Eds .). Qualllitative genetic variation. New York: Academ-
ic, 1979. 
Thorndike , E. L. The nature , purposes , and general methods of measurements of educational prod-
ucts. The 17th Yearbook of the Nat ional Society for the Study of Education , Part II . 19 18. 
38 PAGE 
Tillett, P. I. Optimization of secondary teacher assignments using operations research. Socio-Eco-
nomic Planning Sciences (London), 1975 , 9, 101 - 104 . 
Trueman , R. E . An introduction to quantitative methods for decision making. New York: Holt , 
Rinehart & Winston , 1974. 
VanDusse ldorp, R. A . , Richardson, D. W . , & Foley, W. J. Educational decision-making through 
operations research . Boston: Allyn & Bacon , 1971. 
Wagner, H. M. Principles of operations research: With applications 10 managerial decisions. 
Englewood Cli ffs, N.J .: Prent ice-Hall, 1969. 
Winkler , R. L., & Hays , W. L. Statistics: Probability, inference, and decision (2nd ed.). New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975. 
Wright, S. Correlation and causation. lournal of Agricultural Research, Inl, 20, 557- 585. 
What Cognitive Psychology 
Can (and Can not) Do for Test 
Development 
Robert J. Sternberg 
Yale University 
Whenever research is launched under a new paradigm for studying an old set of 
mental phenomena, researchers joining the new armada of explorers hope, at 
best, to discover new uncharted mental territories and, at worst, to provide new 
mental maps of previously charted territories that amend errors of the old maps. 
This has been I believe, the experience of cognitive psychologists studying 
mental abilities . Although they may not have revolutionized our map of the mind 
(yet), neither have they left the old maps standing. What is critical is that at least 
the flaws and incompletenesses of the new methods are different from those of 
the old . One can therefore be provided with some new insights about the mental 
phenomena being studied. Consider an analogy to polar and Cartesian coordi-
nates: Each provides a different and useful view of a world that is not quite so 
simple as either coordinate system would have us believe. Seeing the mental 
world in two ways can tell us more than seeing it in just one way. In the language 
of Gamer, Hake, and Eriksen (1956), we have provided "converging opera-
tions" to view a unitary phenomenon. 
I have divided my analysis of the contribution of cognitive psychology to test 
construction into four main parts dealing, respectively, with the contributions of 
cognitive psychology to: (1) content for construction of tests; (2) validation of 
tests; (3) scoring and interpretation of tests; and (4) modification of tests . Before 
discussing these contributions , however, let me say just what are the characteris-
tics that define "cognitive psychology" and what psychologists do in the cogni-
tive-psychological investigation of intelligence. 
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WHAT IS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY? 
Cognitive psychology is the study of the mind in terms of the mental (cognitive) 
representations and processes that underlie observable behavior. In particular , I 
find that cognitive researchers tend to address five main questions: 
I . What are the mental processes that constitute intelligent task performance? 
2. How rapidly and accurately are these processes performed? 
3. Into what strategies for task performance do these mental processes 
combine? 
4 . Upon what forms of mental representation do these processes and strat-
egies act? 
5. What is the knowledge base that is organized into these forms of represen-
tation , and how does it affect and become affected by the processes , strategies, 
and representations that individuals use? 
These questions have been asked of performance on a rather wide range of 
cognitive tasks. 
Cognitive Versus Psychometric Approaches 
The cognitive approach is often contrasted with the psychometric one, perhaps 
because historically it has seemed easy enough to separate the psychometricians 
of a given time from the experimental psychologists of that time (many of whom 
now call themselves "cognitive" psychologists) . However , I think it worth 
mentioning and even emphasizing that the distinction has never been as clear as 
Cronbach's (1957) paper on "the two disciplines of scientific psychology" or as 
the conventional wisdom (which may in part be based upon Cronbach's paper) 
might have one believe. Many of the great experimental or "cognitive" psychol-
ogists in the history of psychology have also been psychometricians and vice 
versa, and it often seems almost arbitrary to identify a given individual as one or 
the other. Consider some examples. 
Sir Francis Galton invented the correlational method and yet was an av id 
experimentalist. Alfred Binet invented the prototype for the most widely used 
psychometric intelligence test, and yet a close reading of his writings will show 
his often neglected theorizing to be as "cognitive" as any we find today. Charles 
Spearman invented factor analysis, and yet his 1923 treatise on the "principles 
of cognition" was a cognitive monograph and the basis for much cognitive 
theorizing today, particularly in the domain of inductive reasoning. Edward 
Thorndike is most well known for his experimental work in animal learning and 
yet was the author of a major book on the subject of psychometrically measured 
intelligence. Clark Hull, another famous learning theorist, wrote his first book on 
the subject of aptitude testing. Louis Thurstone, a psychometrician if ever there 
was one , advocated factorial methods as preliminaries to experimental ones, not 
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as replacements for them. Finally, J . P. Guilford, clearly identified as a psycho-
metrician, has also proposed a theory of intelligence in which one of the three 
facets describes the processes of intelligence. 
The list could go on and on, but I think the point by now should be clear: Even 
before Cronbach' s (1957) paper, there was already a substantial connection 
between psychometric and cognitive lines of endeavor. I do not believe they 
were ever quite so separate as Cronbach's paper suggested, and for all the 
overwhelming positive contribution the paper clearly made, it may have served 
the slightly negative function of tending to underscore the points of friction rather 
than the points of smooth contact. Today, I believe (in part because of the 
positive contribution of Cronbach's paper) that the distinction between psycho-
metricians and cognitive psychologists, at least in the research domain of intel-
ligence, is fuzzier than ever. People like Jack Carroll, Earl Hunt , Robert Glaser, 
Susan Whitely, Richard Snow, and myself, among others, could perhaps as 
easily be classified as falling into one camp as into the other. 
If the line between psychometrics and cognitive psychology is so unclear, just 
what is it that is distinctive about the cognitive approach? Certainly it is not just 
the questions asked , in that the questions listed earlier would also be quite 
relevant to the interest of many psychometricians theorizing about intelligence. 
Nor is it, really , the emphasis of the questions upon stimulus rather than subject 
variation. Psychometric methods, like factor analysis, really can be used to study 
either source of variation (although they are most commonly used to study 
subject variation) , and experimental methods can also be used to study either 
stimulus or subject variation (although they are most commonly used to study 
stimulus variation). 
The critical difference, I believe, is a sociological one and resides primarily 
(but not exclusively) in the professional identification of the investigator and of 
the methods he or she uses. A number of contemporary investigators, including 
this author, use multiple regression in modeling of test performance; for what-
ever reason , this methodology today seems more to belong to the "cognitive 
camp," despite the fact that multiple regression can certainly be and has been 
viewed as a psychometric method. Susan Whitely does a highly similar (although 
by no means identical) kind of modeling using latent-trait analysis and tends to 
be viewed more in the psychometric camp. Users of exploratory factor analysis, 
like Raymond Cattell and John Horn , tend to be identified with the psychometric 
camp, whereas users of confirmatory factor analysis, like Carl and John 
Frederiksen, tend more to be identified with the experimental camp. The lines 
between camps are certainly not clearly drawn, although they can be inferred to 
some extent by the conventions one attends and by the journals in which one 
publishes as well as by the methods one uses . The rationale for placing someone 
in one or the other camp is certainly not clear-cut. 
I have tried in several ways to make the basic point, one that I have come to 
believe only recently. This point is that the lines that have been drawn between 
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the psychometric and cognitive approaches to intelligence are often arbitrary and 
even capricious. If I speak in this chapter of the contribution of cognitive psy-
chology to the psychometric tradition of mental test development, I am speaking 
of boundaries between traditions that I think have much more to do with the 
sociology of science than with its substantive concerns. 
Cognitive-Psychological Approaches to the Study of 
Mental Abilities 
How do cognitive psychologists go about studying mental abilities? Cognitive 
psychologists are highly similar in their emphasis on intensive task analysis. The 
idea is to take performance on a single task and then to study it in great depth. 
One then constructs an information-processing model of performance in the 
given task, a model that specifies in considerable detail just how subjects solve 
the task. Only after the task has been intensively analyzed is an attempt made to 
generalize the results of the task analysis to related tasks as well. 
One can carve up the field in many different ways, as people in fact have 
(Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979; Sternberg, 1977, 1981c). I have loosely classified 
these different approaches into four different categories, but it should be under-
stood that these categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive with 
respect to current research approaches in cognitive psychology. 1 now briefly 
describe what each approach is, what its goals are, what kinds of research it has 
generated, and what its implications for test construction are. 
Cognitive Correlates. In this approach to understanding mental abilities, 
subjects are tested in their ability to perform tasks that contemporary cognitive 
psychologists believe measure basic human information-processing abilities. (In-
formation processing is generally defined as the sequence of mental operations 
and their products involved in performing a cognitive task .) Such tasks include, 
among others, the Posner and Mitchell (1967) letter-matching task, in which 
subjects are asked to state as quickly as possible whether the letters in a pair such 
as "A a" constitute a physical match (which they don't) or (in another condition) 
a name match (which they do), and the S. Sternberg (1969) memory-scanning 
task, in which subjects are asked to state as quickly as possible whether a target 
digit or letter, such as 5, appeared in a previously memorized set of digits or 
letters, such as 3 6 5 2. Individuals are usually tested either via tachistoscope (a 
machine that provides rapid stimulus exposures) or via a computer terminal, with 
the principal dependent measure of interest being response time. 
The proximal goal in this research is to estimate parameters (characteristic 
quantities) representing the durations of performance for the information-pro-
cessing components constituting each task and then to investigate the extent to 
which these components correlate across subjects with each other and with scores 
on measures commonly believed to assess intelligence (e.g., Raven's Progres-
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sive Matrices test) . Most commonly, correlations between parameter estimates 
and measured intelligence are statistically significant but moderately low- usu-
ally around .3 (Hunt, Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973; Hunt , Lunneborg, & Lewis, 
1975). The distal goal of cognitive-correlates research is to integrate individual-
differences research and mainstream cognitive- psychological research- in par-
ticular, by providing a theoretical grounding from cognitive psychology for 
differential research (Hunt et al., 1973). Thus, instead of trying to draw theoreti-
cal conclusions by correlating scores on one empirically derived test (e .g., rea-
soning) with scores on another empirically derived test (e.g., vocabulary), as 
differential researchers have done, cognitive-correlates researchers draw the-
oretical conclusions by correlating scores on an empirically derived test with 
parameters generated by a cognitive model of some aspect of mental functioning 
(e.g., memory scanning) . 
Cognitive-correlates researchers would be most likely to supplement psycho-
metric tests with information-processing tests based on standard laboratory infor-
mation-processing tasks such as the memory-scanning and letter-matching tests 
mentioned earlier. Rose (1978) has actually constructed and tested an informa-
tion-processing assessment battery based on standard laboratory tasks. Using this 
battery , one can isolate latency scores for a variety of different information-
process ing components. Rose's battery is an impressive one, although correla-
tions across tasks are relatively low , and correlations of the information-process-
ing tasks and parameters with psychometric tests or various types of real-world 
performance have yet to be reported . 
Cognitive Components. In this approach to understanding mental abilities, 
subjects are tested for their ability to perform tasks of the kinds actually found on 
standard psychometric tests of mental abilities-for example, analogies, series 
completions , mental rotations, and syllogisms. Subjects are usually tested via a 
tachistoscope or a computer terminal, and response time is usually the principal 
dependent variable , with error rate and pattern of response choices as secondary 
dependent variables. These latter dependent variables are of more interest in this 
approach than in the cognitive-correlates approach because the tasks tend to be 
more difficult and thus more susceptible to erroneous responses. 
The proximal goal in this research is first to formulate a model of information 
processing in performance on IQ-test types of tasks; second , to test the model at 
the same time as parameters for the model are estimated; and, finally, to investi-
gate the extent to which these components correlate across subjects with each 
other and with scores on standard psychometric tests . Because the tasks that are 
analyzed are usually taken directly from IQ tests, or else are very similar to tasks 
found on IQ tests, the major issue in this kind of research is not whether there is 
any correlation at all between cognitive task and psychometric test scores. 
Rather, the issue is one of isolating the locus or loci of the correlation that is 
obtained . One seeks to discover what components of information processing in 
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task performance are the critical ones from the standpoint of the theory of 
intelligence. 
Cognitive-components researchers would be most likely to supplement psy-
chometric tests with information-processing tests based on the psychometric 
ones, but with test items administered in a computer-controlled setting that 
would enable the examiner to decompose test performance into its information-
processing constituents. An information-processing analysis of a subject's induc-
tive reasoning performance, for example, would assess skills such as the indi-
vidual's ability: (I) to encode stimuli; (2) to infer relations between stimulus 
terms; (3) to map higher-order relations between relations; (4) to apply pre-
viously inferred relations to new settings; (5) to compare alternative answer 
options in terms of their similarities and differences; (6) to justify one answer as 
preferred but not necessarily ideal; (7) to respond; (8) to combine these compo-
nents into a strategy that results in efficient item solution; and (9) to represent 
information in a way that facilitates operations on the data base stored in long-
term memory (Sternberg & Gardner, 1982) . 
Cognitive Training . This approach to understanding mental abilities can be 
used in conjunction with either the cognitive-correlates approach or the cogni-
tive-components approach, or in conjunction with some other approach. The 
essense of this approach is aptly described by Campione, Brown, and Ferrara 
(1982). Essentially, the approach seeks to infer the identities of cognitive pro-
cesses through an analysis of effects of training. The cognitive-training approach 
has been used widely in a variety of domains. For example, Belmont and Butter-
field (1971), Borkowski and Wanschura (1974), and Campione and Brown 
(1978) have used the approach in investigations of learning and memory. Feuer-
stein (1979), Holzman, Glaser, and Pellegrino (1976), and Linn (1973) have 
used it in investigations of reasoning and problem solving. One conclusion has 
emerged with striking regularity in many studies by many different investigators: 
To attain both durability and generalizability of training, it seems to be necessary 
to train both at the level of metacomponents (or executive processes) and at the 
level of performance components (or lower-order p.ocesses used to carry out the 
orders of the executive processes- see, e.g., Belmont, Butterfield, & Ferretti, 
1982; Feuerstein, 1979, 1980). 
Cognitive-training researchers might follow any of a number of paths to 
testing depending on their choice of what to train and how to train it. One of the 
more interesting approaches to testing among such investigators is that of Feuer-
stein (1979), who has devised a "learning potential assessment device" that he 
believes measures cognitive modifiability, or what Vygotsky (1978) referred to 
as the "zone of potential development." Modifiability is assessed by giving 
examinees guided instruction in solving problems that the examinees are initially 
unable to solve and by evaluating the examinees' ability to profit from in-
struction. 
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Cognitive Contents. Recently, a new approach to research has emerged on 
the cognitive- psychological scene that has yet to be applied directly to the study 
of mental abilities but that seems to provide a good entree into such research. The 
approach seeks to compare the performances of experts and novices in complex 
tasks such as the solution of physics problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981 ; 
Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Larkin , McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a, 
1980b), the selection of moves and strategies in chess and other games (Chase & 
Simon, 1973 ; DeGroot , 1965; Reitman, 1976), and the acquisition of domain-
related information by groups of people at different levels of expertise (Chiesi, 
Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979). Research on 
expert-novice differences in a variety of task domains suggests that the way 
information is stored in and retrieved from long-term memory can largely ac-
count for the substantial differences in performance between experts and nov-
ices. This view would suggest that a possible locus of differences between more 
and less mentally able people is in their ability to organize information in long-
term memory in a way that makes it readily accessible for a variety of purposes 
(Egan & Greeno, 1973). Presumably , information stored in such a flexible way 
is maximally available for transfer from old to new problem situations. 
Because the cognitive-contents approach has not yet been directly applied to 
the investigation of differences in mental abilities, it is impossible to evaluate its 
utility for purposes of such investigation. But the approach seems to supply a 
valuable new inroad for mental-abilities research, and I expect it will be only a 
matter of time before it is used for this purpose. 
Cognitive-contents researchers might supplement psychometric tests with 
complex-learning or problem-solving tasks that elicit an examinee's knowledge 
base and the way in which knowledge is mentally represented . Such researchers 
would be particularly interested in the features of problems to which examinees 
attend. It has been found, for example, that less skilled physics problem solvers 
tend to pay more attention to surface features of physics problems, whereas more 
skilled problem solvers tend to pay more attention to deep structural features 
(Chi et aI., 1981, 1982). Cognitive-contents tests might also supplement cogni-
tive-components tests, with the former assessing knowledge deficiencies and the 
latter assessing processing deficiencies. 
Cognitive psychologists studying mental abilities differ markedly in the tasks 
they have chosen to study, in the dependent variables they use to study these 
tasks, in the kinds of theories that motivate their research, and in their concern 
with individual differences. Because I have more to offer later about differences 
in task content, I pass over this source of differences now. The kinds of depen-
dent variables that cognitive psychologists use include reaction time, percentage 
correct, breakdown of response choices, protocol analysis, and output of com-
puter simulations. Although choice of one (or more) dependent variable(s) may 
not seem like a major issue to many psychologists, the history of cognitive 
psychology up to the present has been marked by active (and at times explosive) 
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debates regarding the relative merits of various dependent measures (see, e.g., 
Ericsson & Simon , 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Pachella, 1974; Sternberg, 
1977 ; S. Sternberg, 1969). Cognitive psychologists also differ in the scope of the 
theories that motivate their research, with scope ranging from quite narrow 
(Egan, 1976) to very broad (Anderson, 1976) . The optimal scope of a motivating 
theory of intelligence has also been a subject of intense debate among cognitive 
psychologists (Anderson, 1976; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). Finally, cogni-
tive psychologists differ greatly in their concern with individual differences. In 
the past decade, cognitive psychologists have progressed from little or no con-
cern to an increasingly broad concern with this issue. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST 
CONSTRUCTION 
Cognitive psychologists studying mental abilities have investigated a wide range 
of tasks, some of which have been used in test construction. The tasks they have 
investigated differ in a multitude of ways, but it is convenient and, I believe, 
accurate to array them along a single dimension of task complexity , from simple 
and choice reaction time at one extreme to complex logic and mathematics at the 
other extreme. The tasks along this continuum differ in the apparent" level" of 
mental processing required . 
At the simple end of the continuum, Furneaux (1956), Jensen (1979), and 
Lunneborg (1977) have used simple and choice reaction time tasks to test the 
hypothesis that individual differences in mental abi lity can be understood largely 
in terms of individual differences in sheer speed of mental functioning . Hunt 
(1978; Hunt et aI. , 1975) has studied mental speed as well but at a somewhat 
higher level of processing. He has suggested that individual differences in mental 
abilities, especially verbal ones , can be understood in terms of differences in 
people 's speed of access to lexical information in long-term memory. In sharp 
contrast to Furneaux, Jensen, and Lunneborg, he has preferred to hold constant 
simple or choice reaction time divorced from lexical access so as not to confound 
his measurement of access speed . Pellegrino and Glaser (1979, 1980) , Snow 
(1979), and I (Sternberg, 1977, 1980c, 198Ic), among others, have claimed that 
the level of mental processing studied by Hunt and his colleagues is sti ll low and 
have preferred instead to study performance on tasks at a level of complexity 
equal to that of intelligence-test items . Like those cited earlier, these researchers 
have emphasized speed of processing, but particularly speed in solving relatively 
complex tasks such as analogies and syllogisms. Finall y, investigators such as 
Greeno (1980); Chi et al. (1982); and Larkin (1981) have suggested, if only by 
implication , that even the intelligence-test items are at too Iowa level of process-
ing and have studied instead performance in very complex mathematics and 
physics problems . 
In sum, the range of tasks studied by cognitive psychologists investigating 
intelligence is at least as broad as that studied by psychometricians. Indeed, the 
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range in levels of complexity is probably greater: Whereas most psychometri-
cians seem to have resolved the Galton- Binet dispute regarding test content to 
their satisfaction, cognitive psychologists seem not to have done so. 
Even if cognitive psychologists did display more agreement regarding the 
kinds of task performance that should be studied under the rubric of intelligence, 
it is not at all clear that they would have much to contribute to psychometricians 
by way of useful feedback regarding test content, because when cognitive psy-
chologists have used reference measures at all for external criteria for their tasks 
and theories, they have used intelligence tests and subtests rather than the behav-
iors these tests were themselves intended to predict (such as school grades and 
job success). Their use of psychometric tests as (obviously proximal) criteria for 
their own tasks and tests has made it impossible to use their data to modify the 
tests . One can use the criteria to suggest changes in the predictor but not the other 
way around! 
My message regarding the contribution of cognitive psychology to selection 
of test content is not a wholly pessimistic one, however. Some recent cognitive 
research has suggested promising lines of endeavor that I believe are now ready 
for at least pilot attempts in psychometric tests. I think three suggestions are 
clearly forthcoming, albeit from experiments using IQ-test items as criteria. 
First, there is good evidence that performance on the Clark and Chase (1972) 
sentence-picture verification task, which requires the examinee rapidly to indi-
cate whether a sentence representation (such as "The star is above the plus.") 
agrees with a pictorial representation (such as : ), can provide a quick estimate 
of a person's general level of intelligence (Hunt et at., 1975) and even, possibly, 
of their proclivity for verbal versus spatial strategies for problem solving (Mac-
Leod , Hunt, & Mathews , 1978; Mathews, Hunt, & MacLeod, 1980). The task is 
easy to adnlinister and usable for examinees over a wide range of ages, ability 
levels , and mental conditions. 
Second, there is strong evidence to suggest value in measuring fluid intel-
ligence by using novel tasks employing novel kinds of concepts (Snow , 1980; 
Sternberg, 1981 a). The important thing appears to be not the particular task or 
concepts used but their relative novelty for the examinees performing them . By 
novelty, I refer not only to a difference in content but to a difference in kind from 
conventional kinds of test items . 
Third, substantial evidence has now been accumulated for the considerable 
value in measuring crystallized, or verbal, intelligence of a task requiring exam-
inees to learn and then define previously unfamiliar words presented in natural 
written contexts (Sternberg, Powell, & Kaye, 1982) . Such a task appears to tap 
at least one major aspect of the antecedents of developed individual differences 
in verbal skills and knowledge. 
To conclude this section, cognitive psychology has probably not been at its 
best in suggesting to test developers the kinds of content they might profitably 
use in test construction . There is almost no resolution among cognitive psychol-
ogists as to what kinds of test contents best measure intellectual functioning, and 
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experiments have not been designed in ways that would be particularly informa-
tive with regard to suggested content even if cognitive psychologists could agree 
as to what kinds of contents to employ . Nevertheless, a few suggestions have 
emerged from cognitive research regarding several kinds of contents that might 
be beneficially employed in future testing. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST VALIDATION 
Whereas cognitive psychology has probably made its weakest contribution to test 
development in the realm of test content, it has probably made its strongest 
contribution in the realm of test validation and , in particular, construct valida-
tion. There is perhaps some irony in the fact that the paradigm that was perhaps 
hoped by some to provide a replacement for the psychometric paradigm has 
instead provided converging evidence to support its major findings. Let me 
elaborate . 
Whereas psychometricians have generally attempted to understand mental 
abilities through the construct of the "factor," cognitive psychologists have 
generally attempted to understand mental abi lities through the construct of the 
"process" and, to a lesser extent , the " mental representation" of information. 
Through successive refinements, cognitive psychologists have developed tech-
niques that seem to be quite successful in the isolation of mental processes 
(Ericsson & Simon , 1980; Newell & Simon , 1972; Pachella, 1974; Siegler, 
1976; Sternberg, 1977; S. Sternberg, 1969) . A few of the cognitive psychol-
ogists, such as Carroll (1976 , 1981) and myself (Sternberg , 1980a) , have ex-
plicitly addressed the question of the extent to which the structural factors of 
psychometric ians deal, at some deep level, with the same latent abilities as the 
processes of cognitive psychologists. We have concluded that both sets of inves-
tigators are, in fact, looking at the same underlying entities, albeit in different 
ways. 
I disagree with Carroll's (1981) position that factors are in some interesting 
sense more " basic" than are processes, and I also disagree with my own earlier 
position (Sternberg, 1977) that processes are in some interesting sense more 
basic than factors. So far as I can tell , there ex ists no empirical means to 
determine which is more basic, nor is it even clear what, conceptually , " more 
basic" means. If there is some basic molar unit in terms of which mental abilities 
are organized, we probably do not know what it is; even more discouraging, 
perhaps, we wouldn't know we knew if we did , in fact, know . At this point, 
therefore, I regard arguments regarding basic-level mental units as nonfruitful 
and believe we should probably be quite pleased that constructs from the psycho-
metric and cognitive, as well as from other approaches (Sternberg, 1981b) , have 
converged as well as they have in suggesting how mental abilities might be 
organized . 
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What, exactly, are these points of convergence? I believe there are three main 
ones . 
First , there appears to be some (i f you wish, higher-order) general factor or 
source of individual differences that is common to performance on a strikingly 
wide range of cognitive tasks (Holzinger, 1938; Jensen, 1980; Spearman, 1927; 
Thurstone, 1938; Vernon , 197 1). Individual differences in this general ability , or 
g, appear to derive in large part from differences in the functioning of (higher-
order) executive processes- such as solution planning, monitoring, and con-
trol- that regulate most mental functions (Butterfield & Belmont , 1977; Cam-
pione & Brown , 1978; Snow , 1979; Sternberg , 1979) . 
Second , there appear to be at least two, and possibly several more , broad 
constellations of skills that operate in fairly broad ranges of tasks but not, by any 
means, in all tasks. The two most prominent constellations, which have been 
referred to by many names but here will be referred to by the names of " fluid " 
and "crystalli zed" abilities (Horn & Cattell , 1966), encompass reasoning kinds 
of tasks on the one hand and verbal kinds of tasks on the other (Cattell , 197 1; 
Horn , 1968; Vernon, 197 1) . Individual differences in these abi lities appear to be 
traceable to present and past functioning of lower-order performance and learn-
ing processes, as well as to the interactions of these processes with the higher-
order executive ones (S ternberg, 1980c) . 
Finally, for however they may interact , it is important to separate speed from 
power aspects of performance (Carroll , 198 1; Egan, 1976; Guyote & Sternberg, 
198 1; Sternberg, 1977 , 1980b). Speed and power appear to be di fferentiable 
aspects of mental skill , and confounding them can lead to misleading or even 
downright incorrect conclusions (Sternberg, 1980b). 
To conclude this section, I would argue that cognitive psychology has pro-
vided a valuable complementary way of investigating pretty much the same 
constructs psychometricians have been studying all along . The contribution of 
cognitive psychology goes beyond a merely salutary or congratulatory one. 
Cognitive psychology has provided insights into the processes underlying the 
products studied by psychometricians and has told us what happens in real time 
to generate these products. The process models of cognitive psychologists, and 
the theoretical and metatheoretical schemes underlying them, have provided 
important insights into mental abilities that previously had been lack ing. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, TEST SCORING, AND TEST 
INTERPRETATION 
Using a cognitive approach, one would deri ve and interpret a set of test scores 
quite different from that derived and interpreted via a psychometric approach. 
The major di fference in scoring would be the isolation, in cognitive analysis , of 
subscores based on processes rather than actual or alleged factors . 
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Consider, for example, the rather global construct of reasoning ability . It 
would not be at all surprising to discover that individuals believed , for one reason 
or another, to be of low intelligence score below the average on tests of reasoning 
ability. But exactly what does this tell us? Does it tell us what it is that leads to 
the subject's low intelligence? Does it tell us what kinds of interventions might 
be indicated to increase the individual's level of intellectual funct ioning? Does it 
even tell us that the individual is low in reasoning ability as opposed, say, to 
encoding the terms of the problem so that the reasoning operations can be 
performed? I would argue that the answer to each of these questions is negative; 
in short, that the low score in reasoning provides relatively little by way of 
diagnostic or prescriptive information. 
A cognitive analysis of the bases of performance on one or more reasoning 
tests would seek to go "inside" the reasoning factor-to elicit for each indi-
vidual a measure of performance on each of the processes theorized in combina-
tion to constitute reasoning performance . In my own theory of inductive reason-
ing, for example (Sternberg, 1977, 1980c), separate component scores might be 
estimated for processes such as encoding, inference , application, and response . 
Other cognitive theories would yield somewhat different sets of process scores, 
just as alternative factorial theories yield somewhat different sets of factor 
scores. At the very least, any of the "reasonable" theories of cognitive process-
ing would permit a separation between performance on the encoding, pure rea-
soning, and response aspects of task performance. 
These process scores not only permit a finer diagnosis of strengths and weak-
nesses in congitive skills but permit as well the construction of a process-based 
training program . It is difficult to conceive of training something as ill-defined as 
"reasoning" but relatively easy to conceive of training a specific skill such as 
inferring relations. The relative ease of conceiving and actually of preparing such 
a training program should not, however, desensitize one to the considerable 
difficulty that can be involved in instantiating transfer of training in the indi-
viduals exposed to the program of instruction . 
The theoretical basis now exists not only for analyzing processing skills in 
reasoning tasks but for analyzing processing skills in other kinds of tasks as well , 
such as spatial, verbal, and numerical tasks. Yet, I do not recommend our 
actually implementing the theory in practice at this time . There are several 
reasons for my reluctance to what I view as premature implementation. 
First, obtaining reliable estimates of process scores for individuals requires 
very lengthy testing , usually via a computer terminal or comparable device . 
Thus, the technology does not yet exist for implementing theory in an expedi-
tious way. We need much more research aimed simply at enabling efficient 
measurement of process parameters of test performance. 
Second, the differential validity of process scores in predicting interesting 
criterion performances has yet to be demonstrated . At present, such differential 
validity is available as a promissory note rather than as a demonstrated accom-
plishment. 
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Third, although we have the means for isolating lower-order processes of 
performance (i.e., those processes used in strategy implementation), we do not 
yet have adequate means for isolating higher-order executive processes (i .e., 
those processes used in strategy planning, monitoring, and control). Yet, these 
latter processes are the ones I believe most crucial to understanding the bases of 
individual differences in intelligence. Until we have a feasible technology for 
isolating these more interesting processes, I am reluctant to advocate rapid im-
plementation of process analysis in mental-ability testing . 
To conclude this section, I believe we now have a theoretical basis for the 
scoring and interpretation of ability tests but that the practical basis has lagged 
behind. In some ways, this situation is a welcome contrast to what has been the 
typical one in abilities research, where theory has tended to lag behind practice. I 
believe that process analysis will eventually become both feasible and desirable 
in the scoring and interpretation of ability tests; the time has not yet come. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST MODIFICATION 
What are the implications of the previous discussion for the modification of 
ability tests? The answer depends on the time frame into which one puts it. At 
present , I think they are modest. None of the cognitive research that has been 
done has come up with any alternative test that is clearly better than the best of 
the ability tests we now have . But there have been interlaced throughout this 
discussion a number of promising notes that I would like to summarize here, 
because I believe they will, eventually, result in test modification. First, with 
regard to test content, I feel the research to date suggests the importance of using 
measurements based upon performance on novel tasks comprising novel task 
content. Second , with regard to construct validation , I think cognitive research 
has shown that current tests can be understood in terms of their measurement of 
process constructs. Third , with regard to test scoring and interpretation, I believe 
it will eventually be possible to measure executive and performance processes in 
technically feasible ways and that such measurements will provide new bases for 
diagnosis and training that are currently unavailable. Finally, I feel that cognitive 
psychology will continue to provide a basis for the questioning of some of our 
assumptions regarding the nature of mental abilities and how they can be 
measured . 
Let me give three specific examples of some dubious assumptions regarding 
the nature of mental abilities that are entrenched in mental testing , and let me 
show how these assumptions are being added into question by information-
processing research. 
Dubious Assumption I . To be smart is to be fast. The assumption that 
"smart is fast " permeates our entire society. When we refer to someone as 
"quick," we are endowing them with one of the primary attributes of what we 
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perceive an intelligent person to be. Indeed , in a recent study of people ' s concep-
tions of intelligence, when we asked people to list behav iors characteri stic of 
intelligent persons, behaviors such as " learns rapidly," "acts quickly," " talks 
quickly," and " makes judgments quickly" were commonly listed (Sternberg , 
Conway , Ketron, & Bernstein , 198 1). It is not onl y the man in the street who 
believes that speed is assoc iated with intellect: Several prominent contemporary 
theori sts of intelligence base their theories in large part upon individual dif-
ferences in the speed with which people process information (Hunt , 1978; 
Jensen, 1979). 
The assumption that more intelligent people are rapid in formation processors 
also underlies the overwhelming majority of tests , including creativity as well as 
intelligence tests . It is rare to find a test that is not timed or a timed test that 
virtually all examinees are able to finish by working at a comfortable rate of 
problem solving. I would argue that thi s assumption is a gross overgeneraliza-
tion: It is true for some people and for some mental operations but not for all 
people or all mental operations . Blind , across-the-board acceptance of the as-
sumption is not only unjustifi ed- it is wrong. 
Almost everyone knows people who , although often slow in performing 
tasks, perform the tasks at a superior level of accomplishment. Moreover , we all 
know that snap judgments are often poor ones . Indeed , in our study of people's 
conceptions of intelligence, " does not make snap judgments" was listed as an 
important attribute of intelligent performance. Evidence for the dubiousness of 
the " smart is fast" assumption extends, however, beyond intuition and everyday 
observation. A number of findings from carefull y conducted psychological re-
search undermine the validity of assumption. I will cite four such findings, which 
are only examples from a wider literature on the subject. 
First , it is well known that , in general, a reflective rather than an impulsive 
style in problem solving tends to be associated with more intelligent problem-
solving performance (see Baron , 198 1, 1982, for reviews of thi s literature). 
Jumping into problems without adequate reflection is likely to lead to fa lse starts 
and erroneous conclusions . Yet , timed tests often force the examinee to solve 
problems impulsively . It is often claimed that the strict timing of such tests 
merely mirrors the requirements of our highl y pressured and productive society. 
But ask yourself how many signi ficant problems you encounter in your work or 
personal li fe that allow no more than the 15 to 60 seconds allowed for a typical 
test problem on a standardi zed test; you will probably be hard pressed to think of 
any such problems. 
Second , in a study of the role of planning behavior in problem solving, it has 
been found that more intelligent persons tend to spend relatively more time than 
do less intelligent persons on global (higher-order, up-front) planning and rela-
tively less time on local (problem-specific, lower-level) planning. In contrast, 
less intelligent persons show the reverse pattern , emphasizing loca l rather than 
global planning (relative to the more intelligent persons) (Sternberg, 198 1 a). The 
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point is that what matters is not total time spent but distribution of this time 
across the various kinds of planning one can do . 
Third, in studies of reasoning behavior in children and adults, it has been 
found that although greater intelligence is associated with more rapid execution 
of most components of information processing, problem encoding is a notable 
exception to this trend. The more intelligent individuals tend to spend relatively 
more time encoding the terms of the problem, presumably to facilitate subse-
quent operations on these encodings (Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980; 
Sternberg, 1977 ; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979) . Similar outcomes have been ob-
served in comparisons of expert versus novice problem solvers confronted with 
difficult physics problems (Chi et aI. , 1982). 
Finally , in a study of people's performance in solving insight problems (arith-
metical and logical problems whose difficulty resided in the need for a nonob-
vious insight for problem solution rather than in the need for ari thmetical or 
logical knowledge), a correlation of .75 was found between the amount of time 
people spent on the problems and measured IQ. The correlation between time 
spent and score on the insight problems was .62 (Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). 
Note that, in these problems, individuals were free to spend as long as they liked 
so lving the problems. Persistence and involvement in the problems was highly 
correlated with success in solution : The more able individuals did not give up; 
nor did they fall for the obvious, but often incorrect, solutions. 
The point of these examples is simple: Sometimes speed is desirable; some-
times it is not. Whether it is desirable or not depends on the task, the particular 
components of information processing involved in solution of the task, and, most 
likely , the person's style of problem solving. Blind imposition of a strict time 
limit for a test, or even a not-so-strict one, is theoretically indefensible and 
practically self-defeating . 
Dubious Assumption 2. Intelligence is last year's achievement. At first 
glance, this would appear to be an assumption few people would accept. Indeed, 
doesn't almost everyone make a clear distinction between intelligence and 
achievement? But if one examines the content of the major intelligence tests, one 
will find that they measure intelligence as last year's (or the year before's, or the 
year before that 's) achievement. What is an intelligence test for children of a 
given age would be an achievement test for children a few years younger. In 
some test items, like vocabulary, the achievement component is obvious. In 
others , it is more disguised, for example, verbal analogies or arithmetic prob-
lems. But virtually all tests commonly used for the assessment of intelligence 
place heavy achievement demands on the students tested. 
The achievement-testing orientation exhibited in intelligence tests may be 
acceptable and even appropriate when the tests are administered to children who 
have had full y adequate educational opportunities in reasonably adequate social 
and emotional environments . But for children whose environments have been 
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characterized by deprivation of one kind or another, the orientation may lead to 
invalid test results . There is no fully adequate solution to the problem of identifi -
cation of the gifted among such youngsters, especially if the youngsters will have 
to function in the normal sociocultural milieu . A common solution to the prob-
lem, exclusive use of nonverbal tests, is almost certainly an inadequate so lution : 
First, one is measuring only a subset of important intellectual skills; second , and 
perhaps more importantly , nonverbal tests actually show , on the average, greater 
differences in scores across sociocultural groups than do verbal ones (Jensen , 
1980; Lesser, Fifer , & Clark , 1965). An alternative solution to the problem is to 
ask what abilities one is really interested in measuring by the achievement-
saturated tests and then to attempt to measure these abilities more directly and in 
ways that reduce the achievement load. This is the path we have followed. 
Consider two examples. 
Consider first one of the most common types of items on intelligence tests-
vocabulary. It is well known that vocabulary is one of the best predictors, if not 
the best single predictor, of overall IQ score (Jensen, 1980; Matarazzo, 1972). 
Yet, few tests have higher achievement load than does vocabulary. Can one 
measure the latent ability tapped by vocabulary tests without presenting children 
with what is essentially an achievement test? I believe one can. 
There is reason to believe that vocabulary is such a good measure of intel-
ligence because it measures, albeit indirectly , children's ability to acq uire infor-
mation in context (Jensen, 1980; Sternberg, Powell, & Kaye, 1982, 1983; 
Werner & Kaplan, 1952). Most vocabulary is learned in everyday contexts rather 
than through direct instruction . Thus, new words are usually encountered for the 
first time (and subsequently) in textbooks, novels, newspapers, lectures, and the 
like. More intelligent people are better able to use surrounding context to figure 
out the words' meanings. As the years go by, the better decontextualizers acquire 
the larger vocabularies. Because so much of one's learning (including learning 
other than vocabulary) is contextually determined , the ability to use context to 
add to one's knowledge base is an important skill in intelligent behavior. Is there 
any way of measuring this skill directly rather than relying on indirect measure-
ment (vocabulary testing) that involves a heavy achievement load? We have 
attempted to measure this skill directly by presenting children with paragraphs 
written at a level well below their grade level. Embedded in the paragraphs are 
one or more unknown words. The children 's task is to use the surrounding 
context to figure out the meanings of the unknown words . Note that , in this 
testing paradigm, differential effects of past achievement are reduced by using 
reading passages that are easy for everyone but target vocabulary words that are 
unknown to everyone. We have found that quality of children's definitions of the 
unknown words is highly correlated with overall verbal intelligence, reading 
comprehension, and vocabulary test scores (about .6 in each case). Thus, one 
can measure an important aspect of intelligence directly and without heavy 
reliance on achievement rather than indirectly and with heavy reliance on past 
achievement. 
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Consider second another common type of intelligence test-arithmetic word 
problems (and at higher levels, algebra and geometry word problems as well). 
Again, performance on such problems is heavily dependent on one's mathemati-
cal achievements and , indeed, opportunities. Can one measure the main ski ll s 
tapped by such tests without creating what is essentially an achievement test? We 
believe we have done so through the insight problems mentioned earlier. Consid-
er two typical examples of such problems: 
I . If you have black socks and brown socks in your drawer, mixed in the ratio 
of 4 to 5, how many socks will you have to take out to make sure of having a pair 
the same color? 
2. Water lilies double in area every 24 hours. At the beginning of the summer 
there is one water lily on a lake. It takes 60 days for the lake to become covered 
with water lilies . On what day is the lake half-covered? 
Solutions of problems such as these requires a fair amount of insight but very 
little in the way of prior mathematical knowledge. In most problems such as 
these, a common element in successful solution is selective encoding- knowing 
what elements of the problem are relevant to solution and what aspects are 
ilTelevant. Performance on such problems is correlated .66 with IQ. Thus , it is 
possible to use word problems that are good measures of intelligence but that 
require very little in the way of prior arithmetical knowledge (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1982) . Moreover, it is unnecessary to time problem administration. 
As mentioned earlier, higher performance is associated with more, not less , time 
spent on the problems. 
To summarize: We need not measure intelligence as last year's achievement. 
It is probably impossible to rid intelligence tests of achievement load entirely. 
Indeed, it may not even be desirable to do so. But the load can be substantiall y 
reduced by asking oneself what intellectual ski lls one wishes to measure and then 
by seeking to measure these directly through the use of items that tap the ski lls 
rather than their by-products. 
Dubious Assumption 3. Testing needs to be conducted in a stressful, anx-
iety-provoking situation. Few situations in life are as stressful as the situation 
confronting the examinee about to receive (and then receiving) a standardized 
test. Most examinees know that the results of the test are crucial for the exam-
inees' future and that I to 3 hours of testing may have more impact on the future 
than years of school performance. The anx iety generated by the testing situation 
may have little or no effect on some examinees and even a beneficial effect on 
other examinees . But there is a substantial proportion of examinees- the test 
anxious- whose anxiety will cripple their test performance, possibly severely. 
Moreover, because the anxiety will be common to standardized testing situations 
(although often not to other testing situations), the elTor in measurement resulting 
from a single testing situation will be compounded by error in measurement in 
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other testing situations. With repeated low scores, a bright but test-anxious 
individual may truly appear to be stupid. What is needed is some kind of 
standardized assessment device that is fair to the test anxious, as well as to 
others, and that does not impose a differential penalty on individuals as a func-
tion of a form of state anxiety that may have no counterpart in situations other 
than that of standardized testing. I believe that we have at least two promising 
leads in this direction. 
The first lead is testing based on the notion of intelligence as in part a function 
of a person's ability to profit from incomplete instruction (Resnick & Glaser, 
1976). A measure of this ability is now provided by Feuerstein's (1979) Learning 
Potential Assessment Device (LPAD), which although originally proposed as an 
assessment device for retarded performers, can be used for performers at varying 
levels of performance, including advanced ones . The device involves administra-
tion of problems with graded instruction. The amount of instruction given de-
pends on the examinee's needs . Moreover, the test is administered in a suppor-
tive, cooperative atmosphere, where the examiner is actually helping the 
examinee solve problems rather than impassively observing the examinee's suc-
cess or failure. The examiner does everything he or she can do to allay anxiety 
(rather than to create it!). Feuerstein has found that children who are cowed by 
and unable to perform well on regular standardized tests can demonstrate high 
levels of performance on his test. Moreover , their performance outside the test-
ing situation appears to be predicted better by the LPAD than by conventional 
intelligence tests (Feuerstein, 1979). 
The second lead is based on the notion that intelligence can be measured with 
some accuracy by the degree of resemblance between a person's behavior and the 
behavior of the "ideally" intelligent individual (Neisser, 1979). Sternberg et al. 
(1981) had a group of individuals rate the extent to which each of 250 behaviors 
characterized their own behavioral repertoire . A second group of individuals 
rated the extent to which each of the 250 behaviors characterized the behavioral 
repertoire of an "ideally intelligent" person . The investigators then computed 
the correlation between each person ' s self-description and the description of the 
ideally intelligent person (as provided by the second group of individuals). The 
correlation provided a measure of degree of resemblance between a real indi-
vidual and the ideally intelligent individual. The claim was that this degree of 
resemblance is itself a measure of intelligence. The facts bore out the claim: The 
correlation between the resemblance measure and scores on a standard lQ test 
was .52 , confirming that the measure did provide an index of intelligence as it is 
often operationally defined . And doing self-ratings involved minimal stress . 
The behaviors that were rated had previously been listed by entirely different 
individuals as characterizing either "intelligent" or "unintelligent" persons . 
The intelligent behaviors were shown (by factor analysis) to fall into three 
general classes: problem-solving ability (e.g., "reasons logically and well," 
"identifies connections among ideas," and "sees all aspects of a problem"); 
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verbal ability (e.g., "speaks clearly and articulately," "is verbally fluent ," and 
"reads with high comprehension "); and social competence (e.g., "accepts oth-
ers for what they are," "admits mistakes ," and "displays interest in the world 
at large") . (No attempt was made to classify the unintelligent behaviors, which 
were not the object of interest in the study.) 
I would not propose the behavioral checklist, or the LPAD, for that matter , as 
replacements for standard intelligence tests. Certainly, there is not enough valid-
ity information yet to make such a proposition. But I think that they deserve to be 
considered as supplements to standard tests. They are much less stress provoking 
than standard intelligence tests and may well be more accurate, at least for 
individuals who fall to pieces when confronted with standardized tests. Persons 
who scored high on these new indices but low on conventional indices would 
merit further follow-up before writing them off as weak or even average perform-
ers. Such measures carry the potential of identifying gifted individuals who are 
being lost for no reason other than their high levels of test anxiety . 
To conclude, although cognitive psychology has not yet provided (and may 
never provide) a basis for replacing existing psychometric tests , it has made and 
is continuing to make contributions that I believe will result in some important 
reconceptualizations of the nature of intelligence and its measurement. I think 
cognitive psychologists have made substantial progress toward this goal during 
the past decade, and I see no reason to believe that this progress will not 
continue. 
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The Status of Test Val idation 
Research 
Lyle F. Schoenfeldt 
Texas A & M University 
More than any other area, validation research is where the "rubber meets the 
road" in test construction and test usage. The very term validation implies the 
assessment or measurement of individuals and the relationship of this assessment 
to some criterion of performance. The success of a test validation effort, or the 
lack thereof, has implications for the value of the assessment and for the utility of 
the procedures. 
In today's environment, whether the validation is intended for employee 
selection, educational decisions, or personal counseling, there is an increasing 
probability that the outcomes of research will have legal implications. In the 
past, a testing program could be set up in terms of professional judgment without 
including the experimental validation of the procedures. If the individuals in-
volved in establishing the test program were knowledgeable, it was quite possi-
ble the tests, although unvalidated, would make a practical contribution in terms 
of the goals intended. In the absence of a formal validation, however, one would 
never know the extent to which the testing program was successful or superior to 
another assessment procedure. A testing program that does not involve validation 
research is at best an unknown and at worst may be an outright fraud. In either 
case, the likelihood that testing procedures will have to be defended, including 
the possibility of legal action, has increased dramatically. 
The purpose of the present review is to look carefully at the current status and 
future directions of test validation research. It will be of value to look at what we 
know, some of the problems with the process by which tests have been validated 
up to now, what needs to be learned, and how we will move ahead in the area of 
test validation research. Finally, it will be important to consider test validation 
research as a vehicle for improving test construction and test usage. 
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Test Validation: A Definition 
In the context of this discussion a test is defined as any measure, combination of 
measures, or procedure used to evaluate differences among people. In this man-
ner , the term tests includes the full range of assessment techniques from tradi-
tional paper and pencil tests to performance assessments, and includes such 
things as training programs (e.g., school achievement), situational assessment, 
and probationary tryouts. In other words , a test is any formal or informal assess-
ment from which an inference is drawn. For example, if a student transferring 
into a middle school were to be given a series of paper and pencil assessments as 
a basis for determining course assignments, few would disagree that these assess-
ments constitute a test. On the other hand, the same decisions could be made on 
the basis of an interview between a school counselor , the student, and parents. 
Because inferences about readiness for various courses result from the coun-
selor- student interaction, one could consider that this is also a test. 
Validity is the degree to which inferences from scores on tests or other 
assessments are supported or justified on the basis of actual evidence. Validity is 
not a characteristic of a test; rather it is a characteristic of inferences that resu lt 
from a test, assessment, or observation . Thus, validation determines the degree 
of relatedness between inferences made and actual events . 
History of Test Validation 
The history of measurement and validation is at least as old as Plato's Republic . 
Various summaries of the important events surrounding modern mental measure-
ments have been well documented (Linden & Linden, 1968). In his review of the 
role of tests in personnel selection, Guion (1976) developed a series of tenets that 
summarize the "orthodox" history of validation research. These tenets, as 
adapted from Guion (1976), are summarized in Table 4.1 . As seen, the emphasis 
is on developing a singular predictor- criterion relationship as the basis for deter-
mining validity. The dates in the table suggest that the tenets were well estab-
lished early in this century. Further, these values would not be wide of the mark 
in the 1980s for an investigator interested in a traditional validation project. 
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO TEST VALIDATION 
Criterion Related 
Traditionally, the criterion-related approach has dominated validation research. 
The "tenets" of criterion-related research are essentially those described by 
Guion (1976) and summarized in Table 4.1. It is possible to distinguish two 
alternate approaches within the criterion-related procedure. Concurrent valida-
tion involves the relationship of tests to criterion measures obtained at the same 
TABLE 4.1 
Guion's Historical Tenets of Orthodox Validation Research" 
Tenet 
I . The purpose of validation is to predict 
future performance . 
2. Predictors and criteria should be se-
lected on the bas is of job analysis. 
3 . Measuring instruments must be 
standardi zed . 
4. Tests should be empiricall y validated . 
5 . Validation is situation-specific. 
6 . More than one test should be used. 
7. Only one criterion should be used . 
8 . Tests are preferred over non test 
assessments . 
9 . Individual differences should be rec-
ognized in evaluating tests. 
Comments 
" It is ... essenti al to know whether the scores 
are in any useful sense predictive of subse-
quent success [Bingham, 1937, p. 216]." 
" the tests which are to be experimented with 
can be chosen onl y on the basis of some more 
or less plausible relationship between particu-
lar tests and the sOl1 of duties performed 
[Kornhauser & Kingsbury, 1924 , p. 47]." 
" In order for measurements of persons taken at 
varying times to be comparable, the procedure 
of the test must be unifo rm [Freyd , 1923, p. 
232]. " 
No test has any signi ficance before it is tried out 
(Link , 1924) . 
"if max imum value is to be attached to test 
scores the conditions under which 
the . [examinees performed] with the use 
of tests should reproduce in general the condi -
tions under which they . [performed] when 
the tests were evaluated [Freyd , 1923 , p. 
38 1] . " 
To quote Guion (1 976 , p. 783), " Hull (1 928) 
insisted that a battery of four or fi ve tests or 
more must be developed if the criteri on in all 
its complexity was to be predicted with max-
imum effi ciency." 
Freyd (1 923, p. 223) described the process by 
which "a criterion" should be selected . 
" The experimenter will not limit hi mself to any 
particular type of measuring instrument, but 
those in which he will be most interested are 
tests and questionnaires [Freyd , 1923, p. 
23 1] . " 
"If men and women are both .. [involved in 
the validation research] it will be necessary to 
examine the results for sex differences , and if 
need be, to eva luate the test separately for the 
two sexes [Freyd, 1923, p. 225]." 
" Adapted fro m G uion (1976). Copyright © 1976 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used by 
permiss ion . 
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time as the test data. Predictive validity involves the assessment of individuals 
followed by the collection of criterion information at some subsequent time. In 
some designs, the time factor can be an important consideration, whereas in other 
situations it is not. For example, in predicting job success, concurrent validation 
inevitably involves existing employees whose motives for performing well on the 
test may differ from the motivation of applicants. In other fields, such as psycho-
metrics, concurrent validity is used to demonstrate, for example, that a paper and 
pencil assessment is an adequate substitution for a more cumbersome, painful, or 
inefficient assessment procedure. In both cases, though, the goal is to develop 
and to test a hypothesis and (hopefu lly) to assert validity on the bases of a 
demonstrated relationship between individual characteristics and measures of 
performance. 
Criterion-related validity has traditionally been the most frequent ly used ap-
proach to test validation. In any instance of criterion-related validity, most atten-
tion is usually given to the decision about the selection of the criterion variables. 
Given that the validation process is one of inferences from test scores, the 
definition of the criterion or standard to be inferred looms large as a possible 
limitation in the criterion-related approach. 
The fact that two relatively recent review articles dealt with this subject 
(James, 1973; Smith, 1976) emphasizes the attention that criteria selection is 
receiving. Although the orthodox tenets of the traditional approach focus on a 
single criterion, which often is a weighted combination of several criteria or a 
succession of single measures, the emphasis of these two reviews is on a more 
complex approach to the development of criteria. Mention is made in these 
reviews of various models including the ultimate criterion (Thorndike, 1949), the 
complete final goal of a particular type of selection or training; multiple criteria 
approaches (Dunnette, 1963; Ghiselli, 1956; Guion , 1961; Wallace, 1965) (as 
exemplified by the model shown in Fig. 4. 1 and discussed later); and general 
criterion models (as exemplified by the models shown in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 and 
discussed in a later section). 
Content Oriented 
Another traditional approach to the validation of tests is the content-oriented 
procedure. This approach is applicable when empirical investigation is not possi-
ble and involves validation on the basis of assumed or hypothesized relation-
ships. The legitimacy of the content-oriented procedure lies in the degree to 
which the hypothesis itself is well grounded in carefully controlled observations 
and prior research results (Guion, 1976). Although mentioned in various texts 
and in the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests (American Psy-
chological Association, 1974), content-oriented validation has always been the 
stepchi ld of testing. Until quite recently information about procedures for dem-
onstrating content-oriented validity has been perfunctory, contradictory, or un-
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TABLE 4.2 
Steps in Content Va lidation 
I . Task analysis 
2. Definition of performance domain 
3. Survey of performance domain 
4. Development of items 
5. Demonstration that items constructed are representative of the performance domain 
6. Development of cut-off score 
avai lable. The emergence of content-oriented validity has been largely a result of 
a series of conferences (Guion, 1974a; Proceedings, 1975) , articles (Guion, 
1974b, 1977; Schoenfeldt, Schoenfeldt, Acker, & Pearlson, 1976; Tenopyr, 
1977), and manuals (American Psychological Association, 1974, 1975 , 1980; 
Mussio & Smith, 1973). The steps involved in a study of content-oriented 
validity are summarized in Table 4.2. 
Perhaps the criticism of these two approaches to validation has been best 
exemplified by Loevinger's (1957) belief that criterion-related validities are "ad 
hoc" and that content-oriented validity relies too much on the judgment of the 
investigator and is thus nongenerali zable. Loevinger believes that ad hoc argu-
ments are sc ientifically of minor importance if not actually inadmiss ible and 
terms both approaches to validation as "administrative" as her way of implying 
a lack of scientific basis. 
CONSTRUCT VALIDATION 
Definition of Construct Validity 
Construct validity is concerned with understanding the underlying dimensions or 
attributes being measured through any test or observation process. This type of 
validation is less concerned with specific performance inferences but instead 
considers the relationship of test scores to possible underlying attributes. 
Many researchers have conducted validation studies but tend to show little 
concern for construct validity. Construct validity is more in the nature of deter-
mining the sc ientific basis of a particular measure and frequently does not con-
cern practitioners. Evidence of construct validity is often fo und in a well-devel-
oped manual accompanying a particular test or is obtained by pulling together the 
results of studies dealing with a particular instrument. With regard to the latter, 
The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (B uros, 1978) lists over 5000 refer-
ences to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Undoubted-
Iy , the totality of this massive body of research provides much valuable in forma-
tion about relationships to other tests, to criteria , and (through various multi-
variate analytic procedures) to numerous constructs. 
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On the basis of relating particular measures to a wide variety of possible 
performance outcomes or other test scores, a network of research data is devel-
oped from which inferences could be drawn about the nature of the original test 
and the constructs that underlie it. Large-scale studies of construct validity are 
done and form the basis for new scientific learning about specific measures in 
particular and human differences in general. More than with other approaches to 
validation, a successful study of construct validity suggests and encourages 
further research. 
History of Construct Validity 
Construct validation has always existed, at least at an implicit level , but was only 
formally defined and extensively discussed in the mid- to late 1950s. A quote 
from Cronbach and Meehl (1955) best summarizes the early articulation of this 
conceptualization: 
Validation of psychological tests has not yet been adequately conceptualized, as the 
APA Committee on Psychological Tests learned when it undertook (1950- 54) to 
specify what qualities should be investigated before a test is published. In order to 
make coherent recommendations the Committee found it necessary to distinguish 
four types of validity, established by different types of research and requi ring 
different interpretation. The chief innovation in the Committee's report was the 
term construct validity. This idea was first formulated by a subcommittee (Meehl 
and R. C. Challman) studying how proposed recommendations would apply to pro-
jective techniques, and later modified and clarified by the entire Committee .... 
The statements agreed upon by the Committee (and by committee of two other 
associations) were published in the Technical Recommendations . ... 
Identification of construct validity was not an isolated development. Writers on 
validity during the preceding decade had shown a great deal of dissatisfaction with 
conventional notions of validity , and introduced new terms and ideas, but the 
resulting aggregation of types of validity seems only to have stirred the muddy 
waters. Portions of the distinctions we shall discuss are implicit in Jenkins' paper, 
" Validity for what?" (1946), Gulliksen's "Intrinsic validity" (1950), Good-
enough' s distinction between tests as "signs" and "samples" (1950), Cronbach' s 
separation of " logical" and "empirical" validity (1949) , Guilford's "factorial 
validity" (1946), and Mosier's papers on " face validity" and " validity generaliza-
tion" (1947, 1951). Helen Peak (1953) comes close to an explicit statement of 
construct validity as we shall present it [po 281]. 
Further discussions by Loevinger (1957), Bechtoldt (1959), Campbell (1960), 
and Ebel (1961) followed , and all contributed in refining of the definition of 
construct validity as well as in compiling ev idence necessary to substantiate its 
existence. 
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Multitrait-Mu ltimethod Approach 
In terms of providing a methodology to verify construct validity, the article with 
by far the greatest impact was "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the 
Multitrait- Multimethod Matrix" by Campbell and Fiske (1959) . In this seminal 
work, Campbell and Fiske (1959) advocated a procedure for triangulating a 
construct, utilizing a matrix of intercorrelations among tests representing at least 
two traits, each measured by at least two methods . Construct validity is the 
degree to which measures of the same trait correlate higher with each other than 
they do with measures of different traits involving separate methods. 
The importance of the multitrait- multimethod (MTMM) procedure is in the 
provision of a conceptualization of construct validity that could be readily opera-
tionalized by researchers . Interestingly, few articles or dissertations were pub-
lished in the 1960s using the MTMM approach. The rate of diffusion of the 
technology was understandably slow. However, the MTMM procedure has come 
into its own in the 1970s and 1980s . An extensive computer review of the 
validity literature revealed that 10 articles/dissertations were published in 1979 
and another 12 were published in 1980, using the MTMM approach. This is 
exemplary of how standard the procedure has become in the establishment of 
construct validity . 
There have been both extensions and critiques of the MTMM. Werts , 
Joreskog, and Linn (1972) suggested that the MTMM approach may be treated as 
a problem in confirmatory factor analysis and that the MTMM is subsumed by 
the general model for analysis of covariance structure. Other authors have pro-
posed further innovative factor analytic applications (Golding & Seidman, 1974; 
Jackson, 1975; Kenny, 1976; Levin, 1974; Ray & Heeler, 1975). Other exten-
sions have been in the application of nonparametric statistics (Hubert & Baker, 
1978) and path analytic procedures (Schmidt, 1978). Limitations of the MTMM 
have been discussed by Kalleberg and Kluegel (1975). 
Other Approaches to Construct Validity 
The multitrait- multimethod procedure has clearly become a standard for the 
establishment of construct validity. At the same time, given the definition of 
construct validity discussed previously, it is obvious that researchers are not 
limited in the number of procedures employed to establish its existence. In fact, 
given the nature of content validity , it is somewhat heretical to focus on methods 
rather than models , although to a large extent the two are closely linked in the 
context of this topic . 
Historically, factor analysis has been associated with the establishment of 
constructs. Many applications of factor analysis are in the nature of data reduc-
tion , and as such the results have little in the way of implications for the 
establishment of construct validity. However, in conjunction with an appropriate 
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model, factor analysis can playa valuable role in the validation of constructs. 
Guilford's (1967 ; Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971) extensive work on the structure of 
intellect is one of many examples that could be cited illustrating how a model and 
appropriate factor analytic procedures can come together in the establishment of 
construct validity. 
Another method receiving recent recognition as a vehicle for its contribution 
to the establishment of construct validity are latent-trait models (LTM). Several 
recent studies by Whitely (l980a , 1980b) provide an example of the potential 
contribution of LTM to the study of intelligence. LTM resolve several measure-
ment problems in studies of intellectual change, including ability modification 
and life-span development. L TM contribute to construct validity in their ca-
pability to represent an individual differences model of cognitive processing on 
ability test items. 
Construct Validity: State of the Science 
Although specific procedures play an important role in the demonstration of 
construct validity, the more important priority should be the research design. 
With regard to the latter, some of the most recent work was discussed in a 
conference on Construct Validity in Psychological Measurement (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, 1980). This conference involved several important 
themes. First was a call for more clearly defined professional standards for 
construct validity. Second was a discussion of the realization of the role construct 
validity plays, in conjunction with criterion-related and content-oriented validity , 
in the assessment of human differences. Included in this theme was the singularly 
unique application of a construct model in the validation of the Federal Govern-
ment's Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE) , as reported 
by McKillip and Wing (1980). 
A third theme of the conference involved a review of thinking and progress in 
several important areas of assessment by several recent contributors in each area. 
Carroll (1980) discussed background and progress in his assessment of abilities. 
Sternberg examined different approaches to the construct validity of aptitude 
tests in the context of an information-processing assessment (Sternberg , 1980). 
Jackson (1980) reviewed construct validity and personality assessment, conclud-
ing " that through a judicious combination of psychological analysis of disposi-
tional variables and psychometric and multivariate procedures, progress in per-
sonality assessment is possible [po 79]." Frederiksen (1980) and Messick 
(1980), in different presentations , discussed research models for construct 
validation . 
In his conference review , Dunnette (1980) developed a number of integrating 
thoughts with respect to construct validity. One of his main points was that, as a 
part of a scientific undertaking, the study of constructs should be pursued by 
diverse research strategies. Certainly anyone present at the conference or familiar 
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with the proceedings would be impressed with the diversity of approaches taken 
and with the state of the art with respect to sc ientific knowledge about intel-
ligence, aptitude, and personality constructs. 
MULTIVARIATE VALIDATION MODELS 
Psychologists and measurement speciali sts have been interested in predicting 
human behavior over a long period of time , although the shape and form of this 
interest has changed. Traditional interest was largely empirical and has been 
based on linear methods of prediction . Typical results have been disappointing. 
For example, Ghiselli (1966) has summarized 107 validity coeffic ients calcu-
lated to predict training and proficiency criteria. The mean validity coefficients 
in five major aptitude areas are shown in Table 4.3. As seen, coefficients are 
relatively modest, with the overall average correlation to predict training success 
being .30 and to predict the more important criterion of job performance, .19. 
These results have spurred many researchers to experiment with various multi-
variate models over the last 15 years . 
Person-Process-Product Models 
One class of approaches might be termed persol1- process- produc/ models in 
that they attempt to examine behavior as a complex outcome of interactions 
between individual attributes and organizational requirements within the setting 
in which the behavior occurs. Figure 4.1 is a schematic portrayal of a prediction 
model adapted from one suggested by Guetzkow and Forehand (1961). It was 
designed in an effort to take into account complex interactions that may occur 
among various predictor combinations, different groups or types of individuals, 
different behaviors, and the consequences of these behaviors. As Dunnette 
(1963) indicated , the model permits the possibility of predictors being differen-
tially useful for predicting the behaviors of different subsets of individuals. Also 
ev ident is the fact that similar behaviors may be predictable by different patterns 
of interaction between groupings of predictors and individuals or even that the 
same level of performance on predictors can lead to substantially different pat-
terns of behavior for different people . Also , incorporated into the model is the 
fact that the same or simi lar behaviors can lead to quite different outcomes 
depending on the situation . 
A simi lar model, couched in terms of predicting job performance, is shown in 
Fig . 4.2 (Campbell , Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick , 1970). In this model, job 
performance is viewed as a product of the person impacting with various organi-
zational forces . The individual is represented as a configuration of abilities, 
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Looking at the model from the individual' s point of view, a job involves task 
demands that are objective lists of expectancies or priorities imposed upon the 
individual in an attempt to alter behavior in specified ways. Due to this, an 
individual' s behavior consists entirely of emitted responses and performance on 
the job that includes those aspects of behav ior related to organizational climate. 
The result or product of the individual 's effort is a contribution to the organiza-
tion , the generalized result of performance. 
The models shown in Figs . 4.1 and 4 .2 are two of several that summarized the 
relationship between individual characteristics and outcomes. The implications 
are significant. Behavior is seen as a complex product of cognitive, noncognitive 
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FIG. 4.2. Model for the prediction of job effectiveness (from Campbell , Dun-
neUe, Lawler, and Weick , 1970, p. 475). 
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gy are the product of motivational forces. The level of motivation determines 
whether goal-oriented behavior occurs or not. Once an individual is motivated, 
the effectiveness of performance is determined by the cognitive capabilities, 
styli stic tendencies, and other attributes of the individual. 
Moderator Validation 
A study by Berdie (1961) suggested that persons differing in intraindividual trait 
variation (on measures of mathematics proficiency) might be differentially pre-
dicted to be successful or unsuccessful in engineering studies . Thus, intrain-
dividual trait variation was thought to "modify" performance predictions . Other 
efforts to discover moderators in predictions were given in studies by Fiske 
(1957) and Fiske and Rice (1 955), both of which were similar to the Berdie 
(1961) study. In addition , studies by Cleary (1966), Frederiksen and Melville 
(1954) , Ghiselli (1956, 1960a, 1960b), Lee (1961), and Rock (1969) are rele-
vant. In each case, the dominate theme has been an effort to identify persons who 
are consistently more (or less) predictable using particular sets of predictors or 
subgroups of persons requiring different prediction procedures. 
The procedures described are statistical in that they all involve variations of 
frequently employed prediction procedures . Although some of the procedures are 
more difficult to implement than others, unlike the models shown in Figs. 4 . 1 
and 4.2, all have been attempted in one or several studies . 
Recently it has become apparent that moderated prediction approaches are not 
much better than traditional linear methods of prediction. Zedeck (1971) , for 
example, showed that initially favorable results usually fa il ed to maintain their 
superiority upon cross validation. In discussing such statistical strategies, Dun-
nette and Borman (1979) concluded that: 
Select ion research must devote increased effort toward reducing sources of both 
variable error (measurement and sampling e~ror) and constant error (such as per-
ceptional biases) in the development of instruments and in the design of studies. 
Non-linear models may some day once again warrant attention but not until such 
errors have been reduced significantly to overcome the inherently superior robust-
ness of the simple linear model ,"p . 495 ). 1 
Aptitude by Treatment Interactions 
In 1957, Cronbach wrote of "The Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology," 
the one concerned with corre lation and the other, through experimentation, with 
the sequence of events. General discussions of the importance of combining the 
IReproduced with permiss ion, from the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 30. © 1978 by 
Annual Reviews , Inc . 
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"two disciplines," as Cronbach (1957) has been recommending, have been 
published by , among others , Owens (1968, 1971) and Vale and Vale (1969) . 
More recently Cronbach (1975) and Cronbach and Snow (1977) have published 
comprehensive and penetrating reviews examining the background into the na-
ture of the problem as well as the rationale for the aptitude by treatment (A TI) 
procedure they advocated as an alternate validation model for enhanced 
prediction. 
The results of the A TI approach to date have not been impressive . Evidence 
for significant interactions is scarce and fragmentary. Second- or third-level 
interactions tend to cloud any simple person-performance relationships, or at 
least render relationships inconsistent from sample to sample. In Cronbach's 
(1975) words: 
The line of investigation I advocated in 1957 no longer seems sufficient. Interac-
tions are not confined to the first order; the dimensions of the situation and the 
person enter into complex interactions .... Taking stock today, I think most of us 
judge theoretical progress to have been disappointing lp. 116]. 
Later in the same article, Cronbach (1975) states: 
When ATls are present, a general statement about a treatment effect is misleading 
because the effect will come or go depending on the kind of person treated. When 
ATIs are present , a generalization about aptitude is an unceltain basis for prediction 
because the regression slope will depend on the treatment chosen .... An ATI 
resu lt can be taken as a general conclusion only if it is not in turn moderated by 
further variables. If Aptitude x Treatment x Sex interact , for example , then the 
Aptitude x Treatment effect does not tell the story. Once we attend to interactions , 
we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity. However far we carry our 
analysis-to third order or fifth order or any other- untested interactions of a still 
higher order can be envisioned (emphasis added) [po 199]. 
Thus, in Cronbach' s own words , the A TI path he has walked in an effort to 
infer future performance better has not been fruitful. Gains were made, as re-
ported in the 1975 publication, but these were of less magnitude than had been 
hoped might materialize . These reservations have led Cronbach (1975) to pro-
pose abandonment of the A TI approach as a potential explanatory model for 
predicting performance behavior. 
Assessment-C lass if icat ion Model 
Although the list of approaches that have been attempted to improve the inferen-
tial or validation process could extend ad infinitum , one further procedure, 
namely the Assessment- Classification model described by Schoenfeldt (1974) , 
is worthy of mention. The Dunnette (1963) model , and virtually all the ap-
proaches discussed in this section, sought to improve the quality of inferences 
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made on the basis of the assessment data by identifying subsets of persons for 
whom predictors were differentially useful, for whom situational factors varied , 
and so forth. On the basis of these concerns , as well as in the interest of an 
alternative to the A TI model, Owens (1968, 1971) suggested his developmen-
tal- integrative model. The Assessment-Classification model, shown in Fig. 
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and the version most compatible with the models shown in Figs. 4 . 1 and 4.2. 
Thus , it incorporates the evaluation of person, process, and product (as sug-
gested by the models in Figs. 4.1 and 4 .2) with the subgroup conceptualization 
formulated by Owens (1968). 
The specific process involved in actualizing the Assessment- Classification 
model consists of providing separate categorizations of the predictor and criteria 
sets. In dealing with the predictor set, two steps are needed. The first step 
involves identifying standard predictors found to be related logically to the 
criteria in question. The individual differences variables of the Campbell et al. 
(1970) model provide an example of predictor variables that might be used. The 
second step requires implementation of the procedures described by Owens 
(1968), that is, formulating subgroups with respect to the major dimensions of 
antecedent behavior and relating the subgroups to relevant criteria . This entai ls 
administering a background questionnaire to assess the antecedent behaviors. On 
the basis of responses to this questionnaire, individuals would then be classified 
into subgroups that are homogenous with respect to important dimensions of life 
behavior. In other words, the subgroups are constructed on the basis of bringing 
together individuals who have reported similar background patterns . 
The other aspect of the Assessment- Classification model concerns the struc-
turing of the criteria domain, the jobs (in the case of Fig. 4.3), but with other 
criteria for other situations. In Fig. 4.3, the structuring of jobs into families 
homogeneous with respect to their performance requirements and desirable con-
figurations of attributes is illustrated. Also, several instruments have been devel-
oped and found to be of use for measuring or structuring jobs in terms of the 
psychological demands required for successful performance (Cunningham, 
1969; McCormick, Jeanneret, & Mecham, 1969). Other procedures would be 
used for structuring the criteria domain in educational or clinical settings. 
Unlike the conceptual models in Figs . 4 . 1 and 4 .2 that do not lend themselves 
to statistical evaluation or the statistical models that have been tried and found 
lacking, the results with the Assessment- Classification model have been posi-
tive . Schoenfeldt (1974) examined the validity of the model with a large sample 
of students (N = 1934) working toward college degrees. Subgroups formed on 
the basis of previous behavioral data collected during the freshman year differed 
with respect to criterion (major , grade point average, and so forth) measurements 
taken 4 years later. More importantly , the subgroups differed with respect to the 
curricular paths taken during college . The result indicated that it was possible to 
differentiate people in meaningful ways (i.e. , to subgroup individuals and to 
match these subgroups with similar structuring of the criteria domain). 
Two industrial applications using the Assessment- Classification model hav.e 
been reported. In the first, Morrison (1977) tested the model's efficacy in making 
placement decisions in an industrial setting with nonexempt employees . Eight 
developmental-interest dimensions describing life choices, values, and interests 
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of 438 blue-collar workers were formulated. Job analysis identified two clusters 
of positions that were homogenous within and differentiated between each other 
on relevant job attributes. One cluster composed of 102 incumbents with more 
than 6 months service consisted of process operator positions . The other cluster 
was composed of heavy equipment operator positions and had 148 incumbents . 
A discriminate function was calculated on a validation group of incumbents in an 
effort to develop a linear combination of the life history factors that maximinally 
differentiated the two job families. Cross validation demonstrated that three 
psychologically meaningful dimensions discriminated among the groups at both 
statistical and practical levels of significance. The process operators were more 
likely to be raised in an urban environment, to have a more favorable self-image, 
and to prefer standardized work schedules than the heavy equipment operators. 
The second study was by Brush and Owens (1979) and utilized a total of 1987 
nonexempt employees of a U.S. oil company. Each employee completed an 
extensive biographical inventory. Hierarchical clustering of the resulting bio-
graphical profiles produced 18 subgroups of employees such that, within anyone 
subgroup , background experience and interest were similar, and yet among 
subgroups they were different. A similar methodology was applied to job analy-
sis data in creating a structure of 19 job families for 939 office and clerical jobs. 
Significant relationships were found between biodata subgroups and other vari-
ables, such as sex, educational level , termination rate, job classification , and 
(most important) performance rating . 
VALIDITY GENERALIZATION 
One of the tenets of the traditional criterion-related validity model has been belief 
in the situational nature of the results . For more than 50 years , researchers have 
believed that the results of criterion-related validity studies were applicable only 
to the situation on which the study was based. This is understandable because 
research, such as that by Ghiselli (1966), has clearly demonstrated results of 
using the same predictors to predict similar criteria using different subjects in 
comparable (different) settings varied over a wide range. The empirical results of 
Ghiselli (1966) demonstrated considerable variability in validity coefficients 
even when predictors and criteria were essentially identical. 
On the basis of findings by Ghiselli (1966) and other investigators over a long 
period of years , the profession has concluded that validity generalization was 
essentially impossible (Ghiselli , 1966, p. 228; Guion, 1965, p. 126). This con-
clusion even has been incorporated into professional standards (American Psy-
chological Association, 1975) and government regulations (U. S. Equal Oppor-
tunity Commission, 1978). In fact, Guion (1976) indicated that the problem of 
limited validity generalization was perhaps the most serious limitation of person-
nel psychology . 
4. TEST VALIDATION RESEARCH 77 
Bayesian Validity Generalization 
Change in the belief of limited generalizability was seen in the mid-1970s and the 
years followed through the work of Schmidt and Hunter along with their col-
leagues. The initial article by Schmidt , Hunter , and Urry (1976) attacked the 
problem of small numbers typically used in validity studies. As pointed out in the 
Schmidt et al. (1976) article, it typically has been believed that sample sizes of 
30 to 50 individuals were adequate to make criterion-related validity studies 
technically feasible . To quote Schmidt and Hunter (1980): 
When sample sizes are in the 30- 50 range statistical power is typically in the .25 
to .50 range. That is, if the test is in fact valid, such studies will correctly detect the 
validity only 25-50% of the time. Sample sizes required to produce statistical 
power of .90 are much larger, often ranging above 200 or 300 [p. 43]. 
In further articles, Schmidt and Hunter (1977) and Schmidt , Hunter , Pearl-
man, and Shane (1979, pp. 260-26 1) identified seven artifactual sources that 
would explain the fact that different validity coefficients would result when 
identical predictors and criteria were studied within the context of the same job . 
The seven sources of variance that might lead to different results were as fo llows : 
I. Differences between studies in criterion reliability. 
2. Differences between studies in test reliability. 
3. Differences between studies in range restriction. 
4. Sampling error (i.e., variance due to N < 00). 
5. Differences between studies in amount and kind of criterion. 
6. Computational and typographical error. 
7. Slight differences in factor structure between tasks of a given type (e.g ., 
arithematic reasoning test). 
Schmidt, Hunter, Pearlman, and Shane (1979) proposed that a researcher 
with, say, 100 validity coefficients relating tests of perceptual speed to clerical 
proficiency compute the variance of the validity coefficient distribution and 
subtract variance due to each of the artifactual sources from this total. The 
Schmidt and Hunter (1977) article, as well as other articles by these authors, 
included computational procedures associated with the first four of the seven 
artifactual sources given previously. It is proposed that if the remaining variance 
is zero or near zero, validity generalization has been achieved, because the 
observed variation in validity results has been shown to be entirely a result of 
statistical artifacts. Further, as Schmidt and Hunter (1977) have pointed out: "in 
cases in which the mean of the corrected distribution is too low and/or the 
variance too great to allow conclusions [as to the generalizability of the validity], 
the corrected distribution will sti ll be useful-as the prior distribution in a Baye-
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sian study of the test's validity [p o 530)." The procedures and results of such a 
Bayesian study are described in the Schmidt , Hunter , Pearlman, and Shane 
(1979) article. 
Schmidt and Hunter , along with their colleagues, have diligently demon-
strated the generalizability of results from numerous small studies covering sev-
eral test- job relationships. In their initial publication (Schmidt & Hunter, 1977), 
they examined 114 validity coefficients relating tests of mechanical principles to 
performance of mechanical repairmen , 191 tests of finger dexterity related to 
performance of bench workers, 72 intelligence tests related to performance of 
general clerks, and 99 studies of spatial relations correlated with performance as 
machine tenders. In the Schmidt, Hunter, Pearlman, and Shane (1979) art icle 
these results were extended through the examination of generali zabi lity of vari-
ous tests related to performance in two fami lies of clerical jobs and the job of 
first-line supervisor. With respect to clerical jobs , the criterion-performance 
relationships of 11 tests were examined, with the number of validity coefficients 
ranging from 53 to 32 1. In their most recent report (Schmidt , Hunter, & Caplan, 
1981) , the generali zabi lity of validities were estab lished for four types of cogni-
tive tests and a weighted biographical information blank, five measures in all , in 
relation to performance in two petroleum industry job groups . 
The results of Schmidt and Hunter 's investigations have been nothing short of 
a revolution with respect to validation research. In essence, they have sorted 
through the confusing and varying results of a 50-year period to show that a 
"true" validity can be establi shed. They are of the belief that these estimates are 
far more meaningful than the results of typical studies with small samples for 
individual scientists and that validities are possible even when they are not 
technically feasible in the context of a particular predictor criterion relationship. 
Meta-Analysis 
The term meta-analysis comes from the work of Glass (1976, 1977) and involves 
integrating findings across studies. The idea is similar to that advanced by 
Schmidt and Hunter (1977), namely to bring together results from numerous 
small studies into an integrated study. Glass (1976) was seeking a way of organ-
izing and depicting results from numerous studies as an alternative to the tradi-
tional narrative review . Again, the most definitive work in the area is by Hunter, 
Schmidt, and Jackson (1982) and describes both quantitative and qualitative 
procedures for integrating findings across studies. The methods are similar to 
those in validity generalization, namely one of removing sources of artifactual 
variance . However, the range of possibilities is far greater than just the simple 
correlation coefficients considered in the validity genera lization work. Hunter et 
al. (1982) deal with the possibility that results of the several studies to be 
integrated might be presented in terms of diverse statist ical procedures , such as 
regression , canonical correlation, or multivariate analysis of variance. In addi-
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tion, procedures were considered for identifying moderator variables or interac-
tions that are indicative of findings that might be selected to be integrated . 
Meta-analysis has clearly been an innovation whose time has come. Although 
the original introduction of the method by Glass was 1976- 1977, there have 
already been extensive publications using meta-analysis procedures. An exten-
sive computer review of the validity literature for 1980 and 1981 indicated II 
and IO articles/dissertations, respectively . This is extremely rapid diffusion, 
equivalent to the current diffusion of the multitrait-multimethod matrix after 20 
years . 
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 
New attention has been focused on procedures that have been available for over 
30 years to estimate work force productivity on the basis of validity information. 
Some of the original work can be traced to Brogden (1949) and the well-known 
publication by Cronbach and GIeser (1965), Psychological Tests and Personnel 
Decisions. More recently Schmidt, Hunter , McKenzie, and Muldrow (1979) 
have suggested simplified procedures that make the previously cumbersome 
productivity analysis approach within the range of possibilities in most 
situations . 
The goal in productivity analysis is to estimate the dollar impact that would be 
realized in using a valid test to select individuals for a particular job. In the past 
the practical value of a selection procedure has been estimated in terms of the 
increase in the percentage of "successful" workers through expectancy table 
analysis or some equivalent procedure. Seldom have these estimates been in 
terms of the economic implications of the valid selection procedure on work 
force productivity. 
The basic formula for overall gain in utility from use of a test is: 
where number of selectees 
cost of testing one applicant 
selection ratio 
average standard score on the test of those 
selected (in applicant group standard score 
units) 
test validity 
standard deviation of job performance in 
dollar terms among randomly selected 
employees . 
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As shown by Schmidt and Hunter ( 1980), the first four items of information are 
easi ly determined. In the past it was believed that the standard deviation of job 
performance dollars (SD) could only be estimated using cost accounting pro-
cedures that were both complex and uncertain. Schmidt and Hunter (1980) have 
shown how SDy could be estimated by supervisors of the job under study using a 
questionnaire procedure. In the Schmidt and Hunter (1980) study , budget analy-
sis supervisors were given the following instructions: 
Now, based on your experience with agency budget analysts, we would li ke for you 
to estimate the yearly value to your agency of the products and services produced 
by the average budget analyst . Consider the quality and quantity of output typical 
of the average budget analyst in the value of this output. In placing an overall dollar 
value on this output, it may help to consider what the costs would be of having an 
outside consulting firm provide these products and services [pp. 55- 56). 
Following an appropriate opportunity to provide that estimate , the supervisors 
were instructed: . 
We would now like you to consider the " superior" budget analyst. Let us define a 
"superior" performer as a budget analyst who is at the 85th percentile.That is , his 
performance is better than that of 85 percent of his fellow budget analysts and only 
15 percent of budget analysts turn in better performances . Consider the quality and 
quantity of the output typical of the "superior" budget analyst. Then estimate the 
value of these products and serv ices . In placing an overall dollar value in this 
output, it may again help to consider what the costs would be of having an outside 
consulting firm perform these products and services [p. 56). 
Schmidt and Hunter (1980) were ab le to use these estimates to obtain final 
estimates for SDy and were able to estimate the value of productivity gains from 
the use of a test in hiring 2000 budget analysts at over 32 million dollars. 
These fairly innovative procedures for estimating the component of an impor-
tant equation (SD) should make feasib le the analysis of the productivity impact 
of selection procedures. As Schmidt and Hunter (1980) concluded: "the resu lts 
of these analyses will convince many who are currently skeptical that good 
selection is critical to organizational success [po 57)." 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TEST CONSTRUCTION AND TEST 
USAGE 
It is worth reemphasizing that validity speaks to the ultimate value of a test by 
affirming, or denying if that be the case, the inferential value of the score in a 
particular circumstance . As such, validity evidence has obvious implications for 
the worthiness of a test's construction and the appropriateness of its usage. 
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Problems with the Process of Validation Research 
Despite the importance of validity ev idence, validation research has not always 
been of the nature that one could point to with pride. The initial half of this 
century could be characterized as relying most heavily on criterion-related evi-
dence of validity, often in a way that represented "blind empiricism" at its 
worst. To be sure, the methods of factor analysis popularized in the 1930s 
encouraged the development of constructs , but the ,methods were somewhat 
prohibitive until the commercial availability of the electronic computer in the 
mid-1950s . Until rather recently , validity research meant a predictor- criterion 
correlation to the average practitioner. Even worse , as evidenced by the intial 
court cases on employment discrimination, tests had a half-life of their own and 
often enjoyed widespread use without concomitant validity ev idence. In retro-
spect, it was clear that validation, as the feedback loop to test construction and 
test usage, could not operate effectively if not undertaken. 
Changes in Validation Research 
Change was rapid and proceeded along several fronts. The formalization of 
construct validation, more than anything else, legitimized validation research as 
a scientific undertaking rather than as a practitioner art. The definition of con-
struct validity began in the mid-1950s and has continued in a steady, albeit slow , 
progression ever since. Certainly the 1979 conference discussed at length earlier 
showed that much progress has been made and that work continues using the 
diverse research strategies recommended. 
There can be no doubt that Title VII of the Civ il Rights Act of 1964 has been a 
profound stimulus in validation research. Although there was a latency period of 
6 or 7 years before the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1 97 1) case communicated in 
clear and forceful terms that tests had to measure the person for the job and not 
the person in the abstract, the effect has been profound , 
The initial flurry of activity, at least at the practitioner level, involved efforts 
to validate existing tests. Implications for test usage were immediate as valida-
tion efforts failed and test programs for employee selection were discontinued. 
At the same time, work was initiated on alternate validation strategies. These 
alternatives included such diverse approaches as attempts to define and refine 
further content-oriented validity along with application of several of the multi-
variate validation models discussed previously . The obv ious capstone to these 
many efforts has been the validity generalization research by Frank Schmidt , 
John Hunter, and their colleagues. 
The Future of Validation Research 
The future of validation research is promising. There has been more progress in 
the last decade than in the previous quarter century . Extending thi s trajectory will 
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undoubtedly lead to new learning about the inferential value of tests in predicting 
and understanding behavior. 
Obviously the work on validity generalization will continue . The profess ion 
has had only a short time to adjust to these fairly unique notions. Perhaps the 
recency of the research is best exemplified by the fact that virtually all the work 
has been by Schmidt and Hunter, along with their students. Ultimately their work 
should render as obsolete the need for the empirical validation that has so charac-
terized the research to date . Practitioners and researchers will only need to 
analyze jobs or situations of concern and , on the basis of these circumstances, 
consult tables of generalized validities from the numerous previous studies using 
various predictors in similar circumstances . This work is still in its infancy , and 
the implications are yet to be fe lt. 
The inferential value of any single assessment or combination of measures is 
at best such to explain half the criterion variance. This is not a problem that will 
be addressed by the ongoing work on validity generalization or utility concepts. 
Instead , the multivariate validation models hold the single best hope of improv-
ing the inferential value of assessments. By seeking to incorporate information 
about the types of individuals and types of behaviors with organizational consid-
eration and consequences, these models hold the best hope of improving the level 
of predictions. As we have seen (Owens & Schoenfeldt , 1979) , these multivari-
ate procedures can bridge the construct and empirical validity procedures. On the 
other hand , the procedures are complex, and progress has been slow. The hope 
of the future is being unshackled from the necessity of endless small studies of 
empirical validity with efforts being directed to the multivariate procedures. 
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It was the Chinese over 3000 years ago, not the Americans in this century, who 
first used large-scale psychological testing (Dubois, 1966). But, as with many 
other technological developments, it was the United States that enthusiastically 
adopted the method (Haney, 1981). By now it is highly probable that every 
person in our country has been affected in some way by the administration of 
tests. Testing has become the means by which major decisions about people's 
lives are made in industry, education, hospitals, mental health clinics, and the 
civil service. 
Tests themselves, by and large, are facially neutral. They do not inherently 
discriminate against those who take them and, undoubtedly, scores derived from 
tests have been used to admit, advance, and employ. For most people, however, 
test results have served as exclusionary mechanisms- to segregate, institutional-
ize , track, and deny access to coveted and increasingly scarce employment 
opportunities . 
At one time, the work of academic and applied psychometricians went vir-
tually unexamined by the law, but as the use of tests increased in the United 
States, so did their potential for causing legally cognizable injury to test takers . 
As a resu lt , there is probably no current activity performed by psychologists so 




Although recent lig itation and legislation directly affect the continued admin-
istration of psychological testing, most especiall y in employment and educa-
tional settings, it is my contention that what appears to be an antitesting move-
ment in the courts and in Congress is not an anti testing movement at all. It is my 
thesis that , in the main , the law 's concern about testing has been evoked by the 
following three major social developments. 
I. Our society in the las t 30 years has made attempts, albeit unevenly , to 
undo the effects of history of de jure segregation and discrimination against 
racial and ethnic minorities. Many of the more familiar cases, such as Larry P. 
v. Riles (1979) affecting individual intelligence scales, Debra P. v. Turlington 
(1981) t concerning minimal competency tests, and Teal v. Connecticut (1982) 
litigating nuances of employment selection assessment, flow inexorably from 
Brown v. Education (1954) and are simply renewed claims by minorities for the 
fulfillment of the meaning of the 14th Amendment 's equal protection clause. 
They refl ect the most recent challenges to practices that are perceived as attempts 
to continue, in a more sophisticated manner, the racial and ethnic separation 
more blatantly used in the early 1950s and 1960s by educational institutions and 
public and private employers . 
2. The courts have recognized , as a constitutional imperative, the right 
against impermissible intrusion by the government into the private li ves of its 
citizens. Defining the right to privacy has been di fficult for the courts, but 
recently the Supreme Court noted that one aspect of the right " is the individual 
interest in avoiding di sclosure of personal matters [Whalen v. Roe, 1977 , p. 
598]" or as the late Justice Brandeis more esthetically phrased it , " the right to be 
let alone [Olmstead v. United States, 1927, p. 478]." If, as Reubhausen and 
Brim ( 1965) assert , the' 'essence of privacy is . .. the freedom of the individual 
to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which , and most 
importantly , the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are 
to be shared with or withheld from others [pp. I 189- 11 90]," one can eas il y see 
why the broad spectrum of testing, but particularly personality and attitude 
testing , wou ld be the object of legal scrutiny. 
3. Finally, there has been a third soc ial development that has influenced the 
law's concern with testing. Unlike judicial declarations concerning di scrimina-
tion and privacy, this last influence is not of recent vintage . As a soc ial phe-
nomenon it has been part of human culture since its beginning. If you will pardon 
a highly technical psycholegal term, I would like to call this third aspect stu-
pidity. Stupidity may be defined as negligence or, alternatively, the fa ilure to use 
reasonable care in carrying out one's obligations. Although it does not connote 
IComplete c itations for a ll cases referenced in the tex t are found in Table 5. 1. 
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intentional or willful desire to harm, negligent harm can be just as damaging as 
purposefully inflicted injury. It is my thesis that stupidity , more than modern 
interpretations of equal protection and privacy , has been responsible for the 
increased legal regulation of psychological testing. On this count, both psychol-
ogists and judges must be faulted. 
I believe that almost all the important legal decisions concerning psychologi-
cal testing may be viewed as various combinations of the social phenomena 
identified as items 1 to 3 just given. I would like to spend some time in develop-
ing this thesis by giving several pertinent examples from educational , em-
ployment , and forensic settings . 
SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON LEGAL DECISIONS: SOME 
EXAMPLES 
Education 
The Supreme Court's ringing declarations in Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) ended state-imposed segregation in the public schools. But in the decade 
after Brown, many southern school systems refused to accept the Court ' s deci-
sion as final. They interpreted the Court's assertion that separation of black 
children from white "solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority ... that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone [po 494]" as an empirically testable hypothesis , not a normative legal 
principle . Thus, in the early 1960s one of Georgia's school systems sought to 
disprove what it believed to be an erroneous factual premise . It alleged the seg-
regation they were accused of perpetuating was not based on color "but rather 
upon racial traits of educational significance as to which racial identity was only 
a convenient index [Stell v. Savannah- Chatham County Board of Education, 
1963, p. 668]." They attempted to show that differences in learning rates , 
cognitive ability, behavioral traits, and capacity for education in general were so 
great that not only was it impossible for black children and white children to be 
educated effectively in the same room but that to "congregate children of such 
diverse traits in schools . . . would seriously impair the educational oppor-
tunities of both white and Negro and cause them grave psychological harm [po 
668]. " 
To prove their contentions the defendants called several expert witnesses, 
among them two psychologists, Travis Osborne and Henry Garrett. Based on 
such instruments as the California Achievement Test and the California Mental 
Maturity Tests, they testified that significant differences in test scores were 
indicative of inherent differences in the races and that only minor changes could 
be achieved by educational readjustment or other environmental change. AI-
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though these test results and testimonies went unchallenged by attorneys fi ghting 
to enforce desegregation, the idea that such devices could measure innate ability 
found its way into a 1967 decision that , at the time, became the most persuasive 
and widely quoted legal opinion of its kind . That case is Hobson v. Hansen. 
At issue in Hobson was not psychological testing but rather the constitu-
tionality of disparities in the allocation of financial and educational resources in 
the Washington, D.C., public school system that , it was claimed, favored white 
children. Also at issue was the overrepresentation of black children in lower, and 
white children in upper, ability groups. But, in the course of the tri al, it was 
adduced that the method by which track assignments were made depended al-
most entirely on such standardized group ability scales as the Metropolitan 
Readiness and Achievement Test and the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability 
Test. Hobson, when read in its entirety, represents the justi fied condemnation of 
rigid , poorly conceived classification practices that negatively affected the edu-
cational opportunities of minority children and led to permanent stigmatization of 
blacks as unteachable . But swept within Hobson' s condemnation of harmful 
classification practices were ability tests used as the sole or primary decision-
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making dev ices to justify placement. Not only was ability grouping as then 
practiced in the District of Columbia abolished , but tests were banned unless they 
could be shown to measure children's innate capacity to learn . No psychologist 
who has written on the subject, including Jensen (1969 , 1980) , believes that tests 
solely measure hereditary endowment (Anastasi, 1976; Cleary, Humphreys, 
Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975). No test could pass such a criterion . 
Left unscathed in Hobson were the stately, revered, and venerated devices 
against which all other tests were measured- the individual intelligence scales. 
But that was soon to change as the result of actions brought in San Francisco and 
Chicago. Two diametrically opposed decisions, Larry P. v. Riles (1979) (the San 
Francisco case) and PASE v. Hannon (1980) (the Chicago case) are seen by 
psychologists as attacks on IQ tests. That, however, is a significant mispercep-
tion . Like Hobson, these two pieces of litigation are actually challenges to 
educational practices deemed to be discriminatory . [Similarly , the recent attack 
on minimal competency tests, see Debra P . v. Turlington (1981), is more appro-
priately seen as a claim by black children that the use of such tests is merely a 
subtle but effective effort by states to resegregate the public schools .] 
The real issue was the basis for di sproportional placement of black children in 
segregated, self-contained classes for the educably mentally retarded. Through-
out his opinion , Judge Peckham in Larry P. v. Riles [hereafter Riles] labeled the 
EMR program "dead-end," " isolating," " inferior," and "stigmatizing." Re-
lying on the testimony of state employees or printed material from the state 
department of education, the court concluded California's EMR classes were 
"designed to separate out children who are incapable of learning in regular 
classes [Riles, 1979, p. 941]" and were not meant to provide remedial instruc-
tion so that children could learn the sk ills necessary for eventual return to regular 
instruction. Given these characteristics , the court considered "the decision to 
place children in these classes . .. a crucial one. Children wrongly placed in 
these classes are unlikely to escape as they inevitably lag farther and farther 
behind the children in regular classes [po 942]." And, as in Hobson, the primary 
bas is for these decisions were found to be tests- most often the WISC-R and the 
Stanford-Binet. 
Interpreting the nondiscriminatory provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 
94-142), particularly regulations requiring that assessment instruments be "vali -
dated for the specific purpose for which they are used [35 C.F.R. §104.35; 34 
C.F.R. §300 .532]," Judge Peckham found the challenged tests unable to meet 
that requirement. The tests, the court ruled, would have to be shown valid for 
selecting children who belonged in substandard , segregated educational anachro-
ni sms (otherwise known as EMR classes). And because that kind of validation 
had not been done, the court permanently prohibited California "from utili zing, 
permitting the use of, or approving the use of any standardized tests .. . for the 
identification of black EMR children or their placement into EMR classes [po 
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989]" without first securing the court's approva l. Even Judge Grady, who in 
PASE v. Hannon ( 1980) upheld the use of individual intelligence tests in a 
similar challenge concluded that inappropriate placement in an EMR class was 
an educational tragedy that was li kely to be totally harmful. 
Emp loyment 
Similar phenomena as I have described in public schools occurred in em-
ployment settings. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), which introduced the 
concept of " job-relatedness" into the law of employment testing and created a 
morass not yet fully resolved, wou ld never have been decided if the defendants 
had not had a history of racial discrimination. Prior to 1965, the Duke Power Co. 
openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of em-
ployees at its Dan River plant. Blacks were employed only in the lowest level 
jobs and at the lowest rate of pay. In 1964 Congress passed Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin . On July 2, 1965, the date on which Title VII took 
effect, Duke Power decided to no longer restrict blacks to the lowest level 
positions. However, at the same time, it instituted a policy that, to qualify for 
placement in higher leve l positions, employees would have to achieve sati sfacto-
ry scores on the Wonderlic Personnel Test, purportedly an intelligence measure, 
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Blacks challenged the tests, 
claiming that neither instrument was directed or intended to measure the ability 
to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. A unanimous Supreme 
Court faulted the company for using "broad and general testing devices [p o 
433]" and reminded the defendants that although the use of tests was permissible 
under Title VII, they had to "fairly measure the knowledge or sk ills required by 
the particular job [po 433]." 
Simi larly, accusations of purposeful discrimination in both the private and 
public sector has stimu lated litigation in such cases as Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody (1975) and Firefighters Institute v. City of St. Louis ( 1980). The result 
has been increasingly sophisticated challenges to professionally developed tests 
even in situations where purposeful discrimination is not an issue [e.g., Guard-
ian Association of New York City v. Civil Service Commission (1980); Teal v. 
Connecticut (1982)]. Like educational tests, "employment tests are being sub-
jected to a degree of governmental scrutiny that very few human contrivances 
could bear [Wigdor, 1982, p. 67]. " 
Privacy 
Although discrimination has evoked judicial scrutiny of ability tests, the concern 
for the right to privacy has stimulated similar examination of personality tests. If 
stupidity has ever fostered a judicial decision concern ing testing, there is no 
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better example than Merriken v. Cressman (1973) . The case had its origins in 
1970 when a survey, ordered by the Commiss ion of Montgomery County , Penn-
sylvania and conducted by a company called Scientific Resources , revealed that 
many children in the county were heavily involved with drugs. Most of the 
children who used drugs, the study claimed, possessed some common charac-
teristics. For example, one finding indicated that 80% of the identified drug 
abusers felt estranged from their families . On the bas is of such data, Scientific 
Resources proposed that the County Drug Commission sponsor a drug preven-
tion program, later labeled CPI, for the Critical Period of Intervention. All three 
of the county school districts agreed to participate in the program. 
There were two phases to the study: identification and remediation. In the first 
phase, tests were given to eighth-grade students and their teachers so that certain 
students, deemed potential drug abusers , could become part of the remediation 
program. The teachers were asked to identify pupils who most and least fit eight 
descriptions of antisocial behavior (e.g . , "This pupil makes unusual or inap-
propriate responses during normal school activity"). The student form was to be 
somewhat lengthier. First , students would be asked to assess their own behavior , 
that is, to state which of the following statements was most like themselves: (1) 
someone who will probably be a success in life; (2) one who gets upset when 
faced with a difficult school problem; (3) someone who has lots of se lf-confi-
dence; and (4) a student who has more problems than other students . In the next 
part of the scale they would be asked questions about their relationships with 
their parents and the behavior of their parents (e.g. , to indicate whether one or 
both parents "tell me how much they love me" or "make me feel unloved" or 
"seem to regret that I am growing up and spending more time away from 
home"). Finally , the students would select from their classmates those who fit 
certain descriptive statements similar in kind to the ones given the teachers. 
The second phase of the study was intervention. When the CPI staff had 
analyzed all the results , they would compi le a li st of chi ldren who would have 
significant potential for becoming drug abusers. This li st would then be given to 
the school superintendent who would organize a joint effort among guidance 
counselors, teachers, school psychologists, and others to provide group 
therapeutic experiences to which the identified students would be involuntarily 
assigned. 
When the program was first developed the school system did not intend to 
obtain the affirmative consent of the parents for their children to participate. 
They did plan to send a letter home to each parent , as follows: 
Dear Parent: 
This letter is to inform you that, this fall , we are initiating a Drug Program 
called "Critical Period of Intervention" (CPl). The aim of thi s program is to 
identify children who may be susceptible to drug abuse and to intervene with 
concrete measures to help these children. Diagnostic testing will be part of this 
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program and will provide data enabling the prevention program to be specific and 
positive. 
We ask your support and cooperation in this program and assure you of the 
confidentiality of these studies. If you wish to examine or receive further informa-
tion regard ing the program, please feel free to contact the school. If you do not 
wish to participate in this program, please notify your principal of this decision. We 
will assume your cooperation unless otherwise notified by you [Merriken v. Cress-
man, 1973 , p. 917). 
Also, as originally proposed, the study contained no provision for student 
consent. 
Sylvia Merriken, the mother of one of the intended participants in the study, 
who happened to be a therapist in a drug and alcoholic rehabilitation center, 
complained to the principal of the school where her son was enrolled and to the 
school board. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) then announced it 
would represent Mrs. Merriken in an attempt to enjoin the school permanently 
from carrying out its plans. The ACLU began by fi ling a complaint in federal 
district court claiming that the program would violate the constitutional rights of 
both Mrs. Merriken and her son. It quickly obtained a temporary injunction 
prohibiting the county from implementing its proposal until the litigation was 
completed. At that point , two of the three schools in Montgomery County decid-
ed to discontinue their participation but the Norristown system, where Mrs. 
Merriken's son attended, persisted, although it honored the temporary in-
junction. 
When the suit itself began, the school system offered to change the format of 
their letter to include parental consent. In another attempt at compromise, the 
school modified the test so that students who did not want to be included could 
return an uncompleted protocol. But the proposal contained no provision for 
student consent and no data were to be provided whereby students could make an 
informed choice about participating. 
Of the many constitutional challenges Mrs . Merriken made , the court enter-
tained only one of them seriously- the right of privacy. The court found that the 
highly personal nature of the instrument disrupted family associations and inter-
fered with the right of the mother to rear her child. It said, "There is probably no 
more private a relationship , excepting marriage, which the Constitution safe-
guards than that between parent and child. This Court can look upon any inva-
sion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's Constitutional right to 
privacy [p . 918] ." And although there was no precedent to the effect in the 
Supreme Court, the district court declared that privacy was entitled to as much 
constitutional protection as free speech . 
Although the court failed to analyze the privacy rights of her son (but see 
Bersoff, 1983), the court found that Mrs . Merriken was unable to give genuinely 
informed consent to the invasion of her personal life because the parental permis-
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sion letter was so inadequate. The court deridingly compared the letter to a Book-
of- the-Month Club solicitation in which parents' silence would be construed as 
acquiescence. The letter was also criticized as a selling device in which parents 
were convinced to allow children to participate. It was not , as it properly should 
be, an objective document telling parents of the potentially negative feature and 
dangerous aspects of the program. 
There were other problems with the program. The promotional letter prom-
ised confidentiality, but the program contemplated the development of a " mas-
sive data bank" and the dissemination of data relating to specific, identifiable 
students to school superintendents, principals, guidance counselors, coaches, 
social workers, PTA members, and school board members. And even if the 
school system had been more circumspect and had constructed means by which 
the data were less widely distributed (or not distributed at all) , no promise of 
confidentiality could take precedence over a subpeona compelling the disclosure 
of the material to law enforcement officers. As the court warned: 
(T)here is no assurance that should an enterprising di strict attorney convene a 
special grand jury to investigate the drug program in Montgomery County, the 
records of the cpr Program would remain inviolate from subpoenas and that he 
could not determine the identity of children who have been labeled by the CPI 
Program as potential drug abusers lp. 9 16) . 
Parents were not at all in formed of this possibility. 
Compounding the other problems was the fact that the identification instru-
ments did not possess enough psychometric soundness to overcome the hazards 
that may have fl owed from their use. Although there could have been consider-
able harm done to children correctly identi fied , the court was particularly con-
cerned about those children incorrectly identi fied . In a statement that should rai se 
the anxiety level of psychologists, it said , "When a program talks about labeling 
someone as a particular type and such a label could remain with him for the 
remainder of his life, the margin of error must be almost nil [p o 920] ." 
Forensics 
Ironicall y, the one use of tests that has remained relatively uncriticized is in 
forensic assessment. Ability tests used in educational and employment decision 
making, despite their myriad problems, have been subjected to decades of em-
pi rical analysis and validation. Yet , they have undergone the most scathing 
review by the legal system. On the other hand , based on personality and projec-
tive instruments, forensic psychologists since the 1940s have routinely testi fied 
in cases involving competency to stand trial, insanity , civil commitment , the 
causal connection between negligent conduct and emotional and physical injury, 
child custody, and the eligibility of criminal defendants for the death penalty. 
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Whereas such determinations are at least as cruc ial to the interests of the test 
taker and society, personality and projective instruments have escaped wholesale 
scrutiny by the courts and remain largely untouched. 
As long as psychologists possess the requisite indices of expertise such as 
proper education, training, experience, scholarly publications, and professional 
affi liation, they are permitted to offer opinions on the kinds of ultimate issues I 
have just cataloged based on the administration of tests like the Rorschach, 
MMPI, and TAT. Although such testimony has subjected individual psychol -
ogists to harsh cross-examinations (Ziskin, 198 1) , the courts have never se-
riously questioned whether these tests are sufficiently precise to evoke probative 
expert testimony or to support valid opinions that will be more helpful than 
testimony of the thoughtful layperson to the jury . 
The confused approach to expert testimony by psychologists is , in part, ex-
plained by a failure to recognize that it is not a unidimensional concept but, 
rather , involves three levels of inference. The first level consists of the psychol-
ogist's personal observation of the client made during the course of the clinical 
evaluation, including essentially objective data about the individual's behavior 
and the uninterpreted results of psychological testing. The second level moves 
from reporting observations to the synthesis of data to form a diagnosis that will 
classify, and perhaps account for, the behavior manifested during the course of 
the evaluation or at the time of the event in question. It is on thi s level that 
psychologists make a judgment about whether the person has a mental disorder. 
Whether the diagnosis is presented in terms of a particular label or a lengthy 
description of personality , the critical element is that the diagnosis derives its 
value from the psychometric soundness of the assessment devices used . The third 
level concerns an opinion about the ultimate issue (i .e., child custody, or in-
sanity) that the jury or judge must resolve. Whereas I have significant reserva-
tions about any testimony by experts as to level three (Comment, 1978; Gass & 
Bersoff, submitted for publication) , it is concern about testimony at level two 
that is most relevant to this chapter. 
The test for the admissib ility of scientific evidence was developed 60 years 
ago in Frye v. United States (1923), which limited such evidence to that which 
has gained "general sc ientific acceptance." Under its modern interpretation by 
subsequent tribunals, the courts require not only acceptance within the scientific 
community but also accuracy. Thus , assessment devices used in the forensic 
arena should not only have gained acceptance within psychology but, more 
importantly , the accuracy of the technique should be demonstrated to yield 
information that is more likely to be true than could be gleaned from lay testi-
mony. Resu lts from polygraphs and voice spectrography have been denied ad-
missibility because the error rate is considered to be 10 to 25%. If such a criterion 
were applied to most clinicians' favorite projective devices , none of the informa-
tion or diagnostic conclusions derived from them would be admitted in court . 
Validity coefficients that clinicians might find highly acceptable may not pass 
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legal muster, Tests' vulnerability to situational and experimenter effects and to 
such phenomena as illusory correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1969) have 
been well documented (Comment, 1978; Monahan, 1981). 
The scientific literature regarding reliability and validity of tests used by 
forensic experts suggests that, at best , they are highly suspect and susceptible to 
a variety of significant sources of psychometric and interpretive error. They have 
limited psychometric soundness even in the hands of the most skilled clinicians , 
and there is little basis to assert that expert opinions , based on projective tests, 
are more accurate than layperson's opinions, But, although forensic psychol-
ogists may have little empirically based expertise to offer the legal system, they 
are uniformly permitted to testify and their judgments often CatTY great weight 
with the jury. On the other hand , the work of educational and industrial psychol-
ogists undergo close review, even though there is greater reason to believe that 
the instruments upon which they rely are more demonstrably accurate. Why? The 
answer is partly rooted in tradition- such issues as insanity have confronted the 
courts for decades; issues such as proper placement in special education pro-
grams or promotion to fire captains have not. But, more importantly, the tests 
used in forensic settings do not impinge on privacy or disproportionately affect 
racial or ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note, however, that recently foren -
sic examinations used in criminal settings have raised concerns about the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel (see Estelle v. Smith, 1981 , 
and Bclltie v. Estelle, 1981), 
SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS 
All of these conflicting perceptions about psychological tests raise a final issue 
with which I wish to conclude- that of the relationship between the social 
sciences and the courts, If that relationship were to be examined by a psycho-
analyst, the analyst would no doubt conclude that it is a highly neurotic, conflict-
ridden ambivalent affair (I stress "affair" because it is certainly no marriage). 
Thirty years ago the vitality of data generated by psychologists seemed assured 
when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) conspicuously 
referred to studies by Kenneth and Mamie Clark concerning the effect of segre-
gation on black children. The reference to those studies in a now famous footnote 
created a controversy that still exists concerning their relevance and validity 
(Cahn, 1955 ; Clark, 1980; Kluger, 1975; Levin, 1978). Despite that controversy 
there is little doubt that Brown represents the most dramatic use of social science 
scholarship. 
But if Brown produced optimism, subsequent events did not uniformly rein-
force those buoyant feelings. In the past 5 years the Supreme Court has rejected 
empirical data in cases concerning sex discrimination, the death penalty , and 
corporal punishment. Perhaps most clearly exemplary of the Court's am-
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bivalence is its decision in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) where it unanimously 
agreed that criminal trials before five-member juries unconstitutionally deprived 
defendants of the right to trial by jury. Justice Blackmun announced the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court and in his decision relied heavily on the work of 
social psychologists and others to support the conclusion that less than six-person 
panels substantially and negatively altered the jury process. However, only one 
other justice joined that opinion. Three justices were particularly critical of his 
use of social science data. In a concurring opinion (indicating agreement with the 
outcome but not the reasoning of the primary opinion) Justice Powell, joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, acerbically noted his "reservations 
as to the wisdom ... of Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology 
derived from statistical studies [po 246]." 
The same love- hate relationship finds its way into lower-court opinions con-
cerning testing. These opinions, regardless of whether one likes the result, are 
generally devoid of sound psychometric reasoning. Even if the conclusions are 
correct, the courts often fail to cite the relevant literature in a way that convinces 
the reader that the conclusion is empirically supportable. 
Social Science in Education and Employment Cases 
Education. We can once again return to the education and employment 
testing cases for the most pertinent examples . As you may recall, the court in 
Riles permanently prohibited the state from using any standardized intelligence 
tests for the identification of black chi ldren for placement into EMR classes and 
held that before the state could use IQ tests, it would have to meet the following 
standards: 
1. Tests would have to yield the same pattern of scores when administered to 
different groups of students. 
2. Tests would have to yield approximately equal means for all subgroups 
included in the standardization sample. 
3. Tests would have to be correlated with relevant criterion measures, that is, 
lQ scores of black children with classroom performance. 
The implication in Riles that an unbiased test must yield the same pattern of 
scores when administered to different groups of people is psychometrically un-
sound . It is generally , though not uniformly, conceded that tests are fair when 
they predict with equal accuracy, not with equal results, for all groups. If that 
position is correct, then the court's definition "eliminates a priori any possibility 
of real group differences on various psychological traits [Schmidt & Hunter, 
1974, p. I] . " The court rejected the possibility of genuine inferiority and social-
class differences . Though the court rested its decision on the finding that the tests 
were culturally biased, it provided little hard data to support such a conclusion 
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and was tentative in discussing it. In fact , the court 's empirical support for its 
conclusions consumed only I of 70 printed pages. Moreover, the court's deter-
mination that the tests contain questions biased against poor black children is not 
uniformly accepted , and there are some data to suggest that whatever discrimina-
tion there is in tests, lower scores in blacks are not totall y the resul t of content 
bias. 
By definition , achievement and intelligence tests will always fail to meet the 
demand for assessment devices devoid of environmental influence. Given what 
they purport to measure, they inev itably refl ect the social setting of the test taker: 
" [All] behavior is ... affected by the cultural milieu in which the individual is 
reared and since psychological tests are but samples of behavior, cultural influ-
ences will and should be refl ected in test performance . It is therefore futile to try 
to devise a test that is free from cultural influences [Anastasi, 1976, p. 345]." 
Efforts to produce culture-free tests or to reduce content bias have met with 
little success. " Nonverbal or performance tests are now generally recognized as 
fa lling short of the goal of freedom fro m cultural influences, and attempts to 
develop culture fair verbal tests ... are recognized as failu res [Reschl y, 1979, 
p. 23 1] ." More spec ifically, Anastasi (1 976) states: "On the WISC , for in-
stance, black children usuall y fi nd the Performance Tests as difficult or more 
di fficult than the Verbal Tests; this pattern is also characteris tic of children fro m 
low socioeconomic levels [p o 348]. " Kirp (1 973) concludes: " [It] is sobering 
but instructi ve to recognize that minority children do poorly even on so-called 
culture-free tests [p o 758]." 
There has been relati vely little research on content bias itself , particularly 
with regard to individual intelligence tests. What has been found with regard to 
standardized tests generally (Flaugher, 1978; Green, 1978), or individual intel-
ligence tests specificall y (Reynolds, 1982; Reschly , 1980; Sandoval, 1979) , does 
not support Judge Peckham' s conclusions. For example , contrary to popular 
thought , such widely criticized questions on the WISC-R comprehension subtest 
as, " What is the thing to do if a boy (girl) much smaller than yourself starts a 
fight with you?" (a question that even Judge Grady in PASE found biased) may 
actually be easier for black children than they are for white (Reschly, 1979). 
Eliminating 13 items perceived to be biased from a widely used 82-item elemen-
tary reading test " did not improve the performance of schools with high-minor-
ity populations relative to their performance on the original ' biased vers ion ' 
[Flaugher, 1978, p. 675]." Deleting what appear to be idiosyncratic items from 
group ability tests resul ts only in " making the tests considerably more difficul t 
for everyone, since many of the items [exhibiting] the widest discrepancy be-
tween groups [are] moderate to low in overall difficulty [Flaugher , 1978 , p. 
675]" (but see Oakland & Matuszek, 1977) . Most pertinently, Sandoval ( 1979) 
found no evidence of items bias on the WISC-R: "The notion that there may be a 
number of items with radically different di fficulties for children from different 
ethnic groups has not been supported [po 925]." Moreover , the interjudge agree-
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ment concerning cultural bias on the WISC-R appears very low (see Reschly 
citing Sandoval, 1980). 
Although Judge Peckham can be faulted for his analysis of cultural discrimi-
nation in intelligence tests and for implying that the issue is more settled than it 
is, any criticism of his analysis does not imply that his conclusion is incorrect or 
that there is support for such alternative hypotheses as genetics- rejected by all 
parties in Riles and PASE--Dr socioeconomic explanations. In any event, the 
court in Riles was correct in criticizing test publishers for not adequately standar-
dizing . and validating their instruments on discrete minority populations . The 
court could only rest its holding on the data presented to it by the parties. The 
state's defense was made difficult by the lack of relevant studies on differential 
validity, the absence of systematic research concerning content bias, and Califor-
nia's concession that cultural differences affected IQ scores . 
If Judge Peckham's analysis of the issue of cultural bias was scanty and 
fau lty , Judge Grady in PASE v. Hannon (1980) can best be described as naive. 
At worst it was unintelligent, and completely devoid of empirical content. Dis-
trustful of the expert testimony in the case, he felt it imperative to examine the 
tests themselves so he could judge whether the claim of cultural bias could be 
sustained. Thus, in a startling and extraordinary manner , he proceeded to cite 
each question on the Wechsler and Binet scales in an attempt to determine which, 
in his estimation, were culturally biased. The result of this analysis was the 
judgment that only eight items on the WISC/WISC-R and one item on the 
Stanford- Binet were suspect or actually biased . At bottom, what it represented 
was a single person's subjective and personal judgment cloaked in the apparent 
authority of judicial robes. If submitted as a study to one of psychology's more 
respected refereed journals, rather than masquerading as a legal opinion , it would 
have been summarily rejected as an experiment whose sample size and lack of 
objectivity stamped it as unworthy of publication. The court's opinion in PASE 
amply supports Reschly's (1980) conclusion that with regard to item bias on the 
individually administered intelligence tests, "subjective judgments appear to be 
unreliable and invalid in terms of empirical analysis .... The only data confirm-
ing test bias that exists now is judgmental and speculative [p o 127]." 
What makes Judge Grady's opinion interesting, if not precedent setting, is the 
fact the decision contains the questions and correct answers to every item on the 
WISC, the WISC-R, and the Stanford- Binet. McClelland (1973) suggested 
several years ago that tests should be given away. Whether inadvertent ly or 
purposely, Judge Grady has done just that. Those who wish to destroy the 
usefulness of these tests need only inform parents and anti test advocates of the 
existence of the decision and its citation to the proper volume in the series of 
legal reports that publishes verbatim all federal district court opinions . Although 
Judge Grady eventually upheld the tests as valid, his decision , to a far greater 
extent than Judge Peckham's decision in Riles, may have the effect of invalidat-
ing the tests as they are presently used. The Psychological Corporation, publisher 
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of the Wechsler Scales (and the System of Multi-Pluralistic Assessment 
[SOMPA] that uses these scales), tried unsuccessfully to convince Judge Grady 
to seal that part of his decision containing the questions and answers to the scales 
so that their content would not be published and thus made public. It has since 
issued a statement attempting to protect its copyright in the tests and threatens 
legal action if it is not protected: "The Psychological Corporation considers 
unauthorized reproduction of its copyrighted material from any source, including 
a court' s opinion , to be an invasion of its rights, including its copyright , and the 
right to maintain the necessary security of its tests [Udell , 1980] ." As of this 
writing , there has not been specific legal action against those who have informed 
general audiences of its existence . But one potential outcome of the decision is 
that the security of these tests may have, indeed, been seriously compromised, if 
not destroyed. 
Employment. The situation with regard to employment testing does not 
evoke any greater confidence. There are sharp differences among the federal 
courts, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and psychometric 
experts as to the proper conceptualization of test validation within the industrial 
setting. Novick (1 98 1) has perceptively summari zed the struggle: 
Individual federal agencies have responsibilities and goals de legated by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government , monitored by the judicial branch, and 
ultimately spec ified by the incumbent agency management. Although these agen-
c ies share concern for benefits to soc iety as a whole, they tend to focus attention on 
their own particular mandates, and for this reason they often view testing and other 
issues quite differently . In fac t, it is not uncommon for government agencies to be 
on opposite sides in litigation involving tests, for employers to receive conflicting 
directives from different government agenc ies, and fo r employees to find that the ir 
tes t scores are considered in light of widely varying objectives by employers and 
government agency representatives [p. 1035]. 
The Supreme Court has been particularly unhelpful in sorting out this confu-
sion . For example , in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1 971) a unanimous court 
stated that the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing were "entitled to great 
deference" (p . 434). Four years later, Chief Justice Burger, who had written the 
dec ision in Griggs now complained in a minority opinion in Albermarle Paper 
Co . v. Moody (1 975) about the Court' s "slavish adherence" (p . 452) to those 
same Guidelines. Perhaps in a more important example, one I described at some 
length in a recent American Psychologist article (Bersoff, 1981) , the Court has 
badly muddled the whole issue of test validation. In Washington v. Davis (1976) 
in support of its opinion that validation could be accomplished in "anyone of 
several ways," the Court cited the then extant version of the Standards fo r 
Educational and Psychological Tests (APA, AERA, NCME, 1974) to the effect 
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that there were " three basic methods of validation: 'empirical' or 'criterion ' 
validity . . . 'construct validity ' ... and 'content' validity [Washington v. 
Davis, 1976, p . 247 , fn . 13] ." 
Many industrial and academic psychologists (Guion , 1980; Messick, 1980; 
Tenopyr, 1977) contend that insofar as the courts have interpreted the test stan-
dards and the EEOC Guidelines (superseded now by the Uni form Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, see EEOC et aI. , 1978) and its implementing 
" Question and Answers" (EEOC et aI. , 1979) to mean that content , criterion, 
and construct validity are distinct forms of validation , those interpretations are 
oversimplified , if not erroneous . The Uniform Guidelines , according to thi s 
view, inappropriately treat three aspects of validity as "something of a holy 
trinity representing three different roads to psychometric salvation [Guion , 1980 , 
p. 386]" rather than viewing them as subsets within the uni fyi ng and common 
framework of construct validity. Most judicial opinions, with one or two con-
spicuous exceptions (see Guardians Association of New York City v. Civil Ser-
vice Commission, 1980) , concerned with the controversy over content versus 
criterion versus construct validity in employment tests also view the three as 
separable entities rather than on a continum and fail to cite or even recognize the 
work of psychologists who have urged a more sophisticated approach to valida-
tion analys is. It has been suggested that the term construct-ref erenced validity 
(Mess ick, 1975) would more prec isely encompass almost all di screte and spe-
ciali zed validation terms, integrating content relevance and content coverage as 
well as predictive and diagnostic utility. "The bridge or unifying theme that 
permits this integration is the meaningfulness of interpretability of the test 
scores, which is the goal of the construct validation process [Messick, 1980 , p. 
101 5]. " 
In 1982, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the EEOC Guide-
lines and its implementing Questions and Answers in Teal v. Connecticut ( 1982) 
but carefully avoided the issue. In that case, the plaintiffs are four black provi-
sional state employees who , when they sought to attain permanent status in their 
jobs as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors, were obliged to participate in a selection 
process requiring a passing score on a written tes~. Those who passed the test 
became part of an eligibility pool from which the state would select successful 
applicants. The final determinations were made on the basis of a number of 
nontest criteri a (e.g., past work , recommendation) . 
All the plaintiffs fa iled to achieve the cutoff score of 65 on the test which 
would have made them eligible for further consideration. As a whole, the pass ing 
rate for blacks was 68% of that of whites. The unsuccessful plaintiffs then 
instituted a suit claiming that the state's use of the test violated Title VII . 
However, a month prior to tri al, the state made its final selection , the result of 
which was that 23% of the eligible blacks and 13.5% of the eligible whites were 
promoted to supervisor. The actual promotion rate of blacks, therefore, was 
169.5% of the actual promotion rate of whites . Thus, whereas the end result of 
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the state's selection process (the so-called " bottom line") was nondiscriminato-
ry to blacks as a class, the threshold testing component did not meet the Uniform 
Guidelines "four-fifths" rule, which provides that a "selection rate for any race, 
sex, or ethnic group which is less than [80%] of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse impact [29 
C.F.R. §1607.4(c)]." 
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, hoi ding that they 
failed to prove a prima facie case of di sparate impact. It asserted that although 
the ratio of the black passing rate to the white passing rate was 68%, the ratio of 
the black appointment rate to the white appointment rate was almost 170%. 
Thus, under the bottom-line approach found in the EEOC Guidelines, the plain-
tiffs ' Title VII claim has to fail. 
The plaintiffs appealed. The COUl1 of Appeals reversed the lower court , 
holding that "where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection 
process produced disparate results and constituted a pass- fail barrier beyond 
which the complaining candidates were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie 
case of disparate impact is established , not withstanding that the entire selection 
procedure did not yield disparate results [Teal v. Connecticut, 1981, p. 135]. " 
In concluding that the district court was wrong in ruling results of the written 
examination alone were insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, it distinguished an earlier decision by the second circuit court. In Kirkland 
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services (1975), the Court of Appeals 
held that proof concerning disparate impact of certain subtests within a larger 
examination did not constitute an unlawful discriminatory impact. But, the second 
circuit said in Kirkland, all applicants were subjected to a complete selection 
process that, when viewed as a whole, did not produce di sparate results. In Teal, 
however, the pass-fail barrier denied employment opportunity to a di sproportion-
ately large number of minorities and prevented them from proceeding to the next 
step in the selection process. Thus, the court concluded, affirmative action 
policies that may benefit minority groups as a class do not excuse employers' 
discriminatory conduct affecting specific and readily identifiable individuals. It 
held that "Title VII was designed to protect the rights of individuals" and that it 
"matters very little to the victimized individuals that their group as a whole is well 
represented in the group ofhirees [pp. 139- 140] ." 
The trial court , finding no evidence of prima facie discrimination, never 
reached the question of the test' s validity (i.e., its " job-relatedness"), even 
though it had been fully tried before the court. However , in addition to reversing 
the tri al court' s decision , the Court of Appeals remanded the case with instruc-
tions that the lower court evaluate the test itself in light of the EEOC Guidelines. 
The state of Connecticut , in June of 1981, asked the Supreme Court to review 
the second circuit' s opinion, arguing that their decision was antagonistic to that 
of other circuits who had adopted the bottom-line concept in Title VII cases . The 
state also asserted that scrutiny of testing practices in those instances where 
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hiring or promotion practices revealed no di sparate impact would redirect em-
ployers' concerns from " the overall hiring process to the testing process, and in 
that sense [the federal courts would] be restructuring business practices ." 
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and in June 1982 it rendered its 
opinion . The Court held , in a 5-4 decision, that " the ' bottom line' does not 
preclude ... employees from establi shing a prima facie case [of employment 
di scrimination] nor does it provide [an] employer with a defense to such a case 
[Teal v. Connecticut , 1982, p. 2529]." The Court reminded employers that 
Section 703(a)(2) spoke not in terms of jobs and promotions but of limitations 
and classifications that would deprive individuals of employment opportunities . 
Thus , " when an employer uses a non-job-related barrier to deny a minority or 
woman applicant employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant 
adverse effect on minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived of 
an employment opportunity ' because of . .. race, color , religion , sex, or na-
tional origin ' [p o 2532]." Therefore, Title VII protects individuals, not groups 
prohibiting victims of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that they have 
not been wronged simply because other persons of their race or sex were hired: 
"Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment 
and against practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation .. . " 
[po 2535] [emphasis added] ." 
As a result , the Court refused to permit employers to claim as a defense in 
disparate impact cases that di scriminatory , non-job-related tests that serve as a 
pass- fail barrier to employment opportunities are permiss ible because the tests 
did not actuall y deprive di sproportionate numbers of blacks of promotions. " it is 
clear ," the Court asserted , " that Congress never intended to give an employer 
license to discriminate against some employees on the bias of race or sex merely 
because he favorably treats other members of the employees' groups [p . 2535]. " 
The di ssenters, led by Justice Powell , speaking for the Chief Justice and 
Justices Rehnquist and O 'Connor , agreed that the aim of Title VIi was to protect 
individuals, not groups. But , they interpreted disparate impact claims to require 
proof of di scrimination to groups. The di ssenting opinion argued that prior cases 
had made it clear that di scriminatory impact claims cannot be based on how an 
individual is treated because those claims are necessarily based on whether the 
group fares less well than other groups under a policy, practice , or test. The 
di ssent warned that the majority 's holding could " force employers either to 
eliminate tests or rely on expensive, job-related , testing procedures, the validity 
of which mayor may not be sustained if challenged. For state and local govern-
mental employers with limited funds, the practical effect of today 's decision may 
well be the adoption of simple quota hiring [p o 2540] ." Moreover, it cautioned, 
substantiall y fewer minority candidates ultimately could be hired simply by 
employers integrating consideration of test results into one overall hiring deci-
sion because, by so doing, " they will be free to select only the number of 
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minority candidates proportional to their representation in the workforce [po 2540 
n.8] . " 
All these decisions reveal that the issue of test bias is complex and controver-
sial and that opinions concerning its existence are contradictory. Several models 
of test bias, particularly with regard to its effect on prediction and selection, have 
been offered (Jensen, 1980; Peterson & Novick, 1976) , none of which seem to 
have gained favor over others. As Ysseldyke (1978) recently commented: 
Several investigators have reviewed the models of test fairness and have concluded 
that there is little agreement among the several models. It is readily apparent that 
major measurement experts have been essentially unable to agree on a definition of 
a fair test, let alone identify a test that is fair for members of different groups. There 
is little agreement on the concept of nondiscriminatory assessment [po 150]. 
Definitions of test bias may not only be "widely disparate," stemming "from 
entirely different universes of discourse [Schmidt & Hunter, 1974, p. I]" but 
ethical positions regarding test bias may be "irreconcilable [Hunter & Schmidt, 
1976, p. 1069] ." Finally, and perhaps more importantly , reliance on psycho-
metric models for test bias without consideration of the social and ethical conse-
quences of test use ignores the concerns of significant segments of society . 
Although the American Psychological Association Ad Hoc Committee Report on 
the Educational Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Students (Cleary et aI. , 1975) 
defended the technical adequacy of tests for prediction and selection, it failed to 
consider what minority groups charge was the egregious misuse of tests having a 
negative impact on the lives of minorities (Bernal, 1975; Jackson, 1975) . As 
Reschly (1979) points out: " to defend tests on the basis of evidence of common 
regression systems or to attempt to separate the issues of technical adequacy from 
the social consequences is insufficient [po 235]." In that light, recent attempts to 
examine the ethical, legal, and socia l implications of various models of test bias 
are valuable additions to the literature (Cole, 1981 ; Hunter & Schmidt, 1976; 
Messick , 1980; Novick & Ellis, 1977; Reynolds, 1982) . In essence, even the 
selection of a model to measure and ameliorate test bias is ultimately a value 
judgment (Kaplan, 1982). 
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
My complaints about the Supreme Court should not deflect responsibility from 
psychologists. I think it may be legitimate to place at least part of the fau lt for the 
current and continuing confusion concern ing tests on psychologists themselves. 
One of the more intriguing aspects of Judge Grady's decision in PASE v. Hannon 
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(1980) was his almost utter rejection of the testimony of expert psychologists 
who testified either for the black children challenging the IQ tests or for the 
school system seeking to defend them . In a quote that I think deserves some 
thought he said: 
None of the witnesses in this case has so impressed me with his or her credibility or 
expertise that I would feel secure in basing a decision simply on his or her opinion. 
In some instances, I am satisfied that the opinions expressed are more the result of 
doctrinaire commitment to a preconceived idea than they are the result of scientific 
inquiry . I need something more than the conc lusions of witnesses in order to arrive 
at my own conclusion [p. 836). 
Several years ago Cronbach (1975) warned psychologists involved in testing 
issues not to be advocates. But , far too often they have testified/or one side or 
the other. Although psychologists perform a valuable service when they testify as 
expert witnesses , they should be aware that their data , interpretations , and opin-
ions will be tested in the crucible of courtroom cross-examination whose very 
purpose is to destroy credibility and evoke evidence of bias on the part of the 
expert. Whereas the distillation of that process may yield testimony of great 
consequence and weight to the court, it can be highly anxiety provoking for the 
psychologist who acts as an injudicious advocate pleading for a position rather 
than as a cautious, neutral scientist presenting data in an even-handed manner. 
Recently, concerned psychologists have indicated the many ways social sci-
entists can influence public policy effectively (Bersoff, 1983; DeLeon, 0 ' Keefe, 
Vandenbos , & Kraut, 1982; Horowitz & Katz, 1975; Loftus & Monahan , 1980; 
Saks, 1978) . Within the bounds of scientific and professional ethics, that is an 
important, if not crucial, role. But, if psychologists are to be respected by the 
courts and treated as more than mere numerologists attempting to convince the 
judiciary of doctrinaire positions, they must offer more situation-specific, eco-
logically valid, objective data that serve science, not a particular adversary. In 
that way , perhaps , courts may finally arrive at not only judically sound but 
psychometrically justified decisions that will withstand both appellate and scien-
tific scrutiny. 
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Testing and the Oscar Buros 
Lament: From Knowledge to 
Implementation to Use 
James V. Mitchell , Jr., Director 
Buros Institute of Mental Measurements 
The field of measurement can be conceptualized as having three different but 
intenelated aspects. First of all, it is a science or a body of knowledge concerned 
with the development of theory and methodology and with the identification and 
confirmation of generalizations governing intenelationships among variables ap-
propriate to its content. Measurement theory and its application to measurement 
problems are important contributors here. Second, it is an applied science or 
technology concerned with the development of products that represent a useful 
application of such a science or body of knowledge . For the field of measure-
ment, test development and validation are important exemplars. Third, it is a 
body of information concerned with why, when, and how these products are 
used, and the results of such use, in the practical measurement setting for which 
they were typically intended. This sequence of intenelated aspects of measure-
ment, from knowledge to implementation to use, is the conceptual foundation for 
much of what follows. 
Within such a context as that just described, the Buros Institute of Mental 
Measurements has always played a unique role. The science of measurement or 
measurement theory has not been one of the Institute's chief concerns, although 
the Institute is often an indirect beneficiary of such contributions. However, the 
Institute has had major involvement with the evaluation of test products, the 
products of an applied science, and with the education of test users in the more 
effective selection and use of those products . Because of the nature of this 
involvement, the Institute has had a perspective on the three separate aspects of 
the field of measurement that is not typical of those representing only the singular 
aspects of the continuum. It is this unique perspective of the Institute that will 
serve as the distinguishing feature of the discussion to follow. 
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The purpose of this discussion is to evaluate critically the contributions and 
progress made in these separate, but interrelated, aspects of measurement: 
knowledge, implementation, and use. The theme of this discussion is that the 
greatest progress has been made in our knowledge, lesser progress in implemen-
tation, and the very least progress in selection and effective use. The implication 
of the discussion is that there is a pressing need to redress the imbalance that has 
developed. 
MEASUREMENT THEORY AND KNOWLEDGE 
No one can accuse the fie ld of measurement of being static. Ferment seems to be 
the rule . With this ferment has come new theories and models, controversy that 
sometimes yields as much light as heat, new understanding, and some fresh 
perspectives. Although it typically seems that activity has been greater than 
results, the results themselves show evidence of progress. Two of the more 
recent rev iews of test theory (Subkoviak & Baker, 1978; Weiss & Davison, 
1981) both devoted considerable attention to criterion-referenced testing, latent-
trait theory, and issues of test bias. Another recent review devoted entirely to 
latent-trait theories (Traub & Wolfe, 1981) described the promise of latent-trait 
theories in their application to educational measurement but also issued a caveat 
about work to date and needed precautions . The overall impression obtained 
from these reviews is that criterion-referenced testing, latent-trait theory, and test 
bias have received the attention deserved from an able group of professionals and 
that some relevant problems have been addressed, development has occurred, 
and progress has been and will continue to be made. A similar reassurance is felt 
with the more central role accorded to construct validity evidence in all areas of 
testing, the attention given to problems with minimum competency testing and 
the setting of standards, and the development of adaptive testing in relation to its 
needed theoretical underpinnings. The influence of cognitive psychology on 
testing has also been beneficial and holds important promise for the future. All in 
all, psychometric theory and knowledge seem to be active, developing, produc-
tive enterprises that will continue to furnish strong and supportive bases for the 
technology of testing and the wise selection and effective use of tests. The 
foundation is promising; whether its promise will be paralleled by equal promise 
in the technology or applied science it supports, or in the intelligent utilization of 
that technology by its consumers, is the critical question to which we now turn. 
TEST TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In comparison with the relatively strong showing of psychometric theory and 
knowledge, the application of that theory and knowledge to the development and 
validation of commercially published tests has produced mixed results at best. In 
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The Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook (1972) and again in The Eighth 
Mental Measurements Yearbook (1978) , Oscar Buros, after describing the 
"crusading" or "missionary" objectives of the Yearbooks, complained that: 
Our success in attaining the last five missionary objectives has been disappointingly 
modest. Test publishers continue to market tests which do not begin to meet the 
standards of the rank and file of MMY and journal reviewers . At least half of the 
tests currently on the market should never have been published [Buros, 1972, p. 
XXVII; 1978, p. XXX I]. 
These are harsh words; yet as one who has followed Oscar Buros as Institute 
director and editor of the Yearbooks, it is difficult to find fault with hi s statement 
even now . The situation is a curious mixture of positives and negat ives. On the 
one hand , there is little doubt that some of the major test publishers employ 
extremely able measurement specialists who have had much impact, for exam-
ple, on translating new developments like latent-trait theory into practice in the 
construction of new tests. On the other hand , there is much of the cottage 
industry ambience to the test publishing business , and there are many test pub-
li shers who are simply test authors distributing their own tests or very small test 
publishers with single or extremely limited test offerings or book or instructional 
materials publishers who have acqu ired a few tests and publish them in a manner 
almost incidenta l to their major interest and thrust. Of the 496 test publishers that 
are listed in Tests in Print II (Buros, 1974) , it is start ling to discover that over 
one-half, or 58% , have on ly a sing le test listed; 75% have three or fewer tests 
listed; and 85% have five or fewer tests listed. The 58 % who have but one test 
listed account for only 11 % of the tests published. The 85% who have one to five 
tests listed account for onl y 16% of the tests published. Although Buros may 
have missed tests published by some companies, the Buros reputation for ac-
curacy cannot be denied , and the overall impression is doubtlessly correct. On 
the other end of the continuum , where the large test companies predominate, a 
mere 1.4% of the publishers are responsible for publishing 26% of the tests! 
Teachers of measurement look ing for strikingly skewed distributions need look 
no further. With a publishing field as skewed and fragmented as this, there is 
little wonder that Oscar Buros often despaired about the likelihood of improved 
quality control. 
Quality Issues in Test Publishing 
Limitations of size and resources are quite likely to influence quality control 
despite the efforts of a small test entrepreneur to meet or exceed minimal stan-
dards and produce a professional product. One president of a small operation 
lamented that: 
We are a very small cooperative venture with quite limited resources. For this 
reason we have as yet not been able to move to a professional finish on the 
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______ , and manuals. However, in 
spite of typos and home-grown typing each of the rough drafts gives ample infor-
mation to permit an assessment of the instruments. They have continued to prove 
themselves in actual use. For this reason I am forwarding additional copies of the 
forms and manuals (rough or otherwise). None of the manuals are "finished." We 
will revise them as information and funds permit. 
This is an instance where the spirit is willing but the funds are weak. There are 
other instances where the markedly skewed distribution of sizes and resources of 
test publishers reported earlier seem to be accompanied by a parallel marked 
skewness in the demonstration of psychometric savvy. The president of one test 
publishing company, after expressing considerable resistance to our request for 
complimentary test materials for review, stated that the company: 
was highly critical about present methods used for determining the reliability and 
validity of a psychometric tool. For example, often the concept of concurrent 
validity is used to determine if a particular test is a valuable tool. Actually what this 
means is that one or the other tool is unnecessary because they are virtually 
measuring the same thing. If the correlation is not significant, we know that we are 
measuring some aspect of behavior not currently being tapped. Buros, however, 
chose to use this lack of correlation as a reason to reject or criticize a test. 
Aside from the fact that Buros let the reviews and reviewers speak for them-
selves, the statement contains much that would cause concern if not apoplexy 
among contemporary measurement specialists . Another company divides its tests 
into those that have validity evidence and those that do not. One wonders what 
kind of reassurance this provides to its clients! 
Some Evidence on Test Quality 
If we move from the level of specific examples to the more generic, It IS 
regrettably true that there are still a surprising number of tests that are published 
without reliability evidence, validity evidence, or norms. When this occurs, it 
has been and will continue to be the practice of the Buros Institute to point out 
this critical lack in the descriptive entry accompanying the reviews in the Mental 
Measurements Yearbook. A small descriptive study was recently conducted by 
Institute personnel to determine how often these critical data were lacking . The 
results are not encouraging . They showed that 22% of the tests listed in The 
Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (1978) were without any reliability data 
whatever; 8 Y2% had no validity data whatever; 7% had neither reliability nor 
validity data; and an additional I % had neither reliability nor validity data for 
certain parts, levels, or editions. Another 5% had no reliability data for certain 
scores, and 9% had no reliability data for certain grades, subtests, or forms. All 
together, some 41 % of the tests listed in The Eighth M ental Measurements 
Yearbook were lacking reliability and/or validity data in some important respect. 
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Tests in the areas of reading, vocations, and 'speech and hearing were the worst 
offenders . 
The data for norms were somewhat better but still not encourag ing. Of the 
tests li sted in The Eighth Mental Measurement Yearbook, II % had no norms 
whatever. Another 3% had no norms for certain scores, and 8% had norms onl y 
for certain subtests, forms, or parts of the standardization population . One per-
cent had no description of the normative population , and for 4 percent the norms 
consisted only of means and standard deviations. All to ld , some 28% of the tests 
listed in The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook were inadequately normed 
in some important respect. 
It should not be concluded that the 4 1 % of tests lacking in validity and /or 
reliability data or the 28% lacking in normative data were the result of very 
rigorous criteria applied by the Buros Institute . As a matter of fact , any kind of 
correlation coeffi cient would usually serve to remove the accusing statement for 
either reliability or validity, and the situation for normative data was equally 
charitable. The standards for declaring such inadequac ies in the descriptive en-
tries were minimal at best , and still many of the tests li sted in the 8th MMY made 
an unhappy showing. If 41 % of the tests listed in the 8th MMY were lacking in 
validity and/or reliability data and 28% were lacking in normati ve data, was 
Oscar Buros far wrong in asserting that at least half of the tests currently on the 
market should never have been published? 
Some Affirmations 
To consider the implementation of test theory and knowledge in actual test 
products is a frustrating exercise in the reconciliation of opposites . On the one 
hand , one observes the amazing rapidity with which a complex deve lopment like 
latent-trait theory has been seized by the test constructor and incorporated into 
instruments like the British Ability Scales; on the other hand , one observes 41 % 
of the tests in the 8th MMY lacking in the simplest kinds of reliability and validity 
data. Test manuals seem to be improving and more technical manuals are being 
offered , many of them well conceived and executed; yet there are still commer-
cially published tests that have no manual, an inadequate manual, or instructions 
for admini stration masquerading as a manual. American Psychologist (Glaser & 
Bond , 198 1) issued a special edition on testing that provides abundant evidence 
of continuing progress and sophistication in the field of measurement and its 
application ; yet there are some reading and personality tests and diagnostic 
inventories whose authors appear never to have seen the inside of an elementary 
measurement text. Because of the makeup of the testing industry, such contradic-
tions are likely to ex ist for the foreseeable future. 
In the face of such contradictions one could argue a good case for applying 
some minimum competency criteria to the testing industry itself! In any event , it 
seems clear that the number of poor or marginal tests could be substantially 
reduced if a cl imate of opinion could be created for both tes t developers and users 
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that would ensure a severe fiscal disadvantage for the test author or publisher 
who did not meet certain minimal criteria. Specific problem areas are summa-
rized below . 
1. Proliferation of Tests. There is a finite amount of money that will be 
spent on tests, especially with current economic conditions and cunent attitudes 
toward testing. Under these circumstances we must do whatever we can in the 
future to ensure that it will be in the best interests of test authors and publishers, 
reputationall y and fiscally, to publish far fewer tests but much better tests. This 
was the rallying cry of Oscar Buros for over 40 years, and the years have not 
diminished its truth or urgency. The proliferation of tests continues unabated , 
however, and the best defense seems to be that of educating people to be more 
discriminating test users. Obviously the Institute of Mental Measurements has a 
critical role here and so do the teachers of measurement. But the amount of 
money sti ll spent on poor and marginal tests, and the startling amounts of money 
acquired from the sale of such tests , suggest that we are probably losing ground 
rather than gaining. 
2. Missing Reliability Information. The fact that 22% of the tests in the 8th 
MMY were without rel iabi lity data is alarming and absolutely without justifica-
tion . We have to find better ways to prevent or discourage a test author or 
publisher from publishing and accepting payment for an instrument that suffers 
from such a basic deficiency. Consumer protection for a gullib le testing public is 
far behind consumer protection in other areas. 
3 . Inadequate Validity Evidence . It was reported earlier that some tests are 
publi shed without any validity evidence. More often, however, validity ev idence 
is insufficient and flimsy and offered more as a ritual than to make a firm case. 
We have reached a point in measurement where many measurement specialists 
feel that all or most validity evidence is properly subsumed under the concept of 
construct validity. The determination of construct validity requires the marshall-
ing of a comprehensive and integrated set of ev idence that is no less demanding 
than the scientific method itself. We should increasingly insist that test authors 
and publishers meet these more comprehensive criteria of validity evidence. 
There is a long way to go from flimsy , halfhearted evidence offered as ritual to 
construct validity evidence meeting the basic tenets of construct definition and 
validation in scientific method. This further requirement , however, could be very 
beneficial in encouraging improvement in the quality of commercially published 
tests and further reducing the number of poor and marginal tests. 
4. Publishers' Claims vis-a-vis Validity Evidence. Measurement profes-
sionals should increasingly insist that test authors and publ ishers bring test valid-
ity and putative test benefits into a more reasonable relationship with one an-
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other. Often it seems that modest to weak validity evidence is offered but is 
somehow shunted aside into insignificance by an attitude and aura that implies 
far more benefits emanating from the test than is justified by the evidence. Many 
examples could be offered, but a case in point is the Common Examinations of 
the National Teacher Examinations (NTE). A review of seven studies relating the 
Weighted Common Examination score with ratings given by principals and 
superv isors during the first year of teaching revealed a median correlation of . II. 
Although attenuation could be a factor here, particularly with respect to the 
criterion, the ev idence is hardly encouraging. But the publisher can and does 
maintain that the NTE is a measure of academic preparation only, and thus the 
validity issue can be at least partially sidestepped. The public most likely as-
sumes that effective teaching is a simple function of knowledge attained, cares 
and understands little about the technical aspects of validity issues, and thus 
uncritically accepts the NTE into its belief system as a guardian of teaching 
standards. The practical resu lt is that 50% of U.S. teachers coll ege graduates 
took the NTE in 1980-1981 and nine states now use the NTE as part of the 
teacher certification process. An overstatement of test benefits, either explicit or 
implicit, in the face of weak evidence and a public inclination to believe, will not 
serve us we ll at a time when test critics are mounting new and more knowledge-
able attacks on the industry and the profession. The tendency to promote test 
utility despite weak validity evidence is surely an obstacle to better understand-
ing and another potential source of public backlash as well. 
THE BOTTOM LINE: THE SELECTION AND EFFECTIVE 
USE OF TESTS 
If the app lication of test theory and knowledge to the development and va lidation 
of commerciall y published tests has produced some mixed results, the actual use 
of tests in practical settings has departed even further from the ideal. In the 
Introduction to The Eighth M ental Measurements Yearbook, Oscar Buros (1978) 
defined five objectives of the Yearbook, in his own inimitable manner, as his 
"crusading" objectives. The three crusading objectives that related to users of 
tests were as follows: 
I . To foster in test users a greater awareness of both the values and limita-
tions involved in the use of standardized tests. 
2. To suggest more discerning methods to test users of arriving at their own 
appraisals of tests in light of their particular values and needs. 
3. To make test users aware of the importance of being suspicious of all 
tests--even those produced by well-known authors and publishers- which are 
not accompanied by detailed data on their construction , validation, uses , and 
limitations [p o XXXI]. 
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As reported earlier, Buros felt that his success in attaining all his crusading 
objectives, including these three, was "disappointingly modest." It could be of 
some use now to take each oj these objectives and see what they highlight with 
respect to current standards an~ practices of test usage. 
In relation to the first objective, what can be said about the level of awareness 
of the rank-and-file test user about the values and limitations of current standard-
ized tests? Buros felt that we have gone through too many periods of " unwar-
ranted optimism" about standardized tests (Buros, 1978 , p. 1973) . Although 
some segments of the public may have unwarranted optimism and a lack of 
appreciation about the limitations of standardized tests, there is some recent 
evidence that this is not true of teachers and administrators in the public schools. 
In a study reported by Salmon-Cox (1981), it was found that teachers, when 
questioned about how they assessed the progress of their students, most fre-
quently mentioned "observation" as their principal tool. Test scores served a 
merely confirmatory role to observation; a child's classroom performance, as 
observed, was given more credence than a test score. In another report in the 
same series, Resnick (1981) summarized the Salmon-Cox results by suggesting 
that: "Tests are, quite simply , a natural feature of the U.S. educational environ-
ment; it appears that teachers and administrators have adjusted to their presence, 
neither desiring much benefit from them nor suffering much distress as a result of 
them [po 624]." 
This certainly seems to suggest rather strongly that teachers are not overly 
impressed with standardized tests or ignorant of their limitations. They may even 
be hard pressed to appreciate their values . Unwarranted optimism about tests 
surely exists, but it is not likely to be found in the rank and file of teachers who 
must administer the tests and interpret the scores. 
In relation to the second Buros objective, what can we say about the methods 
test users employ in their appraisals of tests? It is difficult to find helpful or 
trustworthy data on this question , but it seems safe to say that there has been little 
improvement in the sophistication of methods used to select tests. Perhaps there 
is a more general understanding of how achievement test objectives and content 
should match curriculum objectives and content, and perhaps some large school 
districts with testing offices use the more "discerning methods" referred to by 
Buros. But despite all the efforts of teachers of measurement and the Buros 
Institute, test appraisal and selection in the field has still far to go before it 
becomes the cautious, systematic, methodologically sound process that measure-
ment specialists want it to be . 
In relation to the third Buros objective, concerned with the "suspicious" 
attitudes test users should have in the absence of data on test construction, 
validation, uses, and limitations, the best available evidence seems to indicate 
that many test users may not be interested enough to be suspicious. This conclu-
sion, obviously, is quite congruent with the Resnick (1981) quotation reported 
earlier. If they are interested enough to exercise some careful judgment or show 
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some suspicion , that judgment or suspicion seems quickly allayed by the cosmet-
ic assurance of face validity evidence that seems compelling to many who have 
the strong will to believe in the absence of substantive evidence. "If it looks 
good, use it ," is not a consciously palatable slogan to most people, but it must be 
an unconscious determinant for many people in the selection of tests or we 
wouldn ' t observe so many poor tests being purchased . At the Buros Institute we 
are continually amazed at how much money a poor test can make. For example, 
we received word some months ago that one such test , with little to commend it , 
was responsible for sales amounting to 5 million dollars in 2 years. 
Perhaps part of the problem here is that the criteria for determining whether a 
test is useful or not are all bound up with that esoteric body of thought called 
psychometric theory, which is available and valued by the specialist but seems 
downright forbidding and scary for those uninitiated or of uncertain understand-
ing . If a person looks for a new car , the criteria for what constitutes a good car 
are reasonably within reach and understandable. For tests those criteria are 
enmeshed in a scientism that for some people might as we ll be mysticism , with a 
jargon that seems sufficiently repelling to some to justify ignoring it. Is it any 
wonder , then , that it is the face validity features of a test that can so often 
commend the test 's use to a potential purchaser and just as often mislead that 
purchaser after use to believe that the test did in fact yield the results desired? 
Perceptions of the Genera l Public about Tests 
It is probably in that vast body called the general public where the threat of 
misunderstanding about tests is greatest and where a litt le suspic ion, or at least a 
questioning attitude, might be a good thing. Resnick (1 98 1) reports on a 1979 
Gall up Poll that indicated that 8 1 % of those polled thought that standardized tests 
were "useful " or "somewhat useful ," with only 17% thinking they were " not 
too useful. " Yet it is thi s same general public that is likely to be least in formed 
and most confused about testing. Such confusion , lack of information , or evident 
misinformation has become a critical factor with such issues as bias in testing, 
minimum competency testing, and evaluation of the public schools . A vague 
conviction that something is useful combined with a lack of specific understand-
ing about its most appropri ate uses and interpretations and no conception of its 
limitations is a rec ipe for social di saster . Testing in the public domain has 
become such a social disaster. One feels it keenly when called uROn , as I have 
been , to partic ipate in briefin gs to the public about the proper uses and the 
limitations of tests and testing . One feels it keenly again when two federal district 
judges in Californi a and Illinois reach di ametricall y different judgments about 
whether standardized intelligence tests discriminate against black children, with 
little evidence that either one of them had an adequate understanding, or cared to 
obtain such an understanding, of the psychometric issues involved (Larry P. v. 
Riles, 1979; PASE v. Hannon, 1980). 
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It is clear that the opportunity for the general public to raise its level of 
understanding about testing is even more limited than it is for public school 
personnel or people in business and industry. As professional people with both a 
moral as well as professional responsibility for our field, I do not believe we can 
ignore the public's need for greater understanding of testing without even graver 
social consequences in the future . If continuing education and lifelong learning 
are to be as important as some higher education specialists think, I suggest that 
we do our part to ensure that increased understanding about tests and testing is 
promoted as a critical component of such lifelong learning. How that is to be 
done is an issue that deserves the very careful consideration of every person in 
measurement. 
Vocational Tests for Business and Industry 
An area of special concern about test usage is the area of vocational tests for 
business and industry . Recently the Buros Institute conducted a study on who 
purchased the Mental Measurement Yearbooks, and we were surprised to find 
that the group that purchased the most yearbooks was not education but business 
and industry , which accounted for almost half of the yearbooks sold. We are 
gratefu l for that , because it has often appeared to us that it is tests for business 
and industry, among all others, that are most likely to be promoted with very 
strong promises in the face of little or no evidence that the tests can deliver on 
those promises. Such ambit ious and poorly substantiated claims sorely need the 
antidote that critical reviews from the Yearbooks can provide. Many tests in 
business , particularly those in the management area, involve elaborate concep-
tual schemes, sometimes assoc iated with training programs, that are magnificent 
in their aspirations and complexity and attractiveness to would-be true believers. 
Such conceptual schemes would constitute ideal settings for obtaining construct 
validity evidence, but you can bet your entrepreneurial dollar that there is little 
effort to do that in the great majority of cases . It would likely prove too embar-
rassing. What happens instead is that these tests for business and industry are 
among the most serious offenders when it comes to the simplest kinds of validity 
evidence, let alone construct validity evidence, and we have found that 57% of 
the "Vocations" tests listed in The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook were 
lacking reliability and/or validity data in some way that was important for test 
use. 
Test use in business and industry, of course, is coming under the increasingly 
heavy fire directed toward tests in general. As a result of this double vulnerability 
stemming from inadequate psychometric evidence and potential criticism or even 
litigation , some test publishers show resistance to providing the Buros Institute 
with the complimentary copies of tests needed for review purposes. Fortunately, 
they remain a distinct minority. One test publisher, for example, was reluctant to 
provide complimentary copies of his tests for fear that the reviews of these tests 
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"might be used as 'authoritative' evidence in a discrimination su it. " He then 
went on to say that: 
No test's technical report is so comprehensive or so perfect that it cannot be 
adversely criticized. 
It seems to me that we have an obligation to our test users to avo id providing 
plaintiffs with ready-made attack weapons which appear to have the prest ige of the 
Buros Institute behind them. 
What interesting questions this raises, especially in relation to the concerns 
with "obligation" raised in this letter. In a recent article on professional stan-
dards in testing Novick (1981) pointed out that "There are generally three 
participants in the ability testing process: the institution , or test user, which 
requires the test for some decision-making purpose; the test producer, which 
develops, markets, and/or administers and scores the test; and the test taker, who 
takes the test by choice, direction, or necessity [p o 1035]. " Any reasonable set of 
professional standards would have to take into cons ideration issues of ob ligation 
to all three of these parties, but particularly to the test taker, who is sti ll the least 
powerful of the three. The Buros Institute has an ob ligat ion to be fa ir to all three 
parties involved while providing consumer protection to the test user and the test 
taker. Although no test is so perfect that it cannot be criticized, it is on ly the 
nonexistence or glari ng inadequacy of reliability or validity data that can furni sh 
the ready-made attack weapons referred to in this letter, and under such circum-
stances it is the test producer, not the Buros Institute, that has fashioned the 
weapons and handed them over to the attacker. The best defense for the test user 
is to select tests that are well-constructed and validated and that can stand the 
light of day and not to rely on test companies that have an understandable but 
misplaced motivation to protect the user from test inadequacies that would be 
avoided altogether by not using the test. 
Test Advertising 
A very great influence on test selection and usage is test advert ising, and it is test 
advet1ising that constitutes one of the greatest current concerns of the Buros 
Institute. It was reported earli er that Oscar Buros was concerned about "unwar-
ranted optimism" about tests; it is in test advertis ing that "unwarranted opti-
mism " reaches its peak. Good and poor tests alike are subjected to advertis ing 
claims that cannot be substantiated. The influence of such advertising is consid-
erable, and the situation now is no different than it was in 1968 when Oscar 
Buros, in a presentation to the Assoc iation for Measurement and Evaluation in 
Guidance, reported the fo llowing: 
At present, no matter how poor a test may be , if it is nicely packaged and if it 
promises to do all sorts of th ings which no test can do , the test will find many 
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gullible buyers. When we initiated critical test reviewing in The 1938 Yearbook, we 
had no idea how difficult it would be to discourage the use of poorly constructed 
tests of unknown valid ity. Even the better informed test users who fin ally become 
convinced that a widely used test had no validi ty after all are likely to rush to use a 
new instrument which promises far more than any good test can possibly deliver [p. 
94]. 
The appeals to gullible buyers still ring loud and clear. A diagnos-
tic-prescriptive reading program is described as "so effective a system that it 's 
been known to actually improve reading level by one year in only 11 to 12 one 
hour lessons!" A personality inventory is described as " the quintessential as-
sessment tool for the 80s and beyond- the wave of the future among diagnostic 
instruments. " The same kind of extravagant advertising mania also affects scor-
ing and interpretive services. A reviewer of several of the scoring and interpre-
tive services for the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory expressed his 
strong concern about the advertising for these services in the following excerpted 
comments from The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (Adair , 1978): 
In reviewing the severa l scoring services fo r thi s yearbook , the writer was im-
pressed with a curious dichotomy that appears to ex ist between the profess ional 
psychologist who is obliged to uphold the ethics of the profession and the en-
trepreneurial psychologist who is obliged to make a profit in order to maintain a 
position in the market. ... The dilemma of whether to uphold professional ethics 
or to make a profit is seen most vividly in the promotional literature of the several 
services . . .. The literature of promotion takes on a Madison Avenue-like quality 
where caveats are included in the fine print [p o 940]. 
Examples could be multiplied endless ly. The sins of advertising claims are so 
numerous that the Institute may well consider sending out test advertising to be 
reviewed criticall y right along with the tests themselves. The issue of extravagant 
and unfounded test advertising claims must receive much greater attention in the 
next revision of the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests. In the 
face of such claims the major agents for consumer education and protection are 
the Standards, Buros Institute publications, and a few beleaguered measurement 
teachers. In terms of current standards of test selection and use and the continued 
gullibility of the test-buying public in relation to extravagant test advertising 
claims , even the best efforts of all of these are apparently not enough to change 
the situation as much as it desperately needs to be changed. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter has been quite different from the others with which it appears 
because of its concern with the interrelationships and current status and develop-
ment of the enti re measurement continuum as it encompasses knowledge, imple-
mentation, and use . The latter two elements are the hi storic concerns of the 
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Buros Institute. The conclusion that seems apparent from the evidence discussed 
is that the theory and knowledge base of measurement is strong and evolving, the 
implementation of that knowledge base in developed products has brought tre-
mendous variety and very mixed results, but that the selection , use, and in-
terpretation of tests has been fraught with major difficulties and some unfortunate 
social consequences. It is my strong conviction that although professionals in 
measurement are usually most identified with the first or possibly second element 
of this measurement continuum, they have a strong professional obligation to be 
alert to and to join with others to take action against the continuing serious 
offenses and mistakes that take place through ignorance at the level of test usage. 
Professional support for the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests, 
especially as those Standards relate to test use, is one example of responsible 
professional concern and action in this area. But in view of the extent of the 
abuses and the strength of the need, it is not enough. The Buros Institute and the 
Standards cannot do it alone. 
A Ca ll to Action 
What, then, can be done to stimulate substantial improvement in the selection, 
use, and interpretation of tests (and perhaps, as a consequence, make it unprofit-
ab le to publish poor tests)? I submit that it will requ ire nothing less than an 
organized campaign, launched and sponsored by NCME or the same consortium 
that produced the Standards, that would increase substantially the public under-
standing about testing concepts; the values and limitations of tests ; and the 
se lection , use, and interpretation of tests. Perhaps some funds could be obtained, 
most likely from private philanthropies in this day and age, that could help 
support such a campaign. Of what would such a campaign consist? The fol low-
ing are ill us trat ive: 
J. Convention Programing. In our professional conven tions (NCME, 
AERA, APA, etc.) there should be more discussion of what practical steps could 
be taken to improve the selection, use, and interpretation of tests. Symposia 
could be organized on the topic. Although the 1980 NCME meeting featured 
some usefu l examples of thi s kind of programing (Beck & Stetz , 1980; Crocker, 
1980; Yeh & Herman, 1980), generally there is far too little of this done at the 
present time. Practitioners often feel isolated at profess ional conventions. What a 
fine opportunity this might provide for greater dialogue among the theory and 
knowledge oriented and the practitioners. Benefits could be twofold: the devel-
opment of ideas for improved test usage and the increased recognition by partic i-
pants of their responsibility for what happens in testing at the grass-roots level. 
2. Education of the Public. There is much talk these days about how the 
U.S. population is changing, how people are developing new careers and in-
terests, and how there is more need than ever before for the implementation of a 
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philosophy of " life long learning. " Continuing education has become an impor-
tant topic and need. Why shouldn't increased understanding of measurement 
concepts, tests , and testing be considered an important component of continuing 
education or a lifelong learning program--or indeed- for citi zenship education 
itself? As a part of such continuing education the following kinds of projects 
might be implemented : 
a. Public television could sponsor a series of TV programs on measurement 
concepts and contemporary testing practices . To stimulate interest some dispas-
sionate discussion of contemporary testing issues and controversies could be 
intermixed with the foundational learning of concepts. The success of the pro-
gram, "Who's Keeping Score?", which included parts of NlE's Minimum 
Competency Clarification Hearing, suggests that much more could be done with 
the media to promote greater understanding of testing in the general public. 
Further prospects should be actively explored . 
b. Many continuing education programs offer "minicourses," typically with 
continuing educat ion credit, that are designed to accomplish short-term objec-
tives focused on the development of basic understandings, ski ll s, or interests. 
Why shouldn 't measurement people develop and offer such short courses not 
only to principals and teachers but also to the general public? When a local or 
national testing controversy develops, why shouldn't minicourses be developed 
to help the public better understand the real issues involved and the knowledge 
bases for intelligent decision making? 
c. Perhaps the Buros Institute should develop a short pamphlet describing 
useful procedures and criteria for selecting a test and using and interpreting it 
properly. Such a pamphlet could be sold to the public at minimal cost and could 
also be included in the introduction to The Mental Measurements Yearbook. This 
might also be a useful project for NCME. A pamphlet of this kind would have to 
be much shorter and more readable than the Standards for Educational and 
Psychological Testing, which is tedious and forbidding reading at best. 
d. As suggested earli er, it may well be appropriate for the Buros Institute to 
send out advertising as well as the test itself for review. Some bad press in 
response to extravagant claims might at least temper those claims and motivate 
those involved toward more recognition of their responsibility for their advertis-
ing as well as for their product. "Truth-in-packaging" is a desperate need in 
testing . 
e . More ways should be found to reward and reinforce those test authors and 
publishers whose products represent high standards of construction and valida-
tion. The professional organizations provide this kind of recognition for re-
searchers; why shouldn ' t test authors and publishers receive a parallel form of 
professional recognition? The development of a good test is a very difficult and 
painstaking process , and its achievement should be professionally acknowl-
edged. The Buros Institute would like to participate in a program with such an 
emphasis on the positive. Perhaps our reviewers could nominate tests that they 
6, TESTING AND THE OSCAR BUROS LAMENT 125 
judged to be exceptional exemplars of test construction and validation , and 
members of our National Advisory Committee could select one or two tests from 
each area deserving of special commendation, Or perhaps the profess ional orga-
nizations would wish to provide such recognition , There are possible pitfalls in 
such an undertaking, of course, but a few minor risks may have to be accepted in 
order to accomplish what is considered just and motivating for test authors and 
publishers and beneficial for the field and for test users . 
f. There are strong professionals in the test publishing organizations, and 
they are doubtlessly professionally and personally interested in being part of an 
organization that subscribes to the highest standards of test authorship and pub-
lication. Individuals who join professional associations are often subject to a 
collective code of ethics promulgated by the association. Perhaps an association 
like NCME should have institutional as well as individual memberships, and 
both individuals and organizations should be subject to such a code of ethics. 
PaIt of that code could cover professional responsibilities relevant to test devel-
opment , validation , and advertising. A test publishing company that joined the 
professional association would have to make a written and signed commitment to 
the code of ethics and could indicate in its advertising that it had done so . But if 
any members of the professional association, or a duly constituted professional 
ethics committee, uncovered evidence of code violation by a test publishing 
organization, constitutionally defined steps could be taken to conduct a hearing 
in accordance with rules of evidence and ultimately, if necessary, to take action 
ranging from mild reprimand to ouster from the professional association. This 
too is a rather radical suggestion, but the epidemiology of the disease seems to 
require radical cures. 
Scientists of any kind, whether they be natural , physical , or social scientists , 
are increasingly being called upon to recognize the moral and ethical implica-
tions of their work. Yet there is a tendency for many professionals in measure-
ment to focus on the theoretical and knowledge bases of their field and to lose 
sight of what is going on at the levels of implementation and use. It is our 
business at the Buros Institute to be aware- and sometimes painfully aware--Df 
what is going on at these levels . We recommend that other measurement profes-
sionals and social sc ientists direct more attention to such grassroots issues, 
encourage their wider discussion , and join with the Buros Institute of Mental 
Measurements in seeking more effective solutions to these problems than we 
have ever had in the past. The social utility and reputation of a professional field 
may hang in the balance. 
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INFLUENCES ON APTITUDE 
AND ACHIEVEMENT TEST 
DEVELOPMENT AND USAGE 

Aptitude and Ach ievement 
Tests: The Curious Case of the 
I ndestructi ble Strawperson 1 
Anne Anastasi 
Fordham University 
In a talk I gave at the 1979 ETS Invitational Conference, I remarked that, if I 
were suddenly endowed with the appropriate occult powers, I should choose to 
eliminate certain words from the psychometric vocabulary . Among them were 
the words aptitude and achievement (Anastasi, 1980). These terms have led to 
nearly as much confusion, misinterpretation , and misuse of tests as has the more 
notorious term intelligence . Having been asked once more to discuss the same 
general topic in 1982, it occurred to me that I might consider why the myths that 
surround these terms are so persistent-and persistent they certainly are . 
Let us examine specifica lly the traditional distinction between aptitude and 
ach ievement tests. Aptitudes are typically defined more precisely than intel-
ligence, to des ignate more narrowly limited cognitive domains . Nevertheless , 
like intelligence, they have traditionally been contrasted with achievement in 
testing terminology. This contrast dates from the early days of testing, when it 
was widely assumed that achievement tests measured the effects of learning, 
whereas intelligence and aptitude tests measured so-called innate capacity, or 
potentiality , independently of learning . This approach to testing in turn reflected 
a simplistic conception of the operation of heredity and environment that pre-
vailed in the j 920s and 1930s. The relevant historical background has been 
thoroughly examined in a recent book by a science hi storian, Hami lton Cravens, 
I Paper presented in Invited Sympos ia: State of the Art Series- Ach ievement Testing, at the 
meeting of the American Psychologica l Assoc iati on, Washington, D.C. , August 1982. 
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which covers the heredity- environment controversy among American sc ienti sts 
between the two World Wars (Cravens , 1978; see also Anastas i, 1979). 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
Common misconceptions about the relation between aptitude and achievement 
tests are highlighted by an index introduced in the 1920s and variously named an 
achievement quotient or an accomplishment quotient. Both terms having the 
same initials, this index soon came to be known as the AQ . Its origin is generally 
attributed to Raymond Franzen (1920, 1922). The AQ could be found by divid-
ing the individual 's educational quotient (EQ) by hi s or her intell igence quotient 
(lQ). The EQ was the ratio of educational age (EA) to chronological age (CA) . 
The AQ could also be computed more directly by dividing educational age by 
mental age . The educational age was found by referring the score on an achieve-
ment battery to the age norms for that battery . Still another procedure was to use 
age norms for tests in particular academic subjects, li ke reading or arithmetic , to 
find " subject ages" for the individual, and then to average these subject ages to 
obtai n the educational age . 
Early textbooks on testing regularly included a discussion of the AQ as a 
means of evaluating a student 's educational performance in relation to that stu-
dent' s intellectual potential- a means of comparing achievement with capacity 
to learn (Freeman, 1926, 1939; Garrett & Schneck, 1933; Greene , 194 1; Lincoln 
& Workman, 1935; Mursell , 1947). It is interesting to trace the statements about 
the AQ in texts appearing from the 1920s to the I 940s and early 1950s. Even the 
earliest di scussions called attention to the technical and stati stical weaknesses of 
the AQ as a ratio . The major criticisms fe ll into two categories: The first category 
was similar to the now familiar criticisms of the traditional ratio IQ; the second 
was similar to the equally fa miliar criticism of grade norms--educational age 
norms were certainly no better than educational grade norms. 
These and other technical criticisms, however, were usually mentioned as 
limitations, which might be avoided under proper conditions or which should be 
kept in mind in interpreting results. By the I 940s and earl y 1950s, the criticisms 
had become more vigorous. The reader was now told that the AQ as a technique. 
"cannot be recommended" (Mursell , 1947 , p. 373), that it has " nearl y gone out 
of use" (Greene, 1941 , p . 25 1) , " is in growing disrepute" (Cronbach, 1949 , p. 
282), and " is now practically extinct" (Anastasi, 1954 , p. 463). 
Psychological criticisms of the use of AQs , as contrasted to statistical crit-
ic isms, are found in some textbooks from the outset. Frank N. Freeman ' s 1926 
book , Mental Tests, a widely used tex t of the period , referred to two unwarranted 
assumptions: first , that intelligence tests provide a measure of innate capacity 
independent of training; second , that all educational achievement depends on the 
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same unitary intellectual capacity (Freeman, 1926, pp. 287- 288). These con-
cerns were expressed more mildly and less clearly in other early books . Nev-
ertheless , the same authors who critic ized the AQ on either statistical or psycho-
logical grounds accepted and even recommended a more general, qualitative, 
informal procedure for using intelligence test scores in interpreting measures of 
educational achievement. By midcentury, the AQ itself had in fact disappeared, 
at least from the major textbooks- but its ghost lingered on. 
Closely linked to the AQ is the concept of underachievement and over-
achievement, which was first introduced in attempts to interpret deviant AQs. If 
chi ldren were performing up to capacity , it was expected that their AQs would be 
close to 100. Those with AQs under 100 were designated underachievers; those 
with AQs above 100 were the overachievers. Several writers did express some 
discomfort with the finding of overachievement as thus measured , because it 
implied that' certain persons were performing above their capacity, which seemed 
a logical impossibility (e.g., Lincoln & Workman, 1935). Nevertheless , they 
tried to defend the AQ by attributing values over 100 largely to unreliability of 
both intelligence tests and educational tests and to inaccuracy of educational age 
norms . They also suggested that unusually strong interest and motivation might 
account for a few remaining AQs above 100. 
Actually, the question of underachievement and overachievement can be 
more properly formulated as overprediction and underprediction from the first to 
the second test (Thorndike , 1963). Such intraindividual differences from one test 
to another simply reflect the well-known fact that no two tests are perfectly 
corre lated. Of course , this statement is also true of other performance indicators, 
such as course grades. Among the reasons for the prediction errors in individual 
cases are not only the unreliability of the measuring instruments but also dif-
ferences in content coverage, the varied effects of attitudinal and motivational 
factors on the two measures, and the impact of such intervening experiences as 
remedial instruction. 
It should be noted that underprediction or overprediction will occur regardless 
of the type of test used. It occurs not on ly when an intelligence test is used to 
predict subsequent achievement test performance but also if an achievement test 
is used to predict subsequent intelligence test performance. Furthermore , the 
same prediction errors are likely to occur in either direction , whether we estimate 
scores on the later test from scores on the earlier test, or vice versa. From a 
practical standpoint, the admin istration of alternate forms or different levels of an 
achievement test before and after a course of instruction permits a more accurate 
analysis of individual accomplishment than does the use of two different tests. 
To take an extreme example , if achievement in reading comprehension is pre-
dicted from a nonverbal intelligence test that is heavily loaded with spatial 
aptitude , the children with higher spatial than verbal aptitude will look like 




Psychology has come a long way since World War 1. And some psychometri-
cians have made repeated efforts to exorcise the AQ ghost. That intelligence and 
aptitude tests are not fundamentally different from achievement tests was illus-
trated as early as 1927 by Truman L. Kelley . In this connection, Kelley coined 
the express ion "jangle fallacy" to designate the opposite of the " jingle fa llacy" 
whereby things called by the same name are assumed to be the same . Kelley 
(1927, p. 64) defined the jangle fallacy as " the use of two separate words or 
expressions covering in fact the same basic situation , but sounding different , as 
though they were in truth different." Through an analysis of correlational data, 
Kelley demonstrated that widely used intelligence tests and achievement bat-
teries overlapped by about 90% (Kelley , 1927, pp . 193-209). 
Since that time, other investigators have again reported extensive overlap 
between these two types of tests (e.g., Coleman & Cureton, 1954; Cronbach, 
1970, pp . 284-285). In fact , in some instances, the correlation between intel-
ligence tests and achievement batteries is about as high as the reliability coeffi-
cients of each. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated attempts 
to dispel the myths and clarify the relation between aptitude and achievement 
tests. Relevant discussions can be found in the successive editions of widely used 
textbooks (e.g., Anastasi, 1982; Cronbach , 1970; Thorndike & Hagen, 1977). 
They can likewise be found in the published reports of conferences devoted 
wholly or largely to this topic (e .g., DuBois, 1969; D. R. Green, 1974; 
Schrader, 1980). 
In major addresses and papers by psychologists, the terms aptitude and 
achievement have been used time and again with precision and with sens itivity to 
their possible misapprehensions. For example, in his presidential address to the 
APA Division of Evaluation and Measurement, Bert Green observed that " tests 
of general verbal and numerical skills are usually called aptitude tests , which is 
unfortunate since the term aptitude seems to suggest an inborn, unchangeable 
trait. Actually the tests assess developed abi lities-skills acquired through years 
of training and practice with verbal and numerical material [B . F. Green, 1978, 
p. 669]." Further on, he referred to "the long-range achievement tests we call 
'aptitude tests' [p . 669]. " 
It is also enlightening to read what the College Board writes about its Scholas-
tic Aptitude Test (SAT) and its series of achievement tests. In various current 
publications regularly distributed to students, counselors, and other persons con-
cerned with these tests , the College Board consistently describes the SAT as a 
measure of developed verbal and mathematical reasoning abilities that are related 
to successful performance in college (e.g., College Entrance Examination 
Board, 1981a, 198 1e). In a fuller statement, the Board (I981d) adds that the 
SAT "is not a test of some inborn and unchanging capacity. Scores on the SAT 
are subject to improvement as educational experience, both in and out of school , 
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causes these verbal and mathematical abi lities to develop ." In the same sources, 
the achievement tests are described as measuring the student's " knowledge and 
abi lity to apply that knowledge in specific subject areas." The distinction that 
emerges is primarily one of breadth versus specificity of test content and of 
antecedent learning experience. 
Following the same trend, Snow (1980) described the SAT as "a test of 
extended or generalized achievement designed to be indicative of aptitude for 
college work, that is, for work requiring broader, deeper, higher, and more 
elaborate organizations and reorganizations of scholastic learning than that repre-
sented directly in prior public schooling, or in conventional school achievement 
tests [pp. 43- 44]." At the 1981 ETS Invitational Conference , Christopher 
Jencks presented a paper in which he discussed the SAT and argued quite 
convincingly that what the SAT measures is not fundamentally different from 
what the College Board's achievement tests measure. For many in the audience, 
these arguments came as no surprise . Jencks went on to suggest, however, that 
because of widespread misconceptions about the meaning of "aptitude," col-
lege-bound high school students do not study the subject matter taught in their 
high school courses as thoroughly and as earnestly as they otherwise might 
(Jencks & Crouse, 1982). 
Even more recently, the GRE Board has taken decisive action to help dispel 
the false aptitude-achievement distinctions. In a recent GRE Board Newsletter 
(1982), it was announced that "effective with October 1982 administrations of 
the Graduate Record Examinations, the Aptitude Test will become the General 
Test and the Advanced Tests will be called Subject Tests. The GRE Board 
approved the name changes to avoid any potential misunderstanding about the 
purpose of the tests [p o 3]." Viewing the question from a broader perspective, 
the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Ability Testing, in its recently 
issued formal report, clearly asserts that both aptitude and ach ievement tests 
measure developed abi lities, and both serve as indicators of the abi lity to learn 
(Wigdor & Garner, 1982, pp. 27, 163). 
And so it goes on and on. Sti ll the popular misconceptions persist. These 
viable misconceptions are especially ev ident in some of the current popular 
attacks on testing, particularly on tests such as the SAT and other measures of 
academic aptitudes. The criticisms follow a monotonously uniform pattern. First 
comes the false attribution . For example, aptitude tests are supposed to assess 
innate potential. Second comes disproof, which should be quite easy for such an 
outrageously irrational and naive statement. Third comes the conclus ion : Tests 
are wrong, bad , and should be abandoned . 
This brings me to my subtitle, "The Curious Case of the Indestructible 
Strawperson ." First, the critics set up what in folk language is known as a 
strawman; but in deference to editorial policies to avoid sexist language, I have 
renamed it a strawperson . After the many decades of persistent efforts by psy-
chometricians to dispel these misconceptions, anyone who accepts them as the 
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major premise is certainl y building a strawperson. Once the strawperson is up , it 
is easily demoli shed , and the demolition carries the tests along with the straw . 
But the question still remains: Why do the misconceptions survive in the first 
place? Who keeps them alive?-certainly not the psychometricians and test 
constructors. 
Actuall y, the misconceptions survive among the general public and among 
those test users who are not knowledgeable about either testing or psychology. I 
would not be so bold as to claim that I have the answer to the indestructibility of 
my straw person . But I suggest that one explanation may be found in the desire 
for magic- the desire for easy answers, quick solutions, and shortcuts . It is the 
des ire to which charlatans have catered across the centuries and which accounts 
for the popularity of astrology, phrenology, palmistry , and all the other fancifu l 
shortcuts for understanding ourselves and our associates. It is these pseudo-
sc iences that the first appl ied psychologists had to compete with. Now that 
psychology has expanded into the public arena, it is the psychologists themselves 
who are expected to produce the magic. And, of course, they will be damned if 
they do and damned if they don ' t. 
THE CONTINUUM OF DEVELOPED ABILITIES 
So much for misconceptions. What do we actually know about the relation 
between aptitude and achievement tests? We may begin by recalling that any 
psychological test is essenti ally an objective and standardized measure of a 
sample of behavior. With regard to cognitive behavior , test scores tell us what 
the individual is able to do at the time. They do not tell us why individuals 
perform as they do . To answer that question , we need to know something about 
each person's experienti al background. Both aptitude and achievement tests can 
be best characterized as tests of developed ability. I first heard thi s term used in 
the 1950s by Henry Dyer, 2 in a College Board committee meeting . It was 
probably an idea ahead of its time and did not then have wide impact. It seems 
we are now beg inning to catch up with it. The term developed abilities is 
appearing with increas ing frequency in publications on testing. It will be re-
called , too, that the College Board now regu larly uses this term to describe the 
SAT. 
21 am d ifferentiating here between the concept of deve loped abilities and an experimental battery , 
the Tests of Developed Abilities , produced by ETS for the College Board in the late 1950s (Anastas i, 
196 1, pp . 442- 443 ; Dyer , 1954; Dyer & Coffman, 1957). Those tests were eventuall y abandoned 
because they proved no more predicti ve of co ll ege success than a combination of the SAT and 
ex isting ach ievement tests in spec ific fie lds, while bei ng more costl y to prepare, administer, and 
score and less flexible in their use. 
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What of the differences between instruments traditionally designated aptitude 
tests and those designated achievement tests? First , tests of deve loped abilities do 
not fall into sharply differentiated categories but rather along a continuum . Both 
aptitude and achievement tests vary widely among themselves; and those near the 
center of the continuum overl ap to such a degree as to be nearly indistinguisha-
ble. Nevertheless, if we arrange the instruments that have traditionall y been 
called aptitude tests and achievement tests in this continuum and strip them of 
unwarranted assumptions about their nature, we can di scern some meaningful 
and useful differences. A number of such differences have been identified with 
considerable clarity by several psychometricians , including Lee Cronbach (1970, 
pp . 28 1- 285), Robert Ebel (1974 , p . 316), and Lloyd Humphreys ( 1974, p. 
263), among others. Each formulated the distinction somewhat differently and 
focused on different aspects of the comparison; but their approaches to the 
question have much in common. I should like to sum up the di stinction between 
instruments at opposite ends of the continuum under two headings: one perta ins 
to antecedent experience, the other to the use of test scores. From the standpoint 
of any particular test, we might say that one di stinction concerns its past and the 
other its future . 
Antecedent Experience 
The tests traditionally designated aptitude tests, at one end of the continuum , 
differ from those des ignated achievement tests, at the other end , in the degree of 
precision with which relevant antecedent experience is defined. This does not 
necessarily mean generality or specificity of test content , nor does it imply 
breadth of transfer effect or of applicability of the instrument. Intelligence tests 
and educational achievement batteries can be equally broad in content coverage 
and in the situational scope of their predictive validity . A spatial aptitude test and 
an achievement test in typewriting can be equally specific and limited in content 
coverage and in applicability . What I am referring to instead is essentiall y the 
experiential pool upon which the test constructor draws in formulating test items. 
This experienti al pool is defined with considerable clarity and precision in con-
structing, let us say, an achievement test in so lid geometry, or medieval hi story, 
or motor vehicle operation. At the other extreme is a test like the Stanford- Binet, 
in which the definition specifies little beyond growing up in America in the 
twentieth century. Broadly oriented educational achievement batteries, which 
endeavor to di ssoc iate themselves from spec ific course content , add little to thi s 
definition . Their domain of antecedent experience could be defined as growing 
up and going to school in America in the twentieth century. 
I am reminded in this connection of the difference between a learning curve 
and a growth curve plotted with test scores. The growth curve is a learning curve 
covering a longer period of time and obtained in the absence of precise knowl-
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edge about the independent variables that bring about the observed behavioral 
changes . 
To sum up the first difference, tests of developed ability differ in the degree 
of prec ision versus vagueness with which tbe relevant domain of antecedent 
experience is defined. 
Use of Test Scores 
The second difference concerns the way in which test scores are utilized. It is 
generall y recognized that traditional achievement tests are designed and used 
primarily to assess current status, whereas traditional aptitUde tests are des igned 
and used to predict future performance following a specified learning experience . 
Typical tests of current status , at one end of this continuum , can be illustrated by 
a licensing examination (as in obtaining a driver's license) , a typing test (as in 
hiring a secretary) , a French test (as in selecting an interpreter) , a test to assess 
the effects of self-study or life experiences (as in credit by examination) , and a 
competency test in so-called basic skill s (presumably chosen because they are 
prerequi site to a wide variety of roles in our contemporary culture) . 
At the other end of the continuum , we find typical " intelligence" and "apti -
tude" tests des igned parti cul arly for predictive purposes. What can the indi-
vidual learn- how much and how fas t can he or she learn- when put through a 
particular course of study , educational program, industrial apprenticeship , or 
other systematic learning experience? I'm sure that at this point many o f you are 
thinking that traditional achievement tests can often serve as effective predictors 
of future learning . T hat is certainly true . An achievement test in arithmetic is a 
good predictor of students' subsequent performance in an algebra class. 
We must remember that all tests actually assess current status, whether their 
purpose is terminal assessment or prediction . Hence it is not surpri sing that some 
aptitude tests look very much like achievement tests and vice versa. In fact , some 
writers (Carroll , 1974; Snow, 1980) have argued for aptitude as a concept or 
construct , defined as all the characteri stics of an individual that predispose him 
or her to success or failure in new learning or in the performance of some future 
activity . An aptitude test, according to this view , is only one indicant of aptitude; 
other indicants would include achievement tests, data on prior performance, and 
information regarding re levant personality and physical characteristics. Thi s def-
inition of aptitude obviously focuses on the predicti ve use of information about 
the individual , including current test scores of all sorts. 
MORE ABOUT APTITUDES 
Let us take a closer look at the concept of aptitude itself. This, after all , is where 
myths and excess meanings have accumulated. In di scuss ions of aptitUde and 
achievement tests, it is generally the misconceptions about aptitude that have led 
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to false distinctions and to misuse of scores. Aptitude, as we have seen, has been 
identified with the predictive use of tests. Prediction , in turn , has traditionally 
been linked with the process of selection : Some students are admitted (to college, 
medical school, or whatever) and others are not; some job applicants are hired 
and others are not. As a result of several emerging societal changes, selection is 
beginning to give way to classification. Tests are being used increas ingly for 
such purposes as assisting individuals to choose among courses of study , careers, 
or other alternative action plans; placing applicants in different jobs for maximal 
utilization of their individual qualifications; and assessing the prerequisite skills 
and knowledge of individual students in order to fit instructional programs to 
specific needs. 
In all these contexts, the concept of diagnostic testing is coming to replace 
that of testing for prediction. But the role of tests in diagnosis and prediction is 
not fundamentally different. In all these situations, appropriate tests should be 
chosen or constructed in the light of a task analysis of the desired behavior 
domain- whether identified through an academic curriculum, a career, a particu-
lar job , or whatever. To be effective, a predictive or diagnostic test should assess 
the development of those prerequisite ski ll s and knowledge that the individual 
needs before taking the next step. Although test content may be drawn from a 
common pool of experiences shared by the examinee population , the selection of 
relevant items from that pool should be oriented toward the requirements of the 
subsequent performance pool. Every test has both this backward and forward 
reference . The forward reference, however, is especially relevant for tests used 
to assess one's readiness to advance from where one is to where one wants to 
go--for instance, into a particular job or educational program. 
The concept of aptitude as prerequisite skill s and knowledge is exemplified in 
what Ben Bloom (1976, 1980) calls cognitive entry behaviors and affective entry 
characteristics. The cognitive entry behaviors include such general skills as 
reading comprehension , basic quantitative skills, writing competence, logical 
reason ing processes, and possibly still broader skills such as attention skills and 
study skills. These are the ski ll s tapped in most scholastic aptitude and academic 
intelligence tests. Bloom maintains, however, that the more specific cognitive 
entry behaviors identified as prerequisites for a particular set of learning tasks 
provide more accurate assessment and are more readily alterable by appropriate 
instruction. Affective entry characteristics also influence the individual's subse-
quent learning performance. They include relevant emotional, motivational, and 
self-concept variables. To some extent, they too can be altered by subsequent 
instruction adapted to individual needs. Effective instruction requires full infor-
mation regarding the individual 's status upon entry into the instructional program 
(initial aptitude), as well as clear specification of what is to be learned (achieve-
ment goals). 
School readiness is another condition assoc iated with the concept of aptitude. 
It refers essentially to the attainment of prerequisite skills, knowledge, attitudes, 
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motivations, and other behavioral traits that enable the learner to profit max-
imally from school instruction . These prerequisites are what Hunt and Kirk 
(1974) have called the "entry skills" that the child needs to cope with the 
teaching-learning situation encountered in the first grade. At one time, such 
readiness was conceived largely in terms of maturation. To be sure, the develop-
ment of certain minimum physical qualifications facilitates some kinds of learn-
ing. Unless chi ldren can make the necessary auditory discriminations, they can-
not learn to speak by the usual procedures; without the ability for fine motor 
coordination, they are unable to manipulate a pencil in writing. Most school 
learning , however, is not so closely linked to sensorimotor development. In the 
mastery of educational tasks, the importance of prior learning is being in-
creasingly recognized. More and more emphasis is now placed on the hierarchi-
cal development of know ledges and skills, whereby the acquisition of simple 
concepts equips the chi ld for the learning of more complex concepts at any age . 
Still another way to conceptualize aptitude and achievement in an educational 
context is presented by Robert Ebel (1969, 1974). In an incisive analysis of the 
goals of education, Ebel (1969) concluded that the essence of educational 
achievement is "command of useful verbal knowledge [po 66]" and that this 
objective should be reflected in the construction of educational tests. In order to 
be meaningful to the individual learner and retrievable when relevant, each new 
acquisition must be integrated into a coherent structure of knowledge. According 
to this view, "aptitude for learning consists mainly and essentiall y of relevant 
knowledge .. .. What the student has achieved in learning becomes, if it is 
relevant, his aptitude for further learning" (Ebel, 1974, p . 316) . This process 
cannot occur independently of the subject matter to which it is applied. We do 
not think content-free thoughts nor develop content-free abilities . The avai labi li-
ty of a large, well-organized, and eas ily retrievable content store is also emerging 
as a major difference between the performance of expert and novice in such 
activities as playing chess and solving difficult problems in physics (Glaser , 
1981). 
The increasing .recognition of the importance of the knowledge context of 
developed abilities is reflected in a recent statement prepared under College 
Board auspices. The statement concerns the basic academic competencies that 
college-bound high school students should develop (College Entrance Examina-
tion Board, 1981 b, 1981c). Following an initial year of intensive discussions by 
representative groups of educators, a plan was formulated covering both broad 
developed abilities (called academic competencies) and recommended curricular 
fields . The list of academic competencies, although defined at a higher academic 
level, sounds very much like the cognitive entry behaviors described by Bloom. 
They include developed abilities in reading, writing , listening and speaking , 
mathematics, reasoning, and studying. A major conclusion was "that acquis ition 
of the competencies and achievement in the curriculum are interdependent- that 
is, subject matter cannot be mastered without the necessary competencies, and 
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the competencies cannot be developed in a vacuum without reference to subject-
matter content [College Entrance Examination Board , 1981 c , p . 10]. " 
Despite the indestructible strawperson , we have indeed been making steady 
progress in expanding, clarifying, and refining our understanding of what apti-
tude and achievement tests measure . Our main problem is still how to communi-
cate this growth in understanding to test users , test takers, and the general public . 
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Achievement Test Items: 
Cu rrent issues 
Robert L. Ebel 
Michigan State University 
The writer of achievement test items is confronted with two major problems, as 
Lindquist pointed out nearly half a century ago (Lindquist , 1936, p. 17) . The 
first of these is the problem of what to measure. The second is how to measure it. 
The solution proposed for the first problem is to focus primarily on testing for 
knowledge and only secondarily on testing for abi lities. Cognitive abilities, it is 
reasonable to believe, depend entirely on knowledge. Although the term knowl-
edge, as commonly used , includes both information and understanding, the most 
useful kind of knowledge , the kind that will occupy our attention almost ex-
clusively , is that which involves understanding. Understood knowledge is a 
structure of relations among concepts. To understand is to be aware of relation-
ships. Each of these relationships can be expressed in words as a proposition. 
The solution proposed for the second problem is to present the examinee with 
a series of incomplete propositions , accompanied by two or more alternative 
completions, only one of which makes the proposition true. Many of the current 
issues in the writing of achievement test items are related to these two proposed 
so lutions. 
A CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge originates in information that can be received directly from observa-
tions or indirectly from reports of observations. These observations may be 
external (objects or events) or internal (thoughts and feelings) (Scheffler , 1965, 
p. 137). Information feeds the mind and , like food for the body, it must be 
digested and assimilated. Think ing is the process by which these things can be 
accomplished (Newman , 1852, p. 134). Information that is simply stored in 
memory remains only information , the lowest , least useful form of knowledge . 
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But if the information becomes the subject of reflective thought , if those who 
received it ask themselves , "What does it mean?" "How do we know? " "Why 
is it so?" , the information may come to be understood. It may be integrated into 
a system of relations among concepts and ideas that constitutes a structure of 
knowledge. This has been referred to as "semantic encoding" (Anderson , 1972 , 
p. 146) . Information that is understood , that is incorporated into a structure of 
knowledge , tends to be more powerful, more useful, and more satisfying. It is 
likely to be a more permanent possession than information that is simply remem-
bered (Boulding, 1967 , pp. 7- 8). 
The basis for verbal knowledge exists in the mind in a form that Polanyi 
(1958) has called "tacit knowledge." In that form , it is a purely private posses-
sion. But if concepts can be abstracted from these images and expressed in 
words, and if the relations among the concepts can be expressed in sentences, 
then tacit knowledge is converted into verbal knowledge. This can be communi-
cated and thus made public. It can also be recorded and stored for future refer-
ence. It can be manipulated in the processes of reflective thinking. It is thus a 
very powerful form of knowledge. The peculiar excellence of human beings 
among all other creatures on earth is their ability to produce and to use verbal 
knowledge. Thinkers produce it. Teachers and students, planners , and managers 
use it. Classrooms and libraries and study rooms are full of it. So are conference 
rooms , memoranda , and reports . It would be difficult to overstate the importance 
of structures of verbal knowledge in human affairs (Hayakawa , 194 1, pp. 15-25; 
Langer, 1957, pp . 200- 204). 
If a structure of verbal knowledge consists entirely of a system of articul ated 
relations among concepts and ideas , can it be described completely by li sting the 
elements (propositions) that compose it? Might not a complex structure involve 
relations or dimensions that are not expressed by the constituent elements of the 
structure? Indeed it is possible that a listing of the elements of a structure might 
omit some that have not been perceived or expressed in words . But it is unrea-
sonable to believe that there might be important elements of the structure that 
could not be perceived and expressed; to cite an example of such an unperce ived 
and unexpressed element, one would have to perceive and express it. Once it had 
been expressed, it could be added to the list. The conclusion that a structure of 
verbal knowledge can be described completely by listing the elements that com-
pose it appears to be logically necessary . Where structures of knowledge are 
concerned, the whole seems to be precisely equal to the sum of all the parts. 
THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE TO ABILITY 
The contribution of knowledge to effective human behavior is sometimes ques-
tioned. Knowledge alone is not enough, says the businessman. It does not 
guarantee financial success . Knowledge alone is not enough, says the co llege 
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president. It does not guarantee scholarly achievement. Knowledge alone is not 
enough, says the religious leader. It does not guarantee virtue. Knowledge alone 
is not enough, says the philosopher. It does not guarantee wisdom. 
They are all right, of course. Knowledge alone is not enough . But in this 
complex world of chance and change , no one thing nor any combination of 
things ever will be enough to guarantee financial success or scholarly achieve-
ment or virtue or wisdom. Although this is true , few would deny that the 
command of knowledge does contribute greatly to the attainment of these other, 
more ultimate goals. 
The term knowledge, as it is used in this chapter, means considerably more 
than the same term means in the Bloom Taxonomy (Bloom, 1956, pp. 201-
297). There, knowing something means simply being able to recall it. Having 
knowledge is nothing more than having information. Here, the term knowledge 
refers not only to information but also and, far more importantly, to understand-
ing , which requires a structure of relations among concepts. In addition, the 
emphasis here is on useful knowledge. If knowledge is not available to be used, 
it is not fully possessed. Thus the possession of knowledge, as the term is used 
here , should enable a person to demonstrate all the other abilities and skills 
identified in the other categories of Bloom's Taxonomy: comprehension, ap-
plication, analysis , synthesis, and evaluation . If one knows how to do these 
things, one ought to be able to do them . 
THE MEASURABILITY OF HUMAN 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Any important human characteristic is necessarily measurable. To be important, 
a personal characteristic must make an observable difference , that is, at some 
time, under some circumstances, a person who has more of it must behave 
differently from a person who has less of it. If different degrees or amounts of a 
personal characteristic never make any observable difference , what evidence can 
be found to show that it is, in fact, important? 
But if such differences can be observed, then the characteristic is measurable, 
for all measurement requires is verifiable observation of a more- less relation-
ship. Can integrity be measured? It can if verifiable differences in integrity can 
be observed among men . Can mother love be measured? If observers can agree 
that a hen shows more mother love than a female trout or that Mrs. A. shows 
more love for her children than Mrs. B , then mother love can be measured . The 
gist of the argument is this. To be important, a personal characteristic must make 
a difference. If it makes a difference, the basis for measurement exists. 
In principle , then, any important human characteristic is measurable. In prac-
tice, however, many characteristics said to be important seem to be very difficult 
to measure. Where can one find a reliable test of ability to see relations , to 
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formulate hypotheses, to interpret data, to organize ideas, to draw conclusions, 
to solve problems, or to think? 
Perhaps the difficulty may lie in the characteristics themselves. Perhaps they 
simply do not exist as separate, unified , measurable abilities. Perhaps what we 
call abilities are simply categories of tasks that have some superficial characteris-
tics in common but which cannot be dealt with effectively by the application of a 
single general task-related ability. Perhaps what they may require mainly is 
knowledge of the special context in which the tasks arise. Take problem solving 
for example. The problems a physician must solve are likely to be quite different 
from those a chess player or a football coach or a highway engineer or a theoreti-
cal physicist must solve. No test of general ability to solve problems is likely to 
predict very accurately how successful a practitioner of each of these arts or 
crafts is likely to be. Too little of what makes a physician successful in problem 
solving is also likely to make the chess player, the coach, the engineer, or the 
physicist successful. 
Many of the alleged abilities that are said to be important human characteris-
tics have never been defined operationally, which must be the first step in 
developing valid measures of them. If an operational definition of one of these 
very general abilities could be developed , it might lead to a test composed of 
such a heterogeneity of tasks, with very low intertask correlations, that the test 
scores would be very low in reliability. When this is the case, differences among 
individuals in the amount of this general ability are likely to be difficult to 
discern. It will probably be equally difficult to show that such differences matter 
very much. If they make little difference on a test designed to measure them, 
they are unlikely to make much difference in other contexts . If this is the case, 
they cannot be of great importance . 
It may be a waste of time and energy to try to measure " hard to measure " 
human characteristics . Their measurability is directly related to their importance. 
For the same reason it may be a waste of time and energy to try to develop these 
"hard to measure" characteristics through instruction. A teacher who claims to 
be doing so without being able to produce ev idence of success in doing it 
(because, you see, they are " hard to measure") may be simply throwing dust in 
our eyes . Those who argue that "what can be easily assessed should not dictate 
what is taught" are mistaken. If it cannot be easi ly assessed it cannot be surely 
taught. It is not likely to be worth trying to teach. 
An instructor who wishes to develop in pupils some important characteristic 
must first devise a method for measuring reliably how much of that characteristic 
each pupil has acquired. Then the instructor must devise a method for developing 
that characteristic . Finally the instructor ought to measure the effectiveness of his 
efforts. Most teachers can find a sufficient challenge to their abilities and com-
mitments in teaching things that are not' 'hard to measure ." They should not add 
unnecessarily to the difficulties and frustrations of their work by undertaking to 
teach and to test "hard to measure" achievements. Teachers would teach more 
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effectively and talk more sensibly if they would ban references to " hard to 
measure" qualities from their discourses . 
THE RELATIVE MERITS OF ESSAY AND OBJECTIVE 
TESTS 
Specialists in testing tend to recommend the use d objective tests in general and 
multiple-choice items in particular. They claim not only that objective tests are 
more objective and convenient but that they provide more extensive samples of 
the ability to be tested and yield scores of higher reliability. Critics of multiple-
choice tests claim that essay tests, despite their limitat ions and the difficulties of 
using them , provide more valid measures of ability and encourage more whole-
some educational practices. 
In considering the relative merits of essay and objective tests, it is important 
to make this point at the outset. If the purpose of the test is , as it is usually, to 
determine how much useful knowledge a person has on some subject, then that 
purpose can be achieved by using either an essay or an objective test. The point is 
important because some believe that essay tests call for a different, and higher, 
level of mental ab ility than is required by an objective test. The fact, however, is 
otherwise. There is no empirical evidence to support belief in such a difference 
and no rational basis for expecting it. 
It is reasonable to believe that any cogn itive ability consists entirely of knowl-
edge of how to do something . That knowledge is made up of a structure of 
elements of knowledge, a structure of relations between concepts and ideas. By 
testing examinees for possession of a sample of those elements, one can deter-
mine the extent and strength of their structures of knowledge relevant to the 
ability and, thus, the degree to which they possess the abi lity. 
If person A knows more about a subject than person B, then A is likely to 
write a better answer than B to an essay question on the subject. A is also likely 
to give more correct answers than B to an objective test on the subject. The 
correctness of the answers either person gives to either type of test question 
depends largely on the extent and firmness of that person's structure of 
knowledge. 
It is true that essay tests present tasks to the examinees that are distinctly 
different from the tasks presented in objective tests. The difference , however, is 
more one of form than of substance. In both cases the information used in giving 
the answer comes from the examinee's structure of knowledge. In both cases an 
examinee must choose information relevant to the question being asked. Then , 
with an essay test answer, the examinee must choose how to express in words the 
relevant items of information and the conclusions to which they lead. With an 
objective test , the examinee must choose how to relate the relevant items of 
information to the questions posed by the item and then choose which of the 
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answer options is best supported by the relevant information. In both cases the 
foundation for an answer is the examinee ' s structure of knowledge. In both cases 
the process of arriving at an answer involves making repeated choices. In both 
cases the examinee must apply the knowledge possessed , must relate and infer as 
well as remember. 
The advantage that essay tests have in not suggesting the correct answer to a 
question, or providing clues to it, is more apparent than real. Those who are most 
successful in selecting correct answers to a multiple-choice question tend to be 
also more successful in producing good answers to essay test questions (Cook, 
1955) . The cues to the correct answer that multiple-choice items provide seldom 
give away the correct answer to one who lacks knowledge of it or ability to infer 
it. Multiple-choice items often prove to be too difficult to discriminate well 
despite the cues they may provide . If the multiple-choice items are well written, 
cues to the correct answer will be offset to some degree by other cues that suggest 
incorrect answers to poorly informed examinees. The items in which cues are 
likely to be most helpful are the less desirable kinds in which a previously 
learned answer simply must be recognized. If the item requires application of 
what has been learned to answer a question or solve a problem that has never 
been encountered before, cues will be less helpful. Presenting a good test ques-
tion in multiple-choice form seldom if ever makes the question too easy to do its 
job well. Seldom if ever does presentation of correct answers keep objective tests 
from clearly distinguishing those who know more from those who know less 
about a subject. 
Whatever theoretical advantages there might be to having the examinee pro-
duce an answer are likely to be offset by the tedious, subjective process of 
evaluating the answer and the unreliable scores that often result. Errors in scoring 
objective tests are quite rare and usually very smal l. Differences of opinion in 
judging the quality of essay test answers are often substantial. This is not to say 
that there are no occasions on which an essay test should be used in preference to 
an objective test. It is to say that a general preference for essay tests is unwar-
ranted . The abi lity tested by an item is determined mainly by the content of the 
question , not by the form of the response. 
THE MERITS OF ITEMS BASED ON REALISTIC 
PROBLEM SITUATIONS 
For over 40 years some test specialists have recommended the use of test items 
based on verbal descriptions of realistic problem situations . Items of this kind are 
suitable for inclusion in paper and pencil tests. They are more realistic than items 
that test directly for possession of knowledge or for understanding of principles 
and procedures . They are less realistic than performance tests presented in simu-
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lat ions of "real-life" situations. A discussion of the possibilities and problems of 
applied performance testing can be found in Fitzpatrick and Morrison (1971). 
The inclusion in paper and pencil tests of items that present verbal descrip-
tions of realistic problem situations has several attractions to test constructors. It 
demonstrates that objective tests are not limited to testing for recall of isolated , 
trivial factual detail s. Situation-based items cannot be answered correctly by 
simple recognition of the right answer. They force the examinee to think. They 
obviously require the application of knowledge to real-life problems. Realism in 
the test encourages faith in the validity of the test scores. These are valuable 
assets. But situation-based items also have disadvantages. They tend to be com-
plex and wordy. Complexi ty may obscure the crucial element in the situation , 
complicate the task of the examinee, and thus lower the discriminating power of 
the items. It is true that the real problems we face in living are complex. 
Unfortunately, complex, real problems seldom have single demonstrably correct 
right answers. Giving a person a complex problem to solve may not be the best 
way to estimate that person's capability of solving such problems. 
Ordinari ly a complex test question contributes only a single unit to the total 
test score. It is answered correctly (l) or incorrectly (0) . But to arrive at the final 
answer to a complex question , the only answer that counts, the examinee must 
provide himself with a multitude of intermediate or contributory answers that do 
not count. To reach a correct answer, each of a number of contributory steps 
must be taken correctly . A single error in anyone of them may lead to a final 
answer that is wrong. The value of nine correct decisions can be offset by the 
penalty for one that is incorrect. Should not right and wrong decisions carry more 
nearly equal weight in judging an examinee's capabilities? Would it not be more 
reasonable , would it not be more informative, would it not lead to more accurate 
measurement of the mental ability being tested to assess the correctness of each 
step independently? 
Some would say not , arguing that the whole is more than and more significant 
than the sum of its component parts; that ability to avoid even a single error 
during a complex process is the essence of competence. The argument is not 
without merit. Surely it is true that in the ord inary affairs of living , single errors 
can be very costly . One thing done wrong can cancel the rewards for doing many 
things right. But is our purpose in measuring mental abi lities to imitate life? Or is 
it mainly to assess a person's cognitive resources, that is, the person's knowledge 
and mental abi lities? For that purpose it may be appropriate and advantageous to 
take each decision into account and to assess them independently. It may be 
inappropriate and disadvantageous to consider only a single outcome from a 
sequence or cluster of related , contributory decisions. 
Wordiness should make the items more time-consuming so that fewer could 
be included in a test of given duration. Obviously a test composed of simple 
items wi ll yield more independent scorable responses per hour of testing time and 
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hence will tend to yield more reliable scores than a test composed of complex 
items. Simple test items should also be easier to comprehend and present fewer 
ambiguities or occasions for misinterpretation by the examinees. Because of 
these differences one would expect scores of higher reliability from simple than 
from complex items in tests of similar duration. Experimental studies by Howard 
(1943) and by Ebel (1953) have confirmed these expectations. It seems difficult 
to obtain scores of reasonable reliability in tests of reasonable duration if the test 
items are situation based. This has been true of patient- management problems in 
medicine (Skakun, 1979), of air crew problems derived from critical incidents in 
military aviation, and of simulations in legal education (Alderman, Evans, & 
Wilder, 1981). There seems to be an inverse relation between the realism of the 
problem situations in the test and the reliability of the scores yielded by the test. 
Recognizing these disadvantages, the test constructor may sti ll favor the use 
of situation-based items. For they do test examinee understanding , abi lities to 
app ly knowledge, and abi lity to think. Is there any better alternative? There may 
be . Whereas items involving complex , realistic problem situations are often 
inefficient, ambiguous, and indeterminate, items testing elements of knowledge 
tend to be efficient and can be less ambiguous and more determinate. There are 
reasons for believing that most cognitive abilities that can be measured by situa-
tion-based test items can also be measured, perhaps with greater efficiency and 
re li ability , by proposition-based items. In many situations , tests composed of 
simple items may provide more efficient and accurate measures of mental abili-
ties than can be provided by complex test items. In item writing as in many other 
arts, simplic ity can be a virtue. 
THE MERITS OF ALTERNATE-CHOICE ITEMS 
A simple approach to assessing knowledge is available to those who can accept 
the idea that knowledge is a structure of relations among concepts. Each of the 
relations that makes up the structure can be expressed as a proposition. A propo-
sition is simply a sentence that can be said to be true or false (Cohen & Nagle, 
1934, pp. 27- 30). Propositions simi lar in appearance to those that are part of the 
structure but expressing relations that are not part of the structure can also be 
written. The person whose knowledge is being assessed is asked to distinguish 
between the correct and the incorrect propositions. 
This sounds suspiciously like a true- fa lse test, as indeed it is. True- false 
tests, however, have been condemned by many specialists in testing , often with 
cons iderab le vehemence (Adkins, 1947, p. 41; Travers, 1950, p. 42). Other 
authorities have suggested a different view, which I share. The fau lts found in 
true- false items are not inherent in the form but sometimes result from careless 
or incompetent use of it (Bergmann, 1981, p. 92; Popham , 1981 , p. 243). 
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Both the amount of guess ing pupils do in taking true- false tests (Ebel, 1968) 
and the amount of error that the guessing contributes to their scores (Hills & 
Gladney, 1968) tend to be exaggerated . Classroom true- false tests of approx-
imately 100 items have yie lded coeffi cients of reliability in the .80s and .90s. 
These results would be most unlikely if the scores were di storted seriously by 
guess ing . 
Each true- fal se item tests only one element in a structure of knowledge, but 
there can be many such items in a test . No single essential element in an 
important structure can be regarded as trivial. If the item is seriously ambiguous, 
or if it encourages rote learning, much of the fault must be wi th the one who 
wrote it. Elements in a structure of knowledge can be expressed clearl y. They do 
not need to reward rote learning by being expressed in the exact words or 
sentences of the textbook or lecturer. The fear that incorrect propositions in a 
true- false test will lead to wrong learning has proved to be unjustified (Ross, 
1947 , p. 349; Ruch, 1929, p . 368). 
Despite their intrinsic relevance to the assessment of achievement in learning, 
true- false test items can be ambiguous. They call for absolute judgments of truth 
or falsity . They do not offer different answers among which the examinee can 
choose. Because few statements are complete and accurate enough to be per-
fectl y true, the examinee must dec ide how far the statement can deviate from 
perfect truth and still be call ed true. This is one source of ambiguity . Another is 
lack of clarity in the focus of the item. The element in the statement that is crucial 
to its truth or falsity is not identified clearl y to the examinee . 
An alternative to the true- fa lse item, designed to remove some of the ambigu-
ity , is the alternate-choice item . It consists of an incomplete statement of a 
proposition along with two or more alternative completions, only one of which 
makes the statement true . For example : 
An eclipse of the sun can onl y occur when the moon is: 
(I) full (2) new. 
Items of this kind do not call for absolute judgments of truth or fa lsity. The 
critical element in the statement they make should be quite clear. Their indices of 
di scrimination should be higher on the average than the indices of comparable 
true- fa lse items given to the same examinees. The test scores therefore should be 
more reliable . A recent study has verified this expectation . Students (N = 28) 
enrolled in a class in educational measurement took parallel 25-item true- false 
and alternate-choice tests on each of eight units of instruction in the course. The 
Kuder- Richardson 20 reliability coefficients for the true- false tests ranged from 
. 13 to .7 1, with a mean of .47 . Those for the alternate-choice tests ranged 
from .56 to .76, with a mean of .66 (Ebel , 1982). 
Alternate-choice items are di stinctively di fferent from the famil iar four-alter-
nati ve multi ple-choice items in ways other than the number of response options 
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offered . Because they tend to be simpler and use fewer words, they take less time 
per item (Ebel, 1953). This could lead to higher reliability for tests of a given 
duration. The response options tend to be shorter, often one or two words, which 
focuses the attention of the examinee more clearly on the element of knowledge 
being tested. 
One objection likely to be raised to the use of the alternate-choice items is that 
they deal with isolated factual detail s. Their brevity and specificity may be taken 
as indications of triviality (Highet, 1950, p. 120). But if the conception of 
knowledge presented in this chapter is correct, if verbal knowledge can be 
expressed completely as a structure of relations, if each of these relations (the 
elements of the structure) can be expressed as a proposition , and if each proposi-
tion is used as the basis for an alternate-choice item, then one can assess the 
extent and firmness of the whole structure by examining the parts that compose it 
(Thorndike, 1935; Wood & Beers, 1936, p. 162). The choice of a response to an 
alternate-choice item is simple to indicate, but the process of making it rationally 
may be quite complex. If a problem like the following has not been encountered 
before, it is likely to test understanding and application as well as recall. 
The buoyant force on a ping-pong ball immersed in water is: 
(I) greater than (2) the same as (3) less than that 
on an iron ball of the same size. (Answer 2) 
Even if the problem has been encountered before, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the person who understands the bas is for the answer is more likely than the one 
who does not to give the correct answer. 
When using the alternate-choice item form, the item writer is free to pose 
questions that admit only two good alternative responses. Here are some 
examples: 
I. The density of ice is (I) greater (2) less than that of water. 
2. A point on the surface of the Earth moves toward the (I) east (2) west as 
the Earth turns. 
3. The average size of farms in the United States has (I) increased (2) 
decreased during this century. 
Often, as in these examples, there is only one plausible alternative to the key 
word or phrase in the proposition. 
When item writers are obliged to produce four-alternative multiple-choice 
items, they sometimes do so by combining several alternate-choice items. They 
may present fo ur propositions and ask which one is true or not true. They may 
ask if a statement is true or false, and why. The responses might be: (I) true, 
because A; (2) true , because B; (3) false, because C; (4) fa lse, because D. They 
may ask if something is true of both X and Y. The responses might be: ( I) yes, 
both ; (2) no , only X; (3) no, only Y; (4) no, neither. They may ask the speed and 
direction of a change, so that the responses might be: ( I) rapid increase; (2) slow 
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increase; (3) slow decrease; (4) rapid decrease. Presented separately the two or 
more alternate-choice items would yield two or more independent indications of 
achievement. Combined, they yield only one. The result is likely to be a loss of 
reliability (Ebel, 1978) . 
Three other characteristics of alternate-choice items give them some advan-
tage over conventional multiple-choice items . When the response options are 
brief, as they usually are, they can be included as parts of a continuous sentence 
and need not be listed below an item stem. This makes the typing simpler and the 
resulting pages more compact. When it is awkward to arrange the wording of the 
sentence so that the response options come at the end, they can be put in the 
middle or at the beginning. This sometimes simplifies the wording of the item. 
Finally, because alternate-response items are simple in structure, they are easier 
to write. There are fewer opportunities for errors in item writing that might spoi l 
the effectiveness of the item. 
One other point ought to be mentioned before concluding this case for alter-
nate-choice items . There are items like the following in which more than two 
good response options are readi ly availab le. For example: 
1. The gas given off in photosynthesis is (I) carbon dioxide (2) hydro-
gen (3) oxygen (4) nitrogen. (Answer 3) 
2. Most of the territorial possessions of the United States were gained as a 
result of the (1) War of 1812 (2) Civil War (3) Spanish-American War (4) 
World War I. (Answer 3) 
When more than two good response options are available, the item writer should 
probably offer more than two . 
PROSPECTS FOR A TECHNOLOGY OF ITEM WRITING 
Cronbach (1970) expressed the opinion that "The design and construction of 
achievement test items has been given almost no scholarly attention. The leading 
works of the generation-even the Lindquist Educational Measurement and the 
Bloom Taxonomy- are distillations of experience more than scholarly analysis 
[po 509]." The contrast implied here between "distillation of experience" and 
"scholarly analysis" is interesting. Did not Lindquist and Bloom rely on schol-
ars to aid in the distillations? Did not these scholars analyze the experiences of 
which they were aware? Is it obvious that a theory of item writing has much to 
add to the "distillation of experience" in the development of a technology of 
item writing? 
Roid and Haladyna (1980) have reviewed recent research on item writing, 
with special attention to the more or less mechanistic or semiautomatic methods 
of item generation. Their article contains descriptions and discussions of six 
classes of methods for producing test items: 
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1. Those in which the item writer is guided by statements of the objectives of 
instruction. 
2. Those whose items must meet specifications of the domain of content to be 
covered and the forms of items to be used. 
3. Those in which items are produced by linguistic transformations of seg-
ments of prose instruction. 
4. Those in which mapping sentences derived from facet theory are used to 
define a content domain. 
5. Those whose items are designed to test understandings of concepts. 
6. Those in which items are stored in or actually produced by computers. 
The limitations of these methods is acknowledged clearly in the review. Each 
method appears to have a particular application. They cannot be app lied to any 
content level and at any cogn itive level. They require ingenuity and the exercise 
of judgment. At present they are in the infancy of their development. Cronbach 
believes that they will mature into useful tools for the test constructor. Others, 
including this writer, are more skept ical. Roid and Haladyna endorsed Berk's 
(1978) observation that the rigor and precision of item-writing specifications are 
inversely related to their practicability . 
In a sense, the item development procedures outlined in earl ier sections of this 
chapter constitute a technology for item writing . The form and derivation of the 
items is specified quite precisely. The content of the items depends on the item 
writers' knowledge and ski ll s. Propositions that are important and defensible 
must be selected. They must be expressed clearly, accurately, and concisely. 
Incorrect answer options that have commonsense plausibility must be provided. 
The judgment involved in these choices is crucial, and no algorithm or computer 
program is likely to provide it. 
CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
This chapter has attempted to make 15 points. 
I. Information is the source but not the substance of knowledge . 
2. Useful knowledge is a structure of relations among concepts and 
principles . 
3. The peculiar excellence of human beings is their abi lity to produce and to 
use verbal knowledge. 
4. Cognitive abilities are entirely dependent on the possession of relevant 
knowledge. 
5. The assumption that each kind of cognitive task requires a separate spe-
cial cognitive abi lity is unnecessary and probably unwarranted. 
6. Special tasks are more likely to require special knowledge than special 
abi lities. 
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7. Any important human characteristic is necessarily measurable . 
8. Human characteristics that are hard to measure are likely to be of limited 
importance. 
9. Either an essay test or an objective test can be used to measure any 
important cognitive achievement. 
10. Multiple-choice items that present correct answers among the response 
options can indicate quite accurately an examinee's ability to produce 
correct answers. 
11. Items based on realistic problem situations tend to yield unreliable test 
scores. 
12. Items that consist of incomplete propositions each of which is accom-
panied by one correct and one or more incorrect completions can yield 
valid measures of achievement. 
13 . Items that provide only two response options can measure achievement 
satisfactori ly . 
14. Technologies for the mechanical or semiautomatic generation of test 
items are likely to be of limited value. 
15. Simplicity in the conception of what to test and in the means used to test 
it is commendable. 
Paraphrasing Plato's assessment of the ideas he attempted to illustrate in the 
Allegory of the Cave, "Heaven knows if these things are true , but this, at any 
rate, is how they appear to me." 
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Abilities and Knowledge in 
Educational Achievement 
Testing: The Assessment of 
Dynamic Cognitive 
Structu res 1 
Samuel Messick 
Educational Testing Service 
This chapter confronts the question of what role cogniti ve abilities play or ought 
to play in educational achievement testing, which raises the prior question of 
what educational achievement tests are or ought to be . I begin by considering the 
nature of educational achievement as a construct in an attempt to circumscribe 
what achievement tests ought to be rather than by examining extant achievement 
tests that may be variously off target. S imilar consideration is accorded cognitive 
ability as a construct. This distinction between constructs and the imperfect, 
variously contaminated tests that are purported to measure them is a critical 
recurrent theme in these de liberations . Other questions to be briefl y addressed 
concern the role of cogniti ve abilities in the processes of school learning and the 
role of schooling in the development of cognitive abilities. 
STRUCTURES OF KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY 
Educational achievement refers to what an individual knows and can do in a 
spec ified subject area . At issue is not mere ly the amount of knowledge acc umu-
lated but its organization or structure as a functional system for productive 
IThis chapter was presented as part of a Division 15 (Educati onal Psychology) invited sym-
posium on Achievement Testing at the annual meeting of the American Psychologica l Assoc iation, 
Washington , D.C. , August 1982 . 
This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Robert L. Ebe l. His endu ring commitment to the 
improvement of educational measurement as a means of improv ing education is a worthy legacy fo r 
the fie ld. 
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thinking , problem so lving , and creative invention in the subject area as well as 
for further learning. The individual 's structure of knowledge is a critical aspect 
of educational achievement because it facilit ates or hinders what he or she can do 
in the subject area . What a person can do in an area includes a variety of area-
specific skills, such as extracting a square root or parsing a sentence or balancing 
a chemical equation , but also broader cognitive abilities that cut across subject 
areas, such as comprehension , memory retention and retrieval, reasoning, analy-
sis and restructuring, evaluation or judgment , and fluency. 
These broader cognitive ab ili ties contribute to the assembly and structuring of 
knowledge , to the continual reassembly and restructuring of cumulating knowl -
edge, to the accessing and retrieval of knowledge, and to its use in problem 
representation and solution . "Thus achievement," in Snow's (1980a) words, 
" is as much an organization function as it is an acquisition function. And new 
achievement depends as much on transfer of such organization as it does on 
transfer of specific prior facts and skill s [p o 43]. " Because cognitive abilities 
playa central role in both the acquisition and organization functions of educa-
tional achievement, their influence can hardly be suppressed or ignored in educa-
tional achievement testing that assesses knowledge structures. However , their 
role may be reduced in low-level achievement testing that stresses amount of 
in formation alone. Let us next consider the nature of developed knowledge 
structures in more detail and then the nature of developed abilities , before at-
tempting to relate thi s formu lation to other conceptions of educational 
achievement. 
Knowledge Structure as Relational Understanding 
A person's structure of knowledge in a subject area includes not only declarative 
knowledge about substance (or information about what) but also procedural 
knowledge about methods (or information about how) and strategic knowledge 
about alternatives for goal setting and planning (or information about which, 
when , and possibly why). Although the acquisition of declarative and procedural 
knowledge is an explic it goal of typical instruction in most subject areas, strate-
gic knowledge is rarely so and must often be acquired by induction , if at all 
(Greeno, 1980). Despite enormous variability in the effort , the principles and 
generali zations and first-order relations among concepts that provide coherent 
though rudimentary structure to newly acquired knowledge are also often taught 
explicitly . Possible exceptions are likely to occur at the beginning or elementary 
levels of learn ing in a field , where emphasis may be placed on the accumulation 
of a critica l mass of information prior to organizing it. But the more idiosyncratic 
structures that relate newly acquired knowledge to ex istent knowledge structures 
(which sometimes entail s qualitative reorgani zations) and the more complex 
structures that evolve as experti se develops (which frequently entail s qualitative 
reorganizations) are rare ly under instructional control. 
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Knowledge structure basically refers to the structure of re lationships among 
concepts. But as knowledge develops, these structures quickly go beyond classi-
fications of concepts as well as first-order relations among concepts and classes 
to include organized systems of relationships , or schemas. As organizations of 
present knowledge, these schemas provide a context for the comprehension and 
interpretation of objects and events; hence, they profoundly influence the ac-
quisition of new knowledge. Schemas guide the storage and retrieval of knowl-
edge, the generalization and interpretation of ideas, and the initiation and regula-
tion of action (Anderson, Spiro, & Montague, 1977) . Thus, educational 
achievement is not just data driven by the bottom- up processing of incoming 
information but also conceptually driven by top- down assimilation to mental 
schemas or relational structures. Furthermore, as expertise develops , these sche-
mas or relational systems themselves become organized in complex patterns , 
hierarchies, and dynamic networks. These networks are called dynam ic because 
the knowledge structures of experts permit and even facilitate flexible reorga-
nizations for the application of multiple perspectives to problem representation 
and solution . I have more to discuss later about the implications for educational 
achievement testing of the differences between novices and experts and between 
beginning learners and experienced learners in a field . 
In the context of school learning, the development of students' knowledge 
structures may be viewed as an explicit educational objective in its own right. In 
this connection, Scriven (1974) points out that knowledge structures comprise 
"organized relational knowledge," which is what we ordinarily mean by under-
standing, and that implicit in the use of this latter term are a number of affective 
educational goals bearing on the development of attitudes, values , sensitivity, 
and appreciation. As Scriven (1 974) put it , "there are deep reasons from cogni -
tive psychology why understanding almost has to have an affective component, 
reasons which emerge in the verstehen theory of the philosophy of history, in the 
notion of empathy, and in concepts of modelling and role playing [p o 334]." 
Furthermore, affect and personality are intrinsically implicated in knowledge 
structure as a consequence of the individual's psychology of knowledge 
(Tomkins, 1965); that is, what people know and are interested in knowing is a 
function of the kinds of persons they are and especially of their ideologies . 
Moreover, the degree of differentiation and hierarchic integration of the knowl-
edge structure, the permeability of its boundaries, and the flexibility or rigidity of 
its dimensions or compartments are reflective of the individual's personality and 
cognitive style (Messick, 1976, in press). 
This view of educational achievement stresses the assessment of developed 
knowledge structure because it is both a product of earlier learning and at the 
same time is instrumental to, or a vehicle for , subsequent learning. Thus, knowl-
edge structure is central whether the aim of achievement testing is the certifica-
tion of past accomplishment, the diagnosis of present functioning, or the fore-
casting of future attainment. By emphas izing the role of knowledge structure as 
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the representation each learner constructs of a subject area to comprehend tasks 
and events, make sense of new experiences, and plan appropriate actions, this 
view is inherently constructivist in character. It is consistent with a variety of 
constructivi st psychologies but does not derive from anyone of them . For exam-
ple , this view of learn ing and achievement is closely allied to what Bruner has 
called " instrumental conceptualism" (Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966). It is 
also quite congenial with Piaget's overall stance on developmental process with-
out committing to his position on developmental stages; that is, learn ing and the 
development of cognitive structure are seen as the active assimilation of experi-
ence to conceptual schemas , in balance with the restructuring of schemas in 
accommodation to reality-based or theoretically-correct structures. 
Cognitive Abilities as Process Structures 
Turning now to cognitive ability as a construct, let me stress at the outset that I 
am speaking of multiple abilities and not a unitary force or power , about devel-
oped abilities and not fixed abi lities or capacities (Humphreys , 1962). Indeed, 
these abi lities are clearly sti ll developing well into ad ulthood (Cattell , 1971). 
They may develop more slowly later in learning than earlier and more rapidly for 
some individuals than others . Some may decline with advancing age, sometimes 
being compensated for by increasing facility in the utilization of other abilities. 
But, in general , cognitive abilities appear to respond over the long term to 
education and experience throughout the school years and beyond-even such 
broad intellective abilities as verbal comprehension and quantitative reasoning 
that are relatively well crystall ized by adolescence (Cattell, 1971 ; Messick , 
1980, 1982b). 
Nor is there any implication of innateness of these cognitive ab ilities inherent 
either in the way they are measured or in the way they are theoretically concep-
tualized. At the level of measurement, the drawing of inferences about innate 
abi lity from an individual's test performance has long been discredited. Such 
in ferences drawn by early intelligence testers were based on two unsupportable 
assumptions about equality of motivation to learn and equality of opportunity to 
learn. These early testers reasoned that by selecting skills that all individuals are 
expected to develop as a matter of course in their cu lture, gross differences in 
motivation to learn were avoided ; selecting ski ll s that can be mastered on the 
basis of universally available experiences within the culture avoided gross dif-
ferences in opportunity to learn. Hence, performance differences on tests of 
those skills, they would have it , reflect individual differences in innate ability to 
learn. 
The crucial flaw in this reasoning lies in the premises- ski lls that all exam-
inees have equal motivation and opportunity to acquire probably do not exist 
(Schwarz , 1971). Efforts to satisfy these assumptions continue, however, in the 
gui se of so-called "culture-free" or "culture-fair" tests . Here, the usual ap-
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proach is to select novel tasks where the opportunity (or rather, the lack of 
opportunity) for mastering them is more nearly equivalent in different cultural 
settings. This may better satisfy the opportunity assumption but at the expense of 
the motivation assumption, because tasks that are not emphasized in a culture 
depend for their salience or stimulus value on their intrinsic interest and the 
presumed importance of the testing to each examinee. 
In contrast, the concept of developed abilities stresses the individual's current 
level of consistent proficiency however derived. Individual differences in devel-
oped abilities frankly reflect all sources of ability differences, including indi-
vidual differences in prior motivation and opportunity to learn. Nonetheless, 
direct measures of the student's current functioning level, whatever its multiple 
determinants, are important in their own right for a variety of educational pur-
poses. In much instructional planning, for example, it is critical to know what the 
student can do now. Some instructional strategies may differ, to be sure, depend-
ing on whether current ability levels are thought to reflect deficiencies or difficul-
ties deriving from problems of motivation or of opportunity. In these instances, 
and perhaps as a general rule, measures of developed abilities should be in-
terpreted in the context of independent information about motivation and oppor-
tunity, the latter being conceived broadly enough to include the quality of prior 
and current instruction (Heller, Holtzman, & Messick, 1982; Messick, 1983). 
At the level of theory, most modern conceptions of ability development are 
basically interactionist in character; that is, they accord a causal role to interac-
tion with the environment and hence are counter to earlier traditions of fixed 
intelligence and of genetically predetermined development (Hunt, 1961; Mes-
sick, 1972). Although many theorists hold that the primitive or rudimentary 
processes that initially interact with the environment are innate, these processes 
are not the abilities that develop out of the interaction. Even in those instances 
where a basic innate ability is postulated to start the interactive process , such as 
Catte ll 's (197 1) fluid intelligence, this ability itself develops as a consequence of 
environmental interaction while it simultaneously facilitates the formation and 
development of specific abilities in response to differentiated environmental 
structure. 
Many of these theories also stress a centra l role for positive transfer in learn-
ing and development. In the theory of ability development elaborated by Fergu-
son (1954, 1956), for example, abilities are viewed as learned proficiencies that 
attain relative stability through overlearning. They develop through repeated 
performance across similar tasks and gradually attain relative stability through 
exercise, challenge, and practice. Note that the reference is to relative stability , 
not fixity- that is, proficiency has developed to that part of the learning curve 
where additional effort yields small though nonzero increments. Learning that 
leads to the development of a particular ability, however, is influenced by prior 
learnings and previously established abilities through mechanisms of transfer. 
Indeed, one should expect that the most critical variables exerting transfer effects 
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on subsequent learning would be abilities- that is, those earlier acquisitions that 
have attained stability in performance. 
The operative transfer function in this regard relates performance on a particu-
lar task, or set of simi lar tasks, both to training on those tasks and to proficiency 
levels on relevant abilities. If the learning period is sufficiently prolonged that 
significant changes in the abilities accumulate as a function of training and 
experience, those changes would also be taken into account. Ferguson (1954) 
maintains that "as the learning of a particular task continues, the abi lity to 
perform it becomes gradually differentiated from, although not necessarily inde-
pendent of, other abilities which facilitate its differentiation [po 110]." Because 
existing abi lities, once developed, thus serve to facilitate the differentiation of 
other specific abi lities, the operation of positive transfer produces positive cor-
relations not only among tasks but among abilities . Thus, positive transfer fur-
nishes a simple rationale for the emergence of broader and broader higher-order 
abilities organizing the primary abilities. This suggests that individuals not only 
develop multiple abilities but organized ability structures as well. It also suggests 
that major gains in intellectual power may not come so much from the further 
honing of already well-developed specific abilities as from their organization into 
more general and widely applicable assemblies of integrated ability complexes. 
Furthermore, an important implication of Ferguson's (1954, 1956) line of 
argument is that consistent differential exposure to various task domains leads to 
differential learning and hence to the emergence of different ability patterns in 
different learn ing environments or different cultures (Irvine, 1969; Lesser, Fifer, 
& Clark, 1965; Stodolsky & Lesser, 1967). One might expect, however, that 
higher-order abi lities , if they indeed reflect general transfer components underly-
ing the mutual facilitation of several primary abilities, would tend to apply across 
a variety of task requirements. Hence, higher-order abilities should appear more 
similar from one cultural group to another than do the more specialized primary 
abilities (MacArthur, 1968; Vernon, 1969). 
Given different learning histories and different learning sty les, it seems likely 
that- although the same basic ability processes may be involved in many differ-
ent tasks- they may be strategically used more or less frequently in different 
tasks by different persons. Ability processes may also be organized and deployed 
in different ways for performing the same task, with attendant variation in 
effectiveness. This has led some investigators , such as Simon (1976) and Snow 
(l980b) , to emphasize the assembly and control funct ions of abilities and abi lity 
structures. 
For Gui lford as for Ferguson, transfer also plays a critical role in abi lity 
development. Guilford (1967) claims that' 'the brain is apparently predesigned 
to perform in five major ways [po 417]" corresponding to the five information-
processing operations of cognition or comprehension, memory, convergent pro-
duction, divergent production, and evaluation that comprise the heart of his 
factorial model of the structure of intellect. Specific intellectual abilities develop 
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through the repeated use of these five operations to process information in the 
individual's environment, which Guilford's extensive empirical investigations 
suggest is so structured as to contain 24 types of information generated by the 
cross-classification of four types of content (figural, symbolic, semantic, behav-
ioral) and six types of form or product (units , classes , relations , systems, trans-
formations, implications). 
In Gui lford 's (1967) view , these specific abilities are generali zed ski lls or 
habits that develop through transfer effects occurring by virtue of similarities in 
the task-to-task activities of a particular operation-content- product type. How 
well any specific ability develops depends on how much and how effectively the 
individual exercises the requisite operation in relation to the particular con-
tent- product combination. This in turn depends on the opportunities the person's 
environment offers to operate on such combinations and the individual's needs to 
cope with those offerings . Because tasks within the same operation- content-
product category are more simi lar in shared activities than those in different 
categories, a specific ability should eventually develop via transfer for every cell 
of the operation by content by product cross-classification . This would yield the 
120 abilities in Guilford's structure of intellect. Moreover, because simi larities in 
shared activities may cut across content- product differences for a given opera-
tion such as memory or across operation- product differences for a given content 
such as figura l, higher-order abilities such as general memory facility or general 
figural facility may also emerge (Guilford, 1981 ; Messick , 1973). 
Cattell 's ( 1971) theory of ability development is especiall y pertinent to issues 
of educational achievement because he explicitly stresses not only the role of 
transfer processes in development but the transfer power of developed abi lities in 
task performance. Originating in the investment of innate fluid intelligence in the 
learning of particular tasks or task domains, specific task ski ll s become inte-
grated into primary abi lities that cut across simi lar or related tasks. That is , 
because of an inherent simi larity in the required activities in a particular domain , 
a unity of functioning develops--or in Cattell's (1971) words , "a coherent set of 
habit ski lls, know ledge, conceptual developments, and tactical and strategic 
' know how ' [p o 319]," These primary abi lities, which Cattell calls "agencies," 
become organized through their mutually facilitative transfer effects and shared 
investments of fluid intelligence into higher-order abilities. 
Catte ll (197 1) gives major emphas is to those primary ab ilities derived from 
the learning of judgmental sk ill s associated with the more abstract parts of school 
curricula and nonschool experiences, such as verbal ability and numerical abi lity. 
In the course of education and experience , these judgmental skill s become orga-
nized into a broad higher-order abi lity complex, which Cattell call s crysta lli zed 
intelligence . Other higher-order abi lities include general memory , general visu-
alization, and general retrieva l or fluency. In underscoring the increasing transfer 
power of primary abilities and higher-order abilities, Cattell (1971) likens a 
specific transferable sk ill to a " tool ," by which he means "some insightful 
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device in thinking and acting which , once picked up, enables the user to handle a 
whole group of further performances [p o 316]." He conceives of an agency or 
primary ability as a "whole tool box of cognitively consistent habits [p o 321]," 
which would make crystallized intelligence a veritable workshop of transferable 
structures of ability processes. For Cattell, crystallized intelligence comprises 
highly general abstractions that possess wider transfer effects than those of any of 
the agencies and hence displays a broad generality of useful application. 
From Cattell's (1971) description of abilities as organized complexes of trans-
ferable concepts and skills and from Guilford's (1967) formulation of abilities in 
terms of information-processing operations, it seems clear that abilities in this 
factor-analytic tradition may be conceptualized as process structures, to use 
Carroll's (1974) term, or as stable constellations of psychological processes. 
This usage is consistent with information-processing formulations in cognitive 
psychology, as exemplified by Snow's (I 980b ) conception of abilities as struc-
tures of assembly and control processes as well as performance processes and by 
Sternberg'S (1977) treatment of intellective abilities in terms of both structure 
and process. On the one hand , Sternberg characterizes abilities as task proficien-
cies- specifically, as particular constellations of information-processing compo-
nents that satisfy the requirements of a given task or type of task. On the other 
hand, he also views abilities as dimensions of individual differences- specifical-
Iy, as generalized constellations of information-processing components that form 
stable patterns of individual differences across multiple tasks or types of tasks . 
The critical concept bridging these two notions is that abilities are stable 
consistencies within individuals (across variations in setting, time, and task) that 
reliably differentiate among individuals (Messick , 1982a). The intraindividual 
pattern of abilities for a particular student is the ability structure of concern in 
educational achievement. This mayor may not include all the ability dimensions, 
or interrelate them in the same way, as in interindividual structures of between-
person differences. Nevertheless, research on the structure of individual dif-
ferences does provide many of the dimensions and associated ability measures 
for characterizing and assessing individual structures (Burt, 1949; Cattell, 1971; 
Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976, 1979; Guilford , 1967; Hakstian & Cattell , 
1974) . 
Moreover, because abilities in this view are constellations of information-
processing components operative either in a particular task or stably across 
multiple tasks , they in turn may serve as components or organizers of still more 
complex or temporally extended sequential processes, such as problem solving 
or creative production (Guilford, 1967; Messick , 1972, 1973) . Thus, functioning 
much like subroutines or prior assemblies in computer terms , abilities not only 
facilitate performance on specific tasks and enhance the learning of new tasks but 
may also serve as operational modules in higher-order psychological processes. 
Overall , then, a person's developed ability structure is conceptuali zed here as a 
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multidimensional organization of stable assemblies of information-processing 
components that are combined funct ionally in task performance, learning, prob-
lem solving, and creative production (Messick , 1972, 1973 , 1982a) . 
In educational achievement, abilities and ability structure are engaged with 
knowledge structure in the performance of subject-area tasks. Abilities and 
knowledge combine in ways guided by and consistent with knowledge structure 
to form patterned complexes that may differ by subject area, so that problem 
solving in physics, for example, appears different from problem solving in 
biology or in political sc ience. Furthermore, as expertise develops these abil-
ity- knowledge complexes may become markedly , even qualitatively, different 
by area. Thus, abilities are not revealed directly in educational achievtlrnent 
testing but rather are entai led in ability- knowledge combinations. Yet they do 
operate in achievement conjointly with knowledge, and hence ability tests and 
achievement tests will overlap considerably and correlate substantially---except 
possibly, as indicated earlier, in low-level achievement testing that primarily 
stresses information retrieval and first-order relations. Moreover, because the 
engagement of abilities is extensive and complex in high-level achievement, it 
would not be surprising to find quite high correlations at advanced achievement 
levels. For example, in a Graduate Record Examinations rescaling study, when 
19 advanced subject-matter tests were correlated with a combination of verbal 
and quantitative abilities, six coefficients were between .71 and .81, whereas 
nine were between .60 and .70 (Wallmark , 1969). 
Still, cognitive ab ilities are not the same as subject-matter achievement, even 
those representing generalized school-related learnings such as crystal lized intel -
ligence. Indeed, for many educational purposes it is important to assess them 
separately . That is, a person may fail in subject-area task performance because of 
inadequate knowledge (especially strategic knowledge), dysfunctional knowl -
edge structure , ineffective mobilization or organization of a complex of relevant 
abilities, or deficiencies in anyone of these abilities. Achievement tests tap all of 
these in concert and although they may often effectively separate knowledge 
retrieval from knowledge use, they do not provide independent assessments of 
cognitive abilities . Thus, the coordinate measurement of cognitive abilities as 
well as subject-matter achievement may contribute to the comprehensive diag-
nosis of academic difficulties. 
Cognitive abilities are independent of subject matter but they are by no means 
content-free; rather, they cut across content areas. In some instances , they may 
be specialized by type of content such as verbal , numerical, or figura l, but at 
higher orders they represent more general functions such as memory or fluency . 
The route taken to arrive at this point may have appeared to be circuitous, but it 
was a deliberate attempt to forge an explicit link between concern over the role of 
cognitive abilities in achievement testing and 50 years of factor-ana lytic work on 
the delineation and measurement of abilities. 
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Contrasting Views of Knowledge Versus Ability in 
Achievement Testing 
This view of educational achievement as a compound of developed ability and 
knowledge structures shares some important features with other conceptions of 
achievement but also entails some critical differences in substance and emphasis. 
As an instance, Ebel (1969, this volume) maintains that' 'the essence of achieve-
ment is command of useful verbal knowledge [1969, p . 66]." Ebel (1974, 1982) 
makes it clear that he is speaking not merely about amount of knowledge or 
information but about knowledge structure-that is, about the "structure of 
relationships among concepts, a structure built out of information by processes of 
thought [1974 , p. 3171." But he limits this structure specifically to verbal knowl-
edge, whereas the present formulation admits any form of knowledge, whether 
verbal or visuospatial or whatever. Ebel (1969, 1982) also stresses the usefulness 
of the knowledge, with the implication that useful knowledge is what gets built 
into the knowledge structure whereas useless knowledge is soon forgotten. In 
contrast, the present formulation stresses the usefulness of the knowledge struc-
ture as a functional system in thinking. However, the critical difference between 
Ebel's view and the present one is his explicit exclusion of general cognitive 
abi lities except for knowledge-dependent, area-specific ski lls such as adding 
fractions or formulating sentences (Ebel, 1969, 1974). This is puzzling in light of 
Ebel's insistence that achievement is the command of knowledge because, as 
Snow (l980a) has underscored, "'command' implies organization, generaliza-
tion, faci le adaptation and application of knowledge in new contexts; that is 
what, I contend, general mental abilities are! [po 43]." 
In contrast to Ebel' s exclusion of developed cognitive abi lities from achieve-
ment, Anastasi (1976, 1980, this volume) subsumes achievement under the 
rubric of developed abilities. She refers to a continuum of tests of developed 
abilities that vary in their degree of experiential specificity . Included along with 
"culture-fair" tests, tests of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, and tests of 
differentiated cognitive abilities are course-oriented achievement tests of techni-
cal skills and factual knowledge as well as broadly oriented achievement tests of 
major long-term educational goals such as the interpretation of literature or the 
understanding and application of scientific principles (Anastasi, 1976). 
The differentiation among educational and psychological tests in terms of 
experiential specificity is a helpful one, and the implication that these tests" fuse 
imperceptibly" with one another is an important caveat against misuse. For 
example, some tests designed to assess subject-matter achievement so stress the 
application of learned skills to the solution of new problems in the area that they 
appear to measure general reasoning and other cognitive ab ilities fairly indepen-
dent of factual content; whereas some other tests designed to assess general 
scholastic abi lity draw free ly on varieties of specific word knowledge and arith-
metic principles learned in school. However, the subtle implication that because 
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existing tests overlap markedly or are misa ligned with the ir constructs, therefore 
the construct distinctions are unimportant- that " the terms intelligence, apti-
tudes. abilities. and achievements are indeed different words for essentially the 
same human characteristics lEbel, 1980, p. II) "-{!oes not fo llow at all and is 
insidious in its impact on new measurement efforts. What is needed is not a 
downplaying and blurring of the construct distinctions but , rather , attempts to 
illuminate these distinctions in refined measures of knowledge structures, of 
cognitive abilities as process structures, and of ability- knowledge complexes in 
problem representation and solution . 
EXPERTISE AND APTITUDE 
It should be noted that the present conception of educational achievement is not 
tied to program or course objectives. Educational achievment in thi s view refers 
to what a person knows and can do in a subject area, not just the degree to which 
the person knows and can do what was taught. Such a narrowing of purview can 
of course be imposed and for some uses of achievement tests, such as the 
certification of curriculum mastery or the evaluation of program or course effec-
tiveness, probably should be imposed . Even here, however, one should not 
automatically preclude the assess ment of generalization and transfer in the for-
mer instance or of potential side effects in the latter. The po int is that for other 
uses of achievement tests-such as the diagnosis of academic strengths and 
weaknesses as a basis for remediation or for adaptive instruction and the predic-
tion of future attainment as a basis for selection , placement , or assignment to 
alternative treatments- the broader view may offer added value. Some examples 
of thi s added value come from a consideration of the differences between begin-
ning and experienced learners in a fi eld and between novices and experts. 
Assessing What Is Learned, Not On ly What Is Taught 
As we have seen , when students learn something spec ific, they usually also learn 
something general; that is , they tend to educe general attributes from spec ific 
instances and evolve general structures for representing and understanding new 
spec ifics. For beginning students in a fie ld , these rudimentary knowledge struc-
tures tend to be idiosyncratic , because new information is assimi lated to the 
student 's intuitions about the subject derived from everyday experiences . These 
structures or informal theories are also frequently fragmented or overextended or 
misaligned with reality . In some instances, these informal theories are simply 
vague and poorly articu lated vers ions of acceptable structures, requiring the 
progressive differentiation and reintegration of already ex isting ideas with new 
knowledge (Ausubel, 1968). In other instances, however, the student' s informal 
notions may be seriously at variance with formal theories or accepted structures, 
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in which case they constitute what Driver has called "alternative frameworks " 
(Driver, 1981 , 1982; Driver & Easley, 1978). These alternative frameworks, 
being based on student's intuitions , tend to be quite persistently embraced and 
are frequently resistant to change through instruction . 
A number of common alternative frameworks have been uncovered in science 
education in particular. For example, some beginning biology students evince a 
persistent tendency to think in Lamarckian terms (Deadman & Kelly , 1978) and 
some believe, despite instruction on photosynthesis to the contrary, that plant 
"food" comes exclusively from the ground (Driver, 1982). Some beginning 
physics students have been found adhering to non-Newtonian ideas about motion 
and to notions of impetus reminiscent of pre-Galilean dynamics (Viennot, 1979) . 
It appears that intuitions are not readily abandoned and, in particular, that scien-
tific principles that are counter-intuitive are not easily assimilated. If conceptual 
learning entai ls such radical restructurings of ideas , it is not enough to assess for 
diagnostic purposes whether or not the student knows what was taught--one 
must also assess what else the student "knows" or believes about the subject. 
A simi lar point holds for the assessment of expert- level achievement but for a 
different reason : namely , much of what is learned in the development of exper-
tise, we do not know how to teach . However, from a convergence of recent 
studies we have begun to characterize, albeit tentatively , some of the complex-
ities of developed knowledge and ability structures that constitute the power of 
expertise (Chi, Feltovitch , & Glaser, 1981; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; 
Glaser, 1981; Hunter, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a, 
1980b; Rigney, 1980; Simon, 1976). Hence , we may be able to approach the 
assessment of expertise in terms of these outcomes of learning and development, 
which are beginning to become clear , rather than in terms of the objectives of 
teaching, which in the case of expert ise continue to be vague and ill-defined. 
It appears from this recent work that not only do experts know more than 
novices or have a vastly richer store of relevant knowledge in long-term memory, 
they also structure and continually restructure knowledge in more complex ways. 
In particular , experts construct complex schemas that combine some of the 
dimensions and simpler schemas used by novices into integrated funct ional pat-
terns, while at the same time discarding as redundant or irrelevant some other 
dimensions that novices attend to. Experts also develop new patterns of perceiv-
ing, thinking, and acting or what Ian Hunter (\ 982) calls "adroitly usable pat-
terned complexes." These complex abilities to perceive and apply both patterned 
relational schemas and the attendant action sequences strongly influence the 
nature of problem representations, the avoidance of irrelevancies, and the organi-
zation of performance and solution processes . Experts also develop greater speed 
and fluency of performance, implying in addition to the restructuring already 
mentioned a continual tuning of processes, the automatization of routines and 
control processes, and the shedding of redundant processes (Rumelhart & Nor-
man, 1976) . Furthermore, in contrast to novices , experts appear more capable of 
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flexible restructuring for the application of multiple perspectives to problem 
representation and solution as well as for the adjustment or replacement of 
dysfunctional initial schemas as hypotheses change. 
In addition to providing possible guidelines for the assessment of expertise, 
these findings suggest that not only do abilities facilitate the development of 
more complex abilities but so do rich and extensive knowledge structures. Thus, 
developed abilities influence the structuring and restructuring of knowledge 
whereas developed knowledge structures influence the organization and applica-
tion of abilities, leading to increasingly more complex structures of each. Al-
though the "adroitly usable patterned complexes" of ability developed by ex-
perts are inherently knowledge-dependent, some of their structural and 
functional aspects may be generalizable to the learning of other fields. For 
example, when an expert in one field attempts to learn a different subject matter, 
he or she may be more able than the ordinary novice to discern the deep structure 
of the new field, to ignore irrelevancies, and to perceive the patterned relation-
ships entailed in constructing complex schemas, even though a massive store of 
knowledge in the fi eld has not yet been acquired. If this is possible, then what we 
should mean by a generalist is not a jack-of-all trades and a master of none , but a 
jack-of-all-trades and a master of one or, preferably, two. Thus, expertise in one 
field may be aptitude for the functional mastery of another. 
Aptitudes as Facilitators and Forecasters of 
Performance 
This brings us to the construct of aptitude which , according to Snow (I 980a) , 
refers to " psychological characteristics that predispose and thus predict dif-
ferences in later learning under specified instructional conditions [p o 4 1] ." 
Again , at the outset I want to make clear that there is no necessary implication of 
innateness in this use of the term. This conception comprises two distinct but 
closely related notions of aptitude- namely , aptitude as a forecaster of learning 
or performance and aptitude as a facilitator of learning or performance (Cronbach 
& Snow, 1977) . Although the applied emphasis may be on predictiveness per se, 
the scientific emphas is-in such psychoeducational research as the study of 
aptitude-treatment interactions-is mainly on illuminating the facilitating pro-
cesses that underlie the prediction (Snow, 1980a). This may lead not only to 
better prediction but to better and more responsible use of the predictive findings . 
A compatible conception of aptitude as learning rate is also current (Carroll, 
1963; Green, 1974), but again the primary concern is with the process structures 
that underlie differences in rate (Carroll, 1974) . 
Considerable confusion arises when aptitUde tests as predictors are contrasted 
with achievement tests as measures. because achievement in a subject-matter 
area happens frequently to be quite predictive of subsequent performance in the 
same field. Subject-matter achievement is also often predictive of performance in 
168 MESSICK 
related fi elds, although somewhat less so , whereas measures of general ability 
complexes such as tests of scholastic abili ty or of crystalli zed intelligence tend to 
be more widely predictive across disparate fi elds. Furthermore, the distinction 
between developed abilities and developed knowledge structures cuts across this 
aptitude-achievement contrast , as does Anastasi's (1 976) continuum of experi-
enti al specificity and Snow 's (l 980a) pyramid of referent generality . The latter, 
consistent with the present formulation , illustrates why ability and achievement 
constructs are more readily di stingui shable both conceptually and empirically at 
more spec ific than more general levels. 
Apti tudes may be spec ific or general and so may achievements, developed 
abilities, or knowledge structures. Developed abilities and knowledge structures, 
being evolved through education and experience, are both achievements, to be 
sure . Yet they are also predictive of subsequent learning and performance, more 
broadly in the case of abilities and in more focused fashion in the case of 
knowledge structures, thereby qualifying as aptitudes as well. But the predictive 
developed ability is not the same as the subsequent performance, nor is it a 
measure of that performance . Similarly , current achievement that predicts future 
achievement is not a measure o f that later achievement. 
This confusion between prediction and measurement has led some investiga-
tors to argue that aptitudes, abilities, and achievements are " essentially the same 
human characteri stics [Ebel, 1980 , p. II) " and that aptitude, ability , and 
achievement tests are " fundamentall y similar" in what they measure (Anastas i, 
1980) . The point may be well taken in regard to many existing tests. But as 
Carroll (1 974) has pointed out , " with a definition of aptitude that identifies it 
with the present state of the individual as symptomatic of future performance, it 
is difficult to see why there should be any great difficulty in distinguishing 
between aptitude and achievement as concepts [p o 287) ." Similarly , in spite of 
high corre lations between tests of educational achievement and tests of devel-
oped cognitive abilities but in light of their differenti al responsiveness to direct 
instruction , their differential involvement in aptitude-treatment interactions, their 
different courses of development , and differences in their process and content 
components, it is difficult to see why there should be any great problem in 
di stingui shing between educational achievement and cognitive abilities as 
constructs. 
TH E FAILINGS OF FALLACIES 
We have been alerted to the jingle fallacy , whereby tests purported to measure 
the same construct are naively taken to measure the same thing, and , to the 
jangle fall acy , whereby tests purported to measure different constructs are na-
ive ly taken to measure different things (Kelley , 1927) . We now find that if tests 
purported to measure different constructs correlate highly with each other , the 
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constructs are taken to be the same thing . This might be called the jingle- jangle 
fallacy , because convergent correlational evidence , which would support jingles , 
is taken as tantamount to the absence of discriminant experimental evidence, 
which would support jangles . However, I prefer to call it the jungle fallacy 
because , by failing to maintain the distinction between constructs and their 
indicants or measures, we are in danger of reverting to the jungle of operation ism 
whereby test meaning resides in each investigator's measurement operations 
rather than in validated relational or nomological networks. 
What is needed now is what has always been needed- namely , not just the 
empirical buttressing of constructs inferred from existing measures but the devel-
opment and validation of measures attuned to constructs, especially as constructs 
evolve or change with conceptualizations of new evidence. In educational theory 
and practice today, we must recogn ize, to use Glaser's (1980) words , that "the 
study of learning appears to be taking on the characteristics of a developmental 
psychology of performance changes- the study of changes that occur as different 
knowledge structures and complex cognitive strategies are acquired, and the 
study of conditions that affect these transitions in competence [po 322]." Ac-
cordingly , in educational measurement today, we must recognize, to use Snow's 
(l980a) words, that " achievement constructs refer to complex dynamic cogni-
tive structures [p o 44] ." Hence, to better serve both theory and practice, new 
approaches to achievement measurement should be more complex, dynamic , and 
cognitive . 
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